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Abstract 
 
This thesis conducts a conceptual analysis of the proportionality of non-consensual 
adoptions in England and Wales. It does so by examining the English legislation and case 
law on adoption and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
This thesis considers and applies rights from the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) to 
determine when non-consensual adoption may be regarded as a necessary and 
proportionate interference with children’s and parents’ rights. 
The proportionality principle requires the domestic courts and the ECtHR to strike a 
balance between the various rights and interests of children and parents while taking into 
account children’s welfare. The final strand of the proportionality principle identifies 
whether the State measure is the least restrictive measure available to satisfy the State’s 
objective. This strand is not applied in all non-consensual adoption cases heard by the 
domestic courts or the ECtHR. However, this thesis argues it is essential to identify 
whether less restrictive alternatives exist as these measures may prove equally effective in 
protecting children’s welfare when compared with adoption, and may also protect 
children’s and parents’ rights. 
This thesis makes a conceptual contribution to the academic scholarship on non-
consensual adoption law by identifying how the UNCRC, the ECHR, the best interests 
principle and ECtHR jurisprudence can be applied so as to provide optimal protection for 
children’s and parents’ rights in adoption cases. This thesis concludes that judicial 
reasoning in the courts should routinely consider UNCRC rights and the effectiveness of 
less restrictive alternatives. Furthermore, it argues that there is a positive obligation under 
ECHR Article 8 to provide State assistance in circumstances where children can safely be 
raised by their parents, which is not yet recognised in English case law.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
A picture is worth a thousand words. In a well-publicised YouTube video,
1
 which later 
gave rise to the case of Re J (A Child),
2
 a social worker can be seen forcibly removing a 
baby from the crying mother’s arms. The video is highly emotive and disturbing, and yet 
it is just one example of many troubling stories on non-consensual adoption. Such stories 
can be found on different news websites including the BBC,
3
 The Telegraph,
4
 The 
Guardian,
5
 The Daily Mail
6
 and various blogs.
7
 Television documentaries,
8
 online 
petitions
9
 and freedom of information requests
10
 have been made. Furthermore, non-
governmental organisations
11
 and high profile figures such as John Hemming MP
12
 and 
                                                          
1
 Harrowing. Six-hour-old baby day taken away by Social Services. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOZPsSuINco 
2
 [2013] EWHC 2694 (Fam). 
3
 ‘MP claims 1,000 children “wrongfully” adopted every year’ (13 December 2011) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16157124  
‘Rape victims children face ‘barbaric’ adoption’ (27 March 2014) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26768256  
‘Families flee UK to avoid forced adoption’ (6 October 2001) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29502832  
‘Adoption: Thousands of children forcibly taken into care’ (2 February 2015) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31089412  
4
 Christopher Booker, ‘Forced adoption is a truly dreadful scandal’ (The Telegraph, 3 July 2010) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/7870342/Forced-adoption-is-a-truly-
dreadful-scandal.html  
5
 Owen Bowcott, ‘Latvia complains to UK parliament over forced adoptions’ (The Guardian, 9 March 
2015) http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/09/latvia-complains-to-uk-parliament-over-forced-
adoptions. See for example a case which attracted media attention: CB (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 888. 
6
 Frances Hardy ‘Blood chilling scandal: of the thousands of children stolen by the State: Denise Robertson 
writes about her lengthy investigation’ (Daily Mail, 27 May 2015) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3098468/Blood-chilling-scandal-thousands-babies-stolen-State-
TV-agony-aunt-Denise-Robertson-s-spent-years-investigating-says-s-monstrous-injustice-age.html . Denise 
Robertson has written a fictional book, ‘Don’t Cry Aloud’ on what she states are based on real life 
situations she encountered, where parents had their children removed by the State.  
7
 https://punishmentwithoutcrime.wordpress.com/, http://suesspiciousminds.com/tag/forced-adoption/ 
8
 For example, the ITV series, ‘Don’t Take My child’ and Panorama ‘The Truth About Adoption.’  
9
 https://www.change.org/p/eu-parliament-abolish-adoptions-without-parental-consent 
10
 https://foi.brighton-hove.gov.uk/requests/3233 19 May 2014; http://www.lincolnshireecho.co.uk/Courts-
act-protect-133-risk-youngsters/story-11225063-detail/story.html 
11
 http://www.aims.org.uk/Journal/Vol21No2/childAbuse.htm; http://www.justice-for-families.org.uk/, 
http://www.fassit.co.uk/ian_joseph.htm . Ian Joseph has referred to this type of adoption as ‘forced’ 
adoption. This terminology is considered by Munby P in N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] 
EWCA Civ 1112 at para 8. It has been noted in Julie Doughty, ‘“Where nothing else will do”: Judicial 
approaches to adoption in England and Wales’ [2015] 39 Adoption and Fostering 105 at 107 that this 
terminology is derived from jurisdictions such as Spain and Australia where many adoptions took place 
without parental consent, in the past.   
12
 For overview of John Hemming’s concerns see: ‘MP claims 1,000 children ‘wrongly’ adopted every 
year’ (13 December, 2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16157124 ; Children first: the child 
protection system in England, Fourth Report of Session 2012-13, Volume II Q370-374.  
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Dr Peter Dale, a former NSPCC advisor,
13
 have voiced their concerns about how readily 
children may be taken into care
14
 and, in some cases, placed for adoption without the 
consent of their parents. The issue has also caught the attention of the Council of Europe, 
which has expressed concern about how existing legislation and practice on adoption in 
England and Wales may violate children’s rights.15 
 
The number of looked after children has increased steadily.
16
 In 2014, 30,430 children 
entered the care system.
17
 Of these children, 5,050 were placed for adoption and 76 per 
cent of these adopted children were aged between 1 and 4.
18
 The average age to be 
adopted is 3 years and 5 months, which is 6 months younger than in 2010 and the number 
of children who are reunited with their parents continues to fall, with there being a 
decrease of 24 per cent since 2010.
19
 The emphasis on adoption as a measure of 
permanence for children in care can be traced back to the Waterhouse Inquiry.  
 
In 2000, the Waterhouse Inquiry
20
 raised concerns about the poor social, emotional and 
educational long-term outcomes for children who remain in care.
21
 While parental neglect 
or abuse may predispose children to poor long-term outcomes,
22
 remaining in State care 
is, nonetheless, seen as detrimental to children’s well-being.23 Statistically, figures 
                                                          
13
 ‘Adoption: Thousands of children forcibly taken into care’ (2 February, 2015) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31089412 ; Dr Peter Dale, Contact Arrangements for Children: A Call for 
Views, (Department for Education, 2012) - http://www.peterdale.co.uk/downloads/ 
14
 Sometimes, a child may be accommodated as a ‘child in need’ under the Children Act 1989, s20 before a 
care order is made under the Children Act 1989, s31 and then an adoption order without parental consent 
under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s52(1)(b). This has been controversial. For example, see: N 
(Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] EWCA Civ 1112 and Julie Stather, ‘Is time running out for 
section 20 of the Children Act?’ (2014) http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed129019 
15
 Olga Borzova, Social services in Europe: legislation and practice of the removal of children from their 
families in Council of Europe member states (Council of Europe, 2015).  
16
 Department for Education, Children Looked After in England (including care leavers) year ending 31 
March 2014 (Department of Education, 2014). 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Lost in Care - Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Abuse of Children in Care in the Former County 
Council Areas of Gwynedd and Clwyd since 1974 (2000). See also: The Special Standing Committee on the 
Adoption and Children Bill, 29 November 2001 (afternoon).  
21
 It should be noted, however, that poor educational outcomes may be associated with pre-care experiences 
or pre-existing special educational needs rather than due to being in care, even though while in care, 
children’s problems may persist. See: Aoife O’Higgins, Judy Sebba and Nikki Luke, What is the 
relationship between being in care and the educational outcomes of children? An international systematic 
review (University of Oxford, 2015).  
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Moira Szilagyi, David Rosen, David Rubin and Sarah Zlotnk, ‘Health Care Issues for Children and 
Adolescents in Foster Care and Kinship Care’ [2015] 136 American Academy of Pediatrics 1131. 
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suggest that children in care are more likely to suffer from mental illness, to perform 
poorly at or fail their GCSEs
24
 and are more likely to go to prison than children outside of 
the care system.
25
 The high numbers of and poor outcomes for children in care considered 
in the Waterhouse Report sparked discussion on how law and policy reform could best 
tackle this social problem. Based on the positive social, emotional and educational 
outcomes for adopted children,
26
 adoption was seen by the Labour government as the best 
option for removing children from care and for improving their long-term outcomes in 
life.
27
  
 
It is apparent then that there is tension between the principles of non-intervention in 
family life on the one hand and child protection on the other,
28
 as removing a child into 
care and subsequently placing a child for adoption may potentially be a violation of 
parental rights under ECHR Article 8. State intervention into family life and the removal 
of a child into care can be justified on the basis of the child’s welfare. However, non-
consensual adoption is a severe and permanent form of intrusion into family life. It is 
important to consider when such intrusion may be necessary to protect the child’s right to 
life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR
29
), the right to 
freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under ECHR Article 3
30
 and, the 
child’s right to respect for private and family life under ECHR Article 8. These rights 
may, in some cases, be protected via non-consensual adoption but potentially there may 
be less restrictive alternatives available which may be equally effective.  
 
                                                          
24
 National examinations taken by children in England and Wales at the age of 16.  
25
 This is still the case today. See, for example:  Rachel Blades, Di Hart, Joanna Lea and Natasha Willmott, 
Care - A Stepping Stone to Custody? (Prison Reform Trust, 2011), p1. Government figures consistently 
demonstrate that more children in care commit criminal offences than children who are not in care. 
Children in Care in England Statistics, 13 August 2014. In the year ending March 2012, for example, 7 per 
cent of looked after children aged between 10-17 were subject to a conviction, final warning or reprimand 
compared with 2 per cent of all children. 
26
 Adoption: A New Approach (White Paper, 2000). For example, see: J. Castle, C. Beckett and C. 
Groothues, ‘Infant Adoption in England’ [2000] 24 Adoption and Fostering 26. See subsequent research 
which confirms the benefits of adoption: John Triseliotis, ‘Long-term foster care or adoption? The evidence 
examined’ [2002] 7 Child and Family Social Work 23; D. Quinton and J. Selwyn, ‘Adoption: Research, 
Policy and Practice’ [2006] CFLQ 459. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 See for example Re J (Children) [2013] UKSC 9 and the discussion of Brian Sloan in: ‘Re J – Uncertain 
Perpetrators in Child Protection Cases’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYhaxBanCts . More 
generally on clashes between rights and welfare (or wellbeing) see: E. Kay Tisdall, ‘Children’s Wellbeing 
and Children’s Rights in Tension?’ [2015] 23 International Journal of Children’s Rights 769.  
29
 Formally known as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
30
 In the Matter of J (Children) [2013] UKSC 9 at para 1, per Lady Hale (in relation to Article 3).  
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The ECHR is an important Convention which forms part of a substantial body of law on 
human rights in England and Wales and indeed in Europe.
31
 Judges, social workers and 
other professionals involved in deciding whether or not children ought to be placed into 
care and/or placed for adoption have an obligation to have regard to the Convention 
Rights of children and parents. The legal basis for this obligation is the Human Rights 
Act (HRA) 1998, s6(1) which states that: ‘It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a 
way which is incompatible with a Convention right’. Therefore, all bodies involved in the 
adoption decision-making process (such as the courts, Social Services and central 
government) must not act (or fail to act) in a manner which is incompatible with the 
ECHR.  
 
Under the HRA, s2(1)(a), the courts in England and Wales must ‘take into account’ 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Thus, it is important to 
consider European jurisprudence and the potential impact that it could have on the 
decision-making by the courts in England and Wales. It is also important to consider 
ECtHR judgments because the ECtHR adopts a different approach to decision-making. 
The impact of this is potentially a different case outcome when the Court considers 
arguments before it that parents’ ECHR Article 832 rights have been violated. However, 
as the ECHR does not expressly refer to children’s rights,33 it is desirable also to examine 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which is the main 
international treaty on children’s rights. It has been ratified by the UK and is a persuasive 
authority in both the ECtHR and the English courts. Thus, its general principles provide a 
relevant framework for discussing and assessing the circumstances in which non-
consensual adoption may be a necessary and proportionate measure.  
 
This thesis seeks to establish, by reference to the proportionality principle, whether the 
existing law on non-consensual adoption in England and Wales appropriately balances 
the competing interests of children and their parents. In particular, this includes the need 
to balance the public’s interest in protecting children from being subjected to neglect 
                                                          
31
 Most of the provisions of the ECHR are incorporated into English Law through the Human Rights Act 
1998.  
32
 Claire Simmonds ‘Paramountcy and the ECHR: A Conflict Resolved?’ [2012] 71 CLJ 448. 
33
 Ursula Kilkelly, ‘The Best of Both Worlds for Children’s Rights?’ Interpreting the European Convention 
on Human Rights in the Light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ [2001] 21 HRQ 308 at 
311. The exception to this is a brief reference to the interests of ‘juveniles’ under Article 6(1) of the ECHR, 
on the right to a fair hearing.   
10 
 
and/or abuse by their parents with the rights of children and birth parents’ mutual rights 
to live together and/or to develop and maintain relationships with one another. These are 
important rights which are protected under ECHR Article 8 (the right to respect for 
private and family life) and under the UNCRC. It is essential to explore what is meant by 
‘non-consensual adoption’ and ‘proportionality’ as well as the relationship between the 
concepts (see below).  
1.2 Non-Consensual Adoption and Proportionality 
The legal definition of adoption in the law of England and Wales is found in the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002, s67(1)-(3) which provides that an adopted child is regarded as the 
‘legitimate child of the adopter or adopters’ and the effect of an adoption order is to 
extinguish the parental responsibility of the birth parents. Under the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002, children may be placed for adoption with or without parental consent. 
The statute provides that the Court can make an adoption order without parental consent 
if ‘the parent or guardian cannot be found or is incapable of giving consent’ (see 
s52(1)(a)) or ‘the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with’ (see 
s52(1)(b))’.  
The term ‘non-consensual’ adoption is used within this thesis to reflect the fact that 
parental consent can be dispensed with by the courts in England and Wales and that there 
is no requirement to take into account the question of whether or not the child consents to 
the adoption. In private law proceedings the Court is required to consider the wishes of 
the child and will afford significant weight to the child’s wishes (under the Children Act 
1989) if he or she is regarded as ‘Gillick’34 competent (i.e. has sufficient intelligence and 
understanding to be able to make his or her own decisions). However, there is no 
requirement that children need to be consulted about let alone need to consent to 
adoption. Non-consensual adoption refers then, to adoptions which have taken place 
without the agreement of birth parents and children.  
Non-consensual adoption is contentious
35
 because it can clash with fundamental human 
rights since it brings an end to children’s and parents’ legal, and potentially, factual 
relationships with one another. Adoption orders are typically irrevocable so as to avoid 
                                                          
34
 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112. 
35
 Michelle Donnelly, ‘The Supreme Court and the welfare ground for dispensing with parental consent to 
adoption: ANS and another v ML (Scotland)’ [2014] IFLJ 110. 
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uncertainty for the prospective adopter(s) and the child.
36
 Adoption orders have, however, 
been revoked
37
 in rare cases based on grounds such as the fact that consent to the 
adoption was based on a fundamental mistake
38
 or that the adoption procedure was 
contrary to natural justice.
39
 The general principle in English Law is that the social 
significance of adoption orders and the protection that adoption provides to adopted 
children and their adoptive parents is an important reason for not revoking adoption 
orders.
40
   
 
A significant case where the Court of Appeal refused to revoke non-consensual adoptions 
of three children is Webster and another v. Norfolk County Council and others.
41
 This 
case was the subject of significant media attention
42
 and sparked academic scrutiny of 
adoption law because three children were adopted within less than 19 months of being 
taken into care and, under the circumstances, the outcome was regarded to be unjust for 
the parents.
43
 In this case, Norfolk Social Services determined that the birth parents were 
responsible for the bone fractures which the Websters’ youngest child, a boy, had 
sustained. As a consequence, Social Services applied for care orders
44
 in respect of all 
three of the couple’s children because their other children were also regarded to be at risk 
of harm. The judge granted care orders in relation to the children in May 2004 and freed 
them for adoption under the Adoption Act 1976. Subsequently, the children were placed 
with prospective adopters and were adopted in December 2005, after the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002 came into force. The adoption orders were made under the ACA 2002 
s52(1)(b) and parental consent was dispensed with on the basis of the children’s welfare.  
 
                                                          
36
 See discussion in: Webster and another v. Norfolk County Council and others [2009] EWCA Civ 59. 
37
 In Re B [1995] 3 FCR 671, for example, on the basis of his ethnic heritage a young man wished to have 
an adoption order made when he was a baby, to be set aside. The court refused to do this, believing that it 
would be damaging to the life-long commitment of adoptive parents if they knew the adoption orders could 
be set aside. 
38
 Re M (A Minor) (Adoption) [1991] 1 FLR 458. 
39
 Re K (Adoption and Wardship) [1997] 2 FLR 221. 
40
 Webster and another v. Norfolk County Council and others [2009] EWCA Civ 59. 
41
 [2009] EWCA Civ 59. 
42
 Caroline Gammell, ‘Adoption stands despite possible miscarriage of justice’ (The Telegraph, 11 
February, 2009) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/4592069/Adoption-stands-
despite-possible-miscarriage-of-justice.html ; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/norfolk/7885047.stm (12 
February 2009), http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/court-of-appeal-refuses-to-revoke-
adoption-orders#.VXMb9btFCW8 (12 February 2009). 
43
 J Herring, ‘Revoking Adoptions’ [2009] 159 NLJ 377; Andrew Bainham, ‘The Peculiar Finality of 
Adoption’ [2009] 68 CLJ 283. 
44
 The Children Act 1989, s31(2).  
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The parents, Mr and Mrs Webster, were later cleared of any wrong-doing due to expert 
medical evidence put before the Court, which suggested that the child suffered from a 
rare vitamin C deficiency known as ‘scurvy’.45 Their legal counsel presented an argument 
to the Court of Appeal that the finding amounted to exceptional circumstances which 
justified setting the adoption order aside. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the 
parents had suffered an injustice but nonetheless rejected the Websters’ appeal. The Court 
unanimously held that to reverse the adoption orders would run counter to the best 
interests of the children who had been settled with their adoptive parents for four years by 
the time of the appeal. Although Wall LJ acknowledged that ‘on the face of it, a clear 
breach of their rights to respect for their family life under Article 8(1)’46 had occurred, he 
found that ‘the European authorities do not assist Mr and Mrs Webster’.47 The decision in 
Webster has been criticised by several academic commentators.
48
 Herring, for example, 
suggested that the outcome of the case was ‘possibly a manifest injustice’49 because the 
parents lost legal ties and the opportunity to maintain relationships with their children, 
despite the fact that they had not abused them. Similarly, Bainham described Webster as a 
‘profoundly disturbing case’.50  
 
A particular concern raised by leading judges in subsequent Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court cases is that, in some circumstances, adoption orders may have been 
made by the lower courts
51
 despite the availability of less restrictive alternatives to non-
consensual adoption. Sir James Munby, the President of the Family Division of the High 
Court opined in Re B-S (Children)
52
 that non-consensual adoption may not always be a 
proportionate measure and has emphasised that adoption should be regarded as a ‘last 
resort’.53 Furthermore, Lady Hale, dissenting in the decision of In the Matter of B (a 
                                                          
45
 A rare condition which may occur if a person does not have enough Vitamin C in his or her diet.  
46
 Webster and another v. Norfolk County Council and others [2009] EWCA Civ 59 at para 2, per Wall LJ.  
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the Child’ 25 [2013] CFLQ 40; Kirsty Hughes and Brian Sloan, ‘Post-Adoption Photographs: Welfare, 
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child)
54
 on appeal to the Supreme Court, stated that non-consensual adoption was not 
proportionate unless it could be shown that adoption was the only way to protect a child 
and that less restrictive measures of State assistance would not suffice.
55
 It has been 
observed by Munby P, that adoption orders have been made in cases when other less 
restrictive options may have been available;
56
 and that, where possible, less restrictive 
measures should be used. It can be suggested then, that an important principle which 
underpins this type of decision-making is the proportionality principle.  
 
Proportionality is a legal principle or methodological tool
57
 which enables competing 
interests to be balanced. Judges can apply the principle of proportionality to decide 
whether a measure is necessary in order to satisfy a legitimate objective. Proportionality 
means that a State measure taken in pursuit of a legitimate objective must be 
commensurate to that objective. The concept of proportionality helps to determine the 
relationship between the aims and the means or the proper relationship between the 
constitutional right(s) affected and the means used to achieve the State’s purpose.58 
Proportionality means, then, that the measure ought to strike an appropriate balance 
between the different interests at stake. In adoption cases, this means that the decision-
maker ought to take into account the interests of children and parents and balance these 
(potentially) competing interests and the public interest in child protection. This thesis 
therefore aims to explore and assess whether or not the law of adoption in England and 
Wales strikes the correct balance in examining the rights and interests of children and the 
rights of birth parents in non-consensual adoption cases.  
1.3 Non-Consensual Adoption: A Brief Overview of Relevant Literature 
There is a considerable body of academic, governmental and judicial commentary as well 
as media criticism of the current law
59
 on non-consensual adoption in England and Wales. 
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The Adoption and Children Act 2002, s52(1)(b) provides for adoption orders to be made 
without parental consent, on the basis of the child’s ‘welfare’.60 This statutory provision 
raises difficult issues such as whether or not the rights of birth parents are given sufficient 
weight and consideration in adoption proceedings, whether consideration is given to 
children’s rights and how the rights of children and parents may be reconciled with 
children’s best interests. Some academics, such as Bainham have argued that there has 
been a tendency to deny that parents have rights in general;
61
 but this argument has the 
most relevance in adoption cases where there has been deliberate minimisation of 
parental interests and rights in the context of adoption.
62
 Harris-Short has observed that 
many people may regard what she considers to be sacrificing the rights of parents as 
being justified in order to ensure that children leave the care system faster.
63
 She has 
acknowledged that the parents’ behaviour and the reasons for taking their children into 
care and placing them for adoption may not warrant sympathy. Harris-Short nonetheless 
argues that the present adoption system sees parents being unnecessarily ‘demonised’ and 
‘marginalised’ in the adoption process.64  
 
Sloan, for example, has been critical of the fact that parents’ ECHR Article 8 rights are 
not given independent consideration as adoption is such a severe measure that it has the 
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potential to violate parental rights.
65
 This thesis will consider whether it is necessary for 
independent consideration to be given to parental rights in adoption cases and will 
consider what this analysis might look like. This thesis will also consider whether the 
emphasis on speeding up the process of adoption means that, in some cases, non-
consensual adoption orders are being made where a less restrictive but equally effective 
alternative might have been available.  
 
There have been no in-depth studies which have compared the law in England and Wales 
with the jurisprudence in the ECtHR, and which have considered whether or not the 
proportionality analysis undertaken by the courts ought to involve an assessment of 
whether less restrictive alternatives than adoption were available. Bainham, for example, 
has argued that human rights ‘militate against’ adoption and favour a less drastic 
measure, which might preserve kinship links and contacts.
66
 More recently, Donnelly has 
pointed out that there are increasing calls for adoptions not to take place unless there are 
no equally effective measures available which will protect a child’s welfare.67  
 
This thesis provides a strong basis to argue that a proportionality analysis (particularly in 
adoption cases) ought to routinely consider whether or not less restrictive alternatives 
may be available to non-consensual adoption. It is argued that this is the best approach 
towards analysing the potentially conflicting rights of children and parents and best 
interests of children, because it protects children’s welfare and rights while 
simultaneously respecting parental rights.  
 
In general, there has been a great deal of criticism about the lack of protection afforded to 
parental rights. However, while there has been increasing examination of children’s rights 
in a range of different contexts,
68
 there has been limited discussion on the minimal 
consideration of children’s rights in adoption cases, including the child’s right to have 
and continue to develop a relationship with his or her parents and the right to have a say 
in the adoption process. Harris has suggested that the alleged conflict between the welfare 
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principles in Adoption and Children Act 2002 and Children Act 1989 and ECHR Article 
8 exists because judges do not distinguish between the different legal purposes and 
character. He has argued that Article 8 provides important protection for families in that it 
acts as an ‘overarching constitutional provision’69 which prevents the State from 
interfering disproportionately in the private and family life of individuals.  
 
He argues that Article 8 has the purpose of determining which orders are available in law 
and which orders may be proportionate, but not which order should be made. The purpose 
of the welfare principle, however, is not to provide protection of rights but to dictate 
which order, if any, to make. He therefore proposes that Article 8 and the welfare 
principle can be used as part of a two-stage process. The first step of the court ought to be 
to determine whether or not an adoption order violates the rights of all family members 
and if so, whether or not the violation is a proportionate measure. Secondly, whether or 
not the adoption order was a proportionate measure would be relevant in determining 
children’s best interests and deciding whether or not to make an adoption order, another 
order instead or no order at all.  
 
However, this approach could be seen as more complex than other methods for 
identifying and balancing rights. While it may be relevant to consider the rights of other 
family members (such as siblings) who clearly have rights under ECHR Article 8, it is 
argued that considering the rights of all family members adds unnecessary complexity to 
the process of analysing parents’ and children’s rights in adoption cases. Thus, it is 
argued that unless another family member is making the claim in a non-consensual 
adoption case, then the focus should be on the rights of the child (or children) and birth 
parents. Furthermore, such rights considerations could be addressed purely in terms of the 
child’s own interests. For example, if the child has a strong relationship with other family 
members, this may be a factor under ECHR Article 8 and also under UNCRC Articles 7, 
8 and 9 which is relevant for the court to consider. Another difficulty with Harris’s 
approach is that it may also have the effect of making the welfare principle subservient to 
Article 8. In fact, Harris has acknowledged that judges might be reluctant to conceive of 
Article 8 and the welfare principle in this way.  
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Herring advocates an approach towards children’s and parents’ rights based on relational 
ethics
70
 whereby solutions are found to promote relationships rather than to focus on best 
interests or individual rights. He argues that it is the best way forward in legal decision-
making since people are ‘relational, inter-connected and interdependent’.71 According to 
Herring, people do not understand their lives in terms of interests or rights but in terms of 
their relationships with others and that the legal decision-making process should reflect 
this reality.
72
 He suggests starting a legal analysis with a presumption of an obligation 
rather than a freedom and indicates that it is a practical norm and it is in responsibilities 
where our relationships flourish.  
Eekelaar has observed that a potential detriment to the child (for example, if an adoption 
did not occur) ought to be balanced against the potential detriment to the birth parents 
(for example, if an adoption did occur). According to Eekelaar: ‘The best solution is 
surely to adopt the course that avoids inflicting the most damage on the well-being of any 
interested individual’.73 In adoption cases then, if Eekelaar’s approach was adopted, the 
courts would draw up a list of children and parents’ interests in adoption cases and 
consider the approach which was least harmful to all parties. This approach fits in with 
the central argument of this thesis, which is that a non-consensual adoption ought not take 
place if there is a less restrictive alternative, but equally effective, alternative available.  
However, while useful to this thesis, Eekelaar’s approach is weakness-based rather than 
strength-based. Thus, while a chosen measure might in fact be the least harmful for all of 
the parties involved, it will not necessarily be the most effective course of action for the 
child or children in question. Furthermore, if for example, only two different options are 
available and one option is regarded as less harmful to the child but more harmful to the 
parent, and vice versa, it is not clear how this dilemma would be resolved. This is why 
this thesis focuses on the existence of equally effective alternatives to non-consensual 
adoption rather than measures which emphasise the least detriment to affected parties. 
Thus, this thesis is based on and aims to build on an approach advocated by Goldtein et al 
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who advocated that, where possible, the least detrimental alternative to the family unit, 
which best meets the needs of the child should be taken.
74
 
A unique part of the analysis in this thesis, which has not been considered directly in the 
existing literature, is how the child’s rights under Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 3 
(the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) may be balanced 
against Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) and used to assist in 
determining whether or not it is proportionate for children to be placed for adoption 
without parental consent. This thesis also considers the relevance of the UNCRC in 
adoption cases and whether or not these rights could be helpful in providing an analysis 
of whether a less restrictive but equally effective alternative to non-consensual adoption 
may be found.  
 
Inherent in this thesis is an acknowledgment of the apparent tension between the welfare 
principle and the child’s and parents’ rights to respect for private and family life under 
ECHR Article 8. This tension has been acknowledged by many academics,
75
 who have 
emphasised the importance of identifying and providing protection for children’s rights in 
court proceedings. This thesis contributes to the existing academic literature and provides 
observations which extend beyond previous writings, by emphasising the importance of 
acknowledging children’s rights in the specific context of non-consensual adoption. 
Although it is clear that children’s best interests (protected under UNCRC Article 3) are 
an important right which must be protected by the courts in England and Wales and the 
ECtHR, the irrevocability of adoption and the potential loss of meaningful family 
relationships (protected by ECHR Article 8) means that there ought to be more emphasis 
on children’s rights in the adoption process, including the child’s right to be heard in 
court proceedings (see UNCRC Article 12).  
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This thesis distinguishes itself from previous academic literature by conducting an 
extensive examination and analysis of important adoption cases heard in the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, the UK Supreme Court and the ECtHR. 
In doing so, it examines the rights and best interests at stake in adoption cases, different 
methodological frameworks which may be appropriate to be applied in adoption cases 
where children’s and parents’ rights (including but not limited to ECHR Article 8) are at 
stake, less restrictive alternatives but (potentially) equally effective alternatives which 
may be available to non-consensual adoption and analysis of the circumstances in which 
non-consensual adoption may (or may not) be regarded as proportionate. While there is 
undoubtedly a large body of research on adoption law, as evidenced by the critique 
considered above, there is no study which considers all of these different aspects of 
adoption and human rights in one text.  
1.4 The Research Question 
The main issue which is explored in this thesis is whether non-consensual adoption in 
England and Wales under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s52(1)(b) can be regarded 
as a proportionate measure and, if so, in what circumstances it may be regarded as 
proportionate. In order to determine when non-consensual adoption is a proportionate 
measure, this enquiry will consider if and when non-consensual adoption strikes the 
appropriate balance between the best interests and rights of the child on the one hand and 
the rights of the birth parents on the other. In order to determine whether or not the 
appropriate balance has been struck, this thesis will explore whether in non-consensual 
adoption cases, there are less restrictive alternatives available (such as State assistance, 
kinship care, special guardianship or non-consensual adoption with direct contact) which 
may be equally effective measures to protect children from harm.
76
  
1.5 The Research Methodology 
This thesis engages in a black-letter law analysis
77
 of non-consensual adoption by 
focusing on primary sources such as case law, statutes (for instance, the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002 and the Children and Families Act 2014), government papers and 
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academic commentary. It also does so by applying ‘proportionality’ as an interpretive 
tool to evaluate legal decisions. A black-letter methodological approach to legal analysis 
has been criticised by some commentators. For instance, the approach has been criticised 
for its tendency to repeat existing knowledge and for its failure to connect law to life by 
failing to assess the real world consequences of doctrinal frameworks.
78
 Such criticism 
may be mitigated, however, by analysing the relevant social, psychological and political 
considerations underpinning adoption law, which are examined throughout this thesis.  
 
This thesis supplements the primary documents used in a black-letter law analysis with 
brief reference to secondary data such as commentary from BBC news, media reports and 
other relevant websites. Although caution must be exercised in examining material from 
sources which have not been corroborated by academic studies,
79
 these sources highlight 
the concern that has been generated by adoption legislation in England and Wales. 
Reference to such non-legal sources helps to connect the theme of this research to what 
happens in the ‘real’ world and thereby to counter the criticism considered above. 
Although this thesis largely uses qualitative data from the primary and secondary 
documents referred to above, it also uses quantitative data from the Office for National 
Statistics and from governmental and non-governmental organisations in order to assess 
trends in relation to non-consensual adoption in England and Wales.  
 
This thesis considers how the courts apply the best interests test and human rights, in 
particular the ECHR, in adoption cases. The identification and discussion of the approach 
taken by the courts provides a platform for examining when and whether children’s best 
interests may clash or be in alignment with their own rights and/or those of their birth 
parents in non-consensual adoption cases. Examining human rights instruments (in 
particular, the ECHR and the UNCRC and how these instruments are applied by the 
courts in England and Wales and by the ECtHR will help to determine whether the 
legislation and court decisions on adoption in England and Wales are proportionate.  
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
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In addition to this introduction, this thesis consists of the following six chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the best interests and rights of children and the rights 
of birth parents which are relevant in adoption cases. It considers how international 
human rights instruments, such as the ECHR and UNCRC, may be used as frameworks 
for furthering the rights of children and parents in the adoption process. This chapter 
refers to the domestic, European and international legal frameworks which assist in 
providing an assessment of the circumstances in which non-consensual adoption under 
the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s52(1)(b) may be proportionate.  
 
Chapter 3 considers the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights in non-
consensual adoption cases where violations of ECHR rights have been alleged. This 
chapter considers how the Court has analysed parents’ and children’s rights and 
children’s best interests in adoption cases and how the ECtHR has applied the principle of 
proportionality. This chapter demonstrates that the State has a positive obligation under 
ECHR Article 8 to reunite children and parents, where possible. The case law also 
appears to suggest that there may be a wider obligation under Article 8 to provide State 
assistance, which might prevent the need for restrictive measures such as non-consensual 
adoption. This chapter considers how different principles laid down in ECtHR case law 
could be applied on a consistent basis to determine whether or not a non-consensual 
adoption order may be regarded as a proportionate measure.  
 
Chapter 4 explains and analyses the relevant case law and statute law on non-consensual 
adoption in England and Wales, focusing on decisions from the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court and the legislative framework of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, 
s52(1)(b). This chapter considers the approach of the courts to the rights of children and 
birth parents in adoption cases and the extent to which the courts balance these rights 
against the best interests of children in determining the proportionality of non-consensual 
adoption. This chapter explains that the law in England and Wales is based on a pro-
adoption policy and the courts have gradually started to acknowledge the importance of 
ECHR rights in adoption cases. This chapter also considers the potential tension between 
the case law on adoption and the government’s pro-adoption policy.  
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Chapter 5 provides an examination of less restrictive alternative measures to non-
consensual adoption in England and Wales. These options are: State assistance, 
concurrent planning, special guardianship orders, kinship care and non-consensual 
adoption with contact. The chapter outlines and evaluates these measures and the 
circumstances in which these measures may be equally effective when compared with 
non-consensual adoption. In doing so, this chapter considers the circumstances in which 
these alternative measures are likely to be a more proportionate response to protecting 
children from neglect and/or abuse at the hands of their parents.  
 
Chapter 6 provides an in-depth discussion of two cases heard in the UK which went to the 
European Court of Human Rights (R and H v. UK
80
 and Y.C. v UK
81
). This chapter brings 
together the discussion of children’s best interests and rights and parental rights in 
Chapter 2, the significance of European jurisprudence on non-consensual adoption in 
Chapter 3 and discussion of case law in England and Wales in Chapter 4 as well as the 
examination of less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption in Chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by considering the circumstances in which non-consensual 
adoption may or may not be proportionate and when it might be more appropriate to use 
less restrictive alternatives instead. The chapter also makes suggestions for further 
research with regard to non-consensual adoption law in England and Wales. 
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Chapter 2: Children’s Best Interests and Children’s and 
Parents’ Rights 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are to provide an overview of children’s best interests, to explain 
which rights children and parents may argue in adoption cases and to briefly consider the 
extent to which parental rights may clash, or be in alignment with children’s rights and 
best interests in the context of adoption. ‘Best interests’ is the determinative principle in 
England and Wales when the courts are making decisions in relation to children.
82
 Since 
the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998,
83
 the courts in England and Wales have 
had to consider the relationship between the best interests of children and the rights of 
children and birth parents because the Act brought the principles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into English Law.
84
 Furthermore, domestic courts 
must take into account decisions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
85
 
and international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC), which has been ratified by the United Kingdom but not incorporated 
into domestic law.
86
  
This chapter will briefly consider the ECHR (which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3) and the UNCRC to see which parents’ and children’s rights have been and 
could be argued in adoption cases. In doing so, this thesis will also consider the extent to 
which certain provisions of the UNCRC clarify what rights children have, what rights 
parents have, what is meant by children’s best interests and the extent to which these 
competing rights and interests may be balanced against each other in adoption cases. This 
chapter will consider UNCRC rights which are relevant in non-consensual adoption cases 
and whether or not the UNCRC could be said to regard non-consensual adoption as a 
proportionate measure.  
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This chapter can be seen then, primarily as a descriptive chapter in that it explains the 
legal and rights-based frameworks that have been or could be applied by the courts in 
non-consensual adoption cases. This chapter will first consider the relevance of the 
ECHR, the UNCRC, how these treaties are applied in English Law and other relevant 
principles in respect of children’s best interests and children’s and parents’ rights in 
English Law. These principles will then be applied throughout this thesis.  
2.2 The European Convention on Human Rights 
2.2.1 An Overview of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
In England and Wales, the Human Rights Act 1998, s6, imposes a positive obligation on 
public authorities (including but not limited to the courts and social workers) to protect 
the ECHR rights of individuals affected by State action (for example, children and their 
parents separated by the adoption process). Under the HRA, s2, the courts in England and 
Wales must take ECtHR jurisprudence into account in the course of decision-making. 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is, therefore, considered by the 
courts in England and Wales in many cases, including adoption proceedings.
 87
 
Furthermore, when domestic remedies have been exhausted, parents may decide to argue 
before the ECtHR that their Convention Rights have been violated.  
 
The ECHR has an important role to play in cases where parents have argued that non-
consensual adoption has violated their own human rights. Children in adoption cases are 
typically too young to allege violations of ECHR Rights and so it is only in rare cases 
such as P, C and S v. UK,
88
 where parents argue that their children’s rights have also been 
violated that the ECtHR (or indeed the courts in England and Wales) will examine 
children’s rights in adoption cases. In practice, the most important ECHR rights in 
adoption cases are: Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing)
89
 and ECHR Article 8 (the right 
to respect for private and family life).
 90
 Other applicable rights may be Article 2 (the 
right to life) and Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment)
91
 and there may, in some cases, be a need to balance children’s rights under 
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Articles 2 and 3 against their parents’ rights under Articles 6 and 8. The aforementioned 
provisions of the ECHR and relevant European jurisprudence will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter 3. This chapter will now briefly consider the way in which the ECtHR 
has interpreted and applied the best interests principle.   
 
2.2.2 The European Court of Human Rights on the Best Interests of Children in 
Adoption Cases 
 
This section explains how the best interests principle has been interpreted and applied by 
the ECtHR generally and in particular adoption cases. An adoption order which amounts 
to an interference with parents’ right to respect for private and family life under Article 
8(1) may, in some cases, be justified under Article 8(2) which states that: ‘There shall be 
no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in 
accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society…’ Article 8(2) will be 
satisfied, for example, if adoption is found to be in the child’s best interests.92 It is worth 
examining the Court’s approach to the best interests principle since, as Ifezu and Rajabali 
have suggested, the differences between the decision-making in the UK Supreme Court 
and the ECtHR are most apparent when looking at adoption cases. These differences are 
not necessarily seen in terms of the case outcomes (see Chapters 3 and 6), but in the 
approach to the best interests principle.
93
 
 
The ECtHR has recognised the important role which the best interests test plays in 
adoption cases. In Scott v UK,
94
 for example, the Court considered whether a mother's 
Article 8 rights had been breached by a local authority who had applied to free the child 
for adoption and held that: ‘the best interests of the child is always of crucial importance’ 
in determining when a violation of a parent’s right under Article 8(1) may be justified 
under Article 8(2). Again, in Johansen v. Norway,
95
 the Court recognised the importance 
of the best interests tests and how it can override parental rights, emphasising that:  
 
‘[A] fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child in remaining in 
public care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child... In carrying out 
this balancing exercise, the Court will attach particular importance to the best 
interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override 
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those of the parent.  In particular… the parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 of 
the Convention (art. 8) to have such measures taken as would harm the child's health 
and development’.
96
  
 
In Johansen, the Court acknowledged that removing a child into care and placing a child 
for adoption: 
 
‘…should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if 
they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best 
interests’.
97
  
 
Despite the fact that the ECtHR has always considered the best interests principle, in 
Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland
98
 the ECtHR provided, for the first time, a detailed 
explanation of how it examines the best interests of the child. In Neulinger, the father had 
successfully obtained (in the Swiss Court) an order under the 1980 Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
99
 ordering the return of his son to 
Israel. The mother and son took their case to Strasbourg where they argued that there had 
been a breach of their rights to respect for their family life under ECHR Article 8 as the 
Swiss Court had failed to accept the mother’s defence under Article 13(b) of the Hague 
Convention, that the child would suffer a grave risk of harm if he was returned. With 
respect to the best interests test, the Court in Neulinger observed that the concept of ‘best 
interests’ under UNCRC Article 3(1) had not been developed100 (see Section 2.3.2) and 
that there were no proposed criteria for the assessment of best interests.
101
 The ECtHR 
has emphasised the importance of children’s relationships with family members and has 
stated that: 
 
‘…[T]he child’s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases where the 
family had proved particularly unfit. It follows that family ties may only be severed 
in exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal 
relations and, if and when appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ the family…[I]t is clearly also in 
the child’s interests to ensure its development in a sound environment, and a parent 
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cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the 
child’s health and development’.
102
  
 
The Court made it clear in Neulinger that the issue was whether there was a fair balance 
between the competing interests of the child, parents and of public order, within the 
State’s margin of appreciation, but with the child’s best interests being treated as the 
Court’s primary consideration. It stated that depending on the nature and seriousness of 
the child’s interests, these may override the rights of the parents.103 The Court said that 
this approach was supported by the consensus of Member States and by international law 
(such as the UNCRC) which also emphasises the paramountcy of the child’s best 
interests.
104
 The outcome in Neulinger was that the ECtHR ruled that the boy did not need 
to return to Israel. It was not in his best interests because several years had passed since 
litigation had commenced and the child was settled in Switzerland. The Court in 
Neulinger assessed both its role in determining the best interests of the child and what the 
substance of these interests would be. It stated that the child’s best interests would depend 
on a range of factors such as the child’s age, maturity, presence or absence of his parents 
and the child’s environment and experiences and emphasised that best interests should be 
assessed on a case by case basis.
105
 However, the Court held that it needed to establish 
whether the national authorities had:  
 
‘. . .conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole 
series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and 
medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective 
interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what the best 
solution would be…’
106
  
 
Although in previous ECtHR jurisprudence, the concept of ‘best interests’ was not clearly 
defined, it is argued that the ECtHR has fleshed out its own definition, for the purposes of 
case law, in Neulinger. In fact, it has been suggested by Boschiero et al that the criterion 
of best interests now has a ‘precise and concrete interpretation’107 which could potentially 
be applied in international law. It is not simply the Court’s intention to define best 
interests which makes this decision significant and potentially relevant in adoption cases. 
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The Court held that instead of deferring to the national authorities’ assessment of best 
interests, the Court could perform its own assessment of the child’s best interests and 
proceeded to do so in this case. The Court’s approach in Neulinger was therefore a 
departure from its usual approach. In fact, according to Van Bueren assessing the best 
interests of the child has typically been seen as a matter within the State’s margin of 
appreciation, rather than a matter for the ECtHR.
108
 The question then is whether the 
Court of Human Rights should use its discretion to perform its own assessment in 
adoption cases. Unlike the approach taken in Neulinger, it has been rare for the ECtHR to 
offer express criticism of the merits of a domestic court decision in adoption 
proceedings,
109
 including a domestic court’s assessment of best interests. Despite the fact 
that the Court has acknowledged that this discretion applies in all cases, it has not been 
followed in adoption cases (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). This chapter will now 
go onto consider the significance of the UNCRC and how it has defined ‘best interests’. 
 
2.3 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
2.3.1 The UNCRC, the Courts in England and Wales and the European Court of 
Human Rights 
 
The UNCRC is an important Convention which is tailored specifically to the rights of 
children
110
 and is regarded as the most important international document addressing 
children’s rights.111 The overall ethos of the UNCRC is that children should be raised in 
accordance with the ideals listed within the Convention, in an atmosphere of love and 
understanding, and that the family unit should be provided with assistance so it can fully 
assume its responsibilities.
112
 The UNCRC therefore attempts to strike a balance between 
respecting the child’s individual rights while also recognising and protecting the child’s 
wider interest in rights derived from being part of a family unit. This thesis will consider 
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which UNCRC provisions may be relevant in adoption cases and if any provisions might 
emphasise the use of less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption. 
It is helpful to provide a brief overview of the status of the UNCRC before considering its 
applicability in adoption cases. The United Kingdom ratified the UNCRC on the 20
th
 of 
November, 1989 but the UK has yet to incorporate the UNCRC into domestic 
legislation.
113
 Upon the advice of the UNCRC, the post of Children’s Commissioner was 
created to promote the rights of children
114
 (including UNCRC rights) and as a result has 
attempted to introduce the UNCRC more formally in the policy-making process. Thus, 
the Children’s Commissioner for Wales was involved in developing a Children’s Rights 
Scheme in Wales
115
 whereby Welsh ministers are duty-bound to have regard to the rights 
and obligations in the UNCRC in the exercise of their functions.
116
 Despite having a 
Commissioner to promote children’s UNCRC rights in England,117 England has not 
followed the approach taken in Wales and has not introduced a similar scheme on 
Children’s Rights.  
The Children’s Commissioner, nevertheless, still has an important role to play in ensuring 
that UNCRC rights are protected and, in fact, the Commissioner has expressed concerns 
about adoption law in England and Wales.
118
 Furthermore, the Children and Families Act 
2014 has strengthened the powers of the Children’s Commissioner which may lead to 
increased consideration of UNCRC rights in judicial decision-making and in government 
policy in general and specifically in adoption law and policy. In practice, however, 
because the UNCRC is not incorporated into English legislation its enforcement 
mechanism is still widely regarded as weak
119
 and there has been pessimism about the 
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likelihood of incorporation of the UNCRC in the foreseeable future.
120
 Mr Justice Cobb 
has argued that the UNCRC ought to have primary or secondary legislative status,
121
 
which would strengthen the status of the UNCRC.  
Despite assertions by Lady Hale that the UNCRC amounts to international law with 
which domestic courts must comply,
122
 the courts in England and Wales do not scrutinise 
the extent to which legislation and policy-making respects children’s UNCRC rights. At 
present, the courts can choose to consider relevant articles of the UNCRC in their 
judgments
123
 but they are not obliged to do so
124
 and they are not in the habit of 
considering the UNCRC in adoption cases. Despite the UNCRC’s current limitations, it is 
referred to in an increasing number of domestic law cases
125
 as well as in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.
126
 It has also been suggested by Stalford and Drywood that the EU is 
referring to the UNCRC with increasing frequency either directly or indirectly in policy 
and legislative documents.
127
  
Kilkelly has described the relationship between the UNCRC and the ECHR as having 
‘created an intricate web of standards that is mutually reinforcing’.128 In practice, this 
means that, when the ECtHR is making decisions about whether or not ECHR rights have 
been violated, the UNCRC is referred to and the content of the UNCRC may potentially 
become included within particular ECHR rights. Thus, these rights have been and may be 
considered when a claim is made, for example, under ECHR Articles 6 or 8. According to 
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Lady Hale in the UK Supreme Court, the UK is bound to apply the UNCRC in keeping 
with its international obligations.
129
 In R (on the application of SG and others) v. 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,
130
 Lord Kerr has gone further and has argued 
that despite its legal status that the UNCRC is directly enforceable.
131
 Although Lord 
Kerr provided a dissenting judgment in this case, his comments may be used in a future 
case to argue that the UNCRC is directly enforceable. It is therefore important to explain 
and consider the relevance of the UNCRC in non-consensual adoption cases.  
2.3.2 The UNCRC and the Best Interests Principle 
UNCRC Article 3 is a central provision of the UNCRC which is considered and applied 
by the European Court of Human Rights and by the UK Supreme Court in adoption cases. 
Article 3 provides that a child’s best interests should be a ‘primary’ consideration in 
determining State action: 
 ‘1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.  
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is 
necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or 
her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, 
and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.  
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible 
for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by 
competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and 
suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision’. 
Hodgkin and Newell have argued that the best interests principle recognises the 
possibility of conflict between the interests of the child and those of their parents and 
wider community.
132
 Despite the existence of this potential conflict, Henricson and 
Bainham have claimed that the UNCRC nonetheless recognises the importance of parents 
in several provisions of the UNCRC, including the best interests principle itself.
133
  
                                                          
129
 For example, see: ZH (Tanzania) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4; H (P) 
v. Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic v. H (P) v. F-K v. Polish Judicial Authority [2012] UKSC 25.  
130
 [2015] UKSC 16. 
131
 R (on the application of SG and others) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 at 
paras 233-255. In particular, see: paras 233 and 255.  
132
 Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 3
rd
 edn (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2007), p38. 
133
 Clem Henricson and Andrew Bainham, The child and family policy divide: Tensions, convergence and 
rights (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2005) p21. 
32 
 
The best interests principle in Article 3 can be seen as a substantive right, a fundamental 
interpretative legal principle and a rule of procedure. It is one of the UNCRC ‘general’ 
principles
134
 which should be applied in legislation and decision-making in relation to all 
of the other Convention rights.
135
 The UN Committee has emphasised that there is no 
hierarchy of rights and that the best interests principle exists to ensure a child’s ‘effective 
enjoyment’136 of all UNCRC rights. The Committee has stated that:  
‘The full application of the concept of the child's best interests requires the 
development of a rights-based approach, engaging all actors, to secure the holistic 
physical, psychological, moral and spiritual integrity of the child and promote his or 
her human dignity’.137  
In other words then, the UNCRC’s conception of best interests involves a consideration 
of a wide range of human rights, arguably including a number of rights which are relevant 
in adoption cases (including but not limited to UNCRC Articles 5, 7, 8 and 9). Although 
the best interests principle is relevant in respect of all of the Convention Rights, explicit 
reference to ‘best interests’ can be found within a number of UNCRC rights including 
Articles 9, 18, 20, 21, 37 and 40.
138
 Article 3 provides that the child’s best interests must 
be ‘a primary consideration’ in the decision-making process. In other words, the child’s 
best interests will not necessarily take priority over others’ rights, such as, for example, 
those of the child’s birth parents. The exception to the principle that children’s best 
interests will not take precedence over the rights of others, is Article 21 on the right to 
adoption (considered below).  
2.3.3 The UNCRC and Adoption 
Article 21 outlines the circumstances in which adoption may be permitted: 
‘States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that 
the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall: 
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(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities 
who determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of 
all pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the 
child's status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, 
the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis 
of such counselling as may be necessary’. 
Although there is no explicit reference to non-consensual adoption, the wording states 
that parental consent to adoption will only be required where it is also required under 
domestic legislation. By implication then, provisions enabling adoption without parental 
consent will be lawful, as long as such an adoption is in a child’s best interests. It can be 
concluded then, that non-consensual adoption under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, 
s52(1)(b) is permitted by Article 21. In fact, the child’s best interests can be regarded as a 
determining factor dictating when an adoption should or should not take place. The fact 
that the child’s best interests are paramount in adoption cases has been interpreted to 
mean that the child’s best interests should be placed above those of the prospective 
adopter(s) as well as those of the birth parents.
139
  
Not only is non-consensual adoption clearly permitted under Article 21, the UNCRC also 
emphasises the paramountcy of children’s best interests in adoption cases. However, it 
has been argued that the welfare analysis required under Article 21 may be more 
extensive than first thought. Thus, Sloan, for example, has argued that 21(a) of the 
UNCRC may ‘point in a different direction’140 from a simple welfare test. This is 
important in the context of this thesis since a simple welfare test has, since the enactment 
of the ACA 2002, been applied by the courts when deciding whether or not an adoption 
ought to take place under s52(1)(b) of the ACA. If more than a simple welfare test is, in 
fact, required under Article 21 then it could be argued that the approach taken by the 
courts in England and Wales in determining whether or not it is in the child’s best 
interests to be adopted is at best, insufficient and at worst, amounts to a violation of other 
UNCRC rights (for example, Articles 7, 8 and 9).  
UN General Comment No. 14 has made it clear that where the child’s best interests has 
the potential to conflict with the rights of other children (or children in general) a careful 
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balancing process must take place so as to find a ‘suitable compromise’141 and that the 
same approach must be taken: 
‘if the rights of other persons are in conflict with the child’s best interests. If 
harmonization is not possible, authorities and decision-makers will have to analyse 
and weigh the rights of all those concerned, bearing in mind that the right of the 
child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration means that the 
child's interests have high priority and not just one of several considerations’.
142
 
Although the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is not opposed to the adoption of 
children in care, it is not positively in favour of non-consensual adoption. This assertion 
is supported by Sloan who has suggested that the UNCRC can ultimately be seen as 
‘neutral’143 on the subject of adoption. Further support for this argument can be found 
within the UNCRC itself and also, in the UN Guidelines on Alternative Care for 
Children.
144
 In fact, both the UNCRC and the Guidelines emphasise the importance of 
keeping children and birth parents together, and of reuniting children with their parents 
where a separation has occurred. The Guidelines mention foster care and kinship care as 
alternatives to children living with birth parents who may be unable to provide adequate 
care for their children
145
 while Article 20(3) of the UNCRC explicitly mentions 
alternatives to adoption for children in care.
146
  
Under UNCRC Article 6 (see Section 2.3.5), States must protect the child’s ‘inherent 
right to life’ and the right to maximal ‘survival and development’. Thus, Article 6 is a 
relevant consideration under the best interests analysis to be undertaken by the courts in 
adoption cases. According to Sloan, it may ‘provide clues’147 as to the meaning of best 
interests (under Article 3) and how they ought to be applied under Article 21. Prioritising 
non-consensual adoption for children in care has consequences for various UNCRC 
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provisions
148
 (such as Articles 5, 7, 8, and 9) which emphasise the importance of 
maintaining children’s relationships with their birth parents. It can be argued then, that 
the UNCRC may in fact be consistent with a conception of proportionality which 
routinely incorporates the assessment of less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual 
adoption.  
Another relevant consideration when determining whether or not an adoption ought to 
take place is the extent to which a child has had a say in the adoption process. It is argued 
that, where possible, the child should be able to participate in the adoption process.
149
 
Although, within Article 21, there is no explicit reference to the child’s views or whether 
or not the child should be able to consent to adoption. Article 21 could be construed 
alongside Article 12. In this sense, taking children’s views into account in adoption cases 
may be regarded as an implied requirement under UNCRC Article 12 (considered 
below).
150
  
2.3.4 The UNCRC and the Child’s Right to be Heard 
Article 12 (the right of the child to be heard) concerns children’s right to participate in 
court proceedings and provides that the child’s views should be ‘given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child’ thereby acknowledging the importance 
of children’s right to autonomy in the context of court proceedings.151 It provides: 
‘1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child.  
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent 
with the procedural rules of national law’. 
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There are three aspects to Article 12: the ability to be heard, to be heard in official 
proceedings and for the child’s views to be given due weight but there is no guarantee 
that a child’s views and wishes will be followed because the balance between the child’s 
participatory rights and the child’s best interests needs to be respected. Article 12 was 
developed because of the scant attention paid to the views of children.
152
  
Article 12 has been influential in cases in England and Wales,
153
 but it has not yet been 
referred to in adoption cases. It can be argued, nonetheless, that it has the potential to be 
an important right which may be used in support of the child’s right to have a say in the 
adoption process or even to provide or withhold consent to adoption. As the law currently 
stands, however, while the wishes and feelings of the child are a factor which courts may 
consider, they are not compelled to do so.
154
 In practice, children in England and Wales 
have a very limited role to play in expressing themselves in the adoption process.  
Fortin has argued that even though Article 12 does not explicitly refer to the rights of 
parents, it nonetheless promotes children’s autonomy while respecting parents’ 
authority.
155
 This can be demonstrated by the relationship between Article 12 and Article 
5 (on respect for parents’ rights, duties and responsibilities) since parents must take into 
account the evolving capacities of the child when making decisions in relation to the 
child. It is important under Article 12, for adults - including parents and policymakers - to 
facilitate the participation of children in matters that affect their lives,
156
 including in 
particular, the draconian step of adoption.   
Other rights which may balance against Article 12 include Article 3 (the best interests 
principle) which arguably takes precedence over Article 12 in legal proceedings in some 
countries
157
 such as in England and Wales. Articles 3 and 12 are interrelated since a best 
interests determination (including but not limited to adoption cases, for example) should 
mean that decision-makers take into account the child’s own views as to what will be in 
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his/her best interests.
158
 However, there can be a tension between Articles 3 and 12
159
 
since a child might wish to remain with his or her birth parents or not to be adopted when 
in practice, this may be the best way to meet a child’s emotional needs and ensure 
stability and permanence for that child. In England and Wales, children’s participatory 
rights are limited because as Tisdall et al
160
 have recognised, the wider implementation of 
Article 12 in children’s proceedings in England and Wales has been hindered by the 
belief that listening to children might clash with their best interests. This could be seen, 
for example, where a child may wish to be reunited with his or her parents and this may 
not be possible due to severe neglect and/or abuse (relevant rights in this context are 
Articles 6, 19 and 34 of the UNCRC).  
2.3.5 The UNCRC and Child Protection 
Under UNCRC Article 6 it is stated that:  
‘1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.  
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and 
development of the child’.161  
This right overlaps with Article 3 of the Convention, in the sense that Article 6 also aims 
to ensure that children grow up in a healthy and safe environment and reach their full 
potential.
162
 Thus, there is a need for the State to consider children’s safety and 
development when drafting laws and policies.
163
 Rights under Article 6 can be bolstered 
by Article 19, which protects children from abuse.  
The positive educational, social and emotional outcomes which may be attributed to 
adoption are relevant considerations when developing an appropriate and effective way of 
protecting children in care. It should be noted, though, that the State must consider ‘the 
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least intrusive intervention as warranted by the circumstances’164 and under Article 20 
must give ‘special protection and assistance’ to children who cannot be raised by their 
birth parents. Although at first glance, Articles 6 and 19 could be regarded as relevant 
considerations when determining whether or not non-consensual adoption is a 
proportionate measure, the emphasis on the need for less intrusive intervention (also 
found in the UN Guidelines on Alternative Care for Children) implies that the State ought 
to avoid ‘intrusive’ measures (e.g. non-consensual adoption). Furthermore, Sloan has 
asserted that, ‘given the other requirements of the UNCRC,165 the right to development 
must ordinarily relate to development within one’s home environment’.166 Thus, the need 
for State intervention is insufficient by itself to justify a restrictive measure such as non-
consensual adoption. In other words, non-consensual adoption ought to be a measure 
reserved for circumstances in which less restrictive alternatives are unavailable.  
2.3.6 The UNCRC and the Child’s Relationship Rights 
 
Article 7 (the right to know and be cared for by one’s parents) and Article 8 (the right to 
know one’s identity) alone or in conjunction with each other emphasise that children 
ought to be raised by their birth parents and that they ought to know who they are and 
where they come from. See below.  
‘Article 7  
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from 
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents.  
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with 
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments 
in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.  
Article 8  
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her 
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law 
without unlawful interference.  
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2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her 
identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a 
view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity’. 
Article 7 can be read along with other articles of the UNCRC in addition to Article 8 such 
as Articles 5, 9, 10 and 20 and 27.
167
 Articles 7 and 8, like Article 12, could also be seen 
as constituting participation rights which are relevant to making decisions in adoption 
cases since children may wish to have information about
168
 or contact with their birth 
parents. Articles 7 and 8 have been referred to briefly in some adoption cases heard by 
the ECtHR,
169
 as well as by the UK Supreme Court
170
 but have not been considered in 
depth. Also, the ECtHR made no reference at all to the UNCRC in two important ECtHR 
cases concerning non-consensual adoption (P, C and S v. UK
171
 and Kutzner v. 
Germany
172
) despite the importance of the UNCRC in international law.  
There is disagreement about the scope of Article 7 and whose rights it protects. This is 
significant in the context of adoption proceedings because it could be interpreted as 
applying to all types of parent (birth, foster and adoptive parents for example),
173
 or 
solely to relationship between children and their birth parents.
174
 The right to identity and 
preservation of family relationships under UNCRC Article 8 is most ‘at risk’ when an 
adoption order is made.
175
 As O’Donovan has argued, a person’s identity exists at birth 
and our childhood, life experiences
176
 and our genetics
177
 all form part of our identity. 
Regardless of the age at which a child is adopted, he or she has an identity that comes 
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from his or her birth family based on genetics and experiences up to the point of adoption 
which will influence children even after the adoption process.  
When parents face poverty and housing problems, this increases the likelihood of public 
care and raises issues under Articles 7 and 8.
178
 Where less restrictive alternatives are 
available to the State which will keep children and parents together, States may have an 
obligation to provide assistance (e.g. practical assistance with housing or help from social 
workers or financial assistance). Where such assistance is likely to help children to 
remain with their birth parents while simultaneously protecting them from harm, this 
affords protection of children’s rights under Articles 7 and 8. Thus, it may be argued that 
in some circumstances, less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption may be 
required to protect children’s rights under Articles 7 and 8.  
In fact, Sloan has argued that Articles 7 and 8 serve as a reminder that adoption may not 
be proportionate, even where it is appropriate to separate parent and child.
179
 In the light 
of these Convention articles, Sloan has rightly expressed concern that the judicial 
approach towards adoption in England and Wales is not necessarily compatible with 
Article 7 or with the emphasis on ‘family relations’ in Article 8.180 This thesis will now 
consider in further detail how the UNCRC protects familial rights and may in fact support 
the use of less restrictive but equally effective alternatives to non-consensual adoption.  
2.3.7 The UNCRC and the Family Unit 
 
Article 5 aims to respect the role of parents and others in the child’s upbringing and to 
provide limited protection of parents’ rights to make decisions in relation to their 
children: 
‘Article 5  
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by 
local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to 
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate 
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the 
present Convention’. 
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Article 5 is not routinely referred to in adoption cases but, like other Convention articles 
considered in this thesis, it may also suggest the need for less restrictive alternatives than 
non-consensual adoption. There is an absence of a paramountcy principle in Article 5 
which means it places an emphasis on the interests of both adults as well as children and 
Article 5 also recognises the possibility of conflict between the best interests of the child 
and the interests of the birth parents and the wider community.
181
 Furthermore, it refers to 
‘extended family’ or the ‘community’ thereby acknowledging that other persons involved 
in the child’s life, and who may care for the child, may also have rights.182  
According to Ferreira, Article 5 reflects ‘progressive autonomy’183 since it acknowledges 
that the evolving capacity of the child will have a bearing on the discharge of parental 
rights and responsibilities. For example, Article 5 could be used in support of providing 
children with the opportunity to be involved in the adoption decision-making process,
184
 
which will ultimately impact on the extent to which their birth parents may have a say in 
their lives. Recognition of the importance of parents’ rights and duties under Article 5 
implies that where possible, children should be raised by their parents who ought to be 
able to make decisions about their children’s lives. Implicit in Article 5 then, is the notion 
of minimal intervention
185
 and a recognition of the importance of the birth family’s 
guiding role in a child’s life. In fact, it has been observed by McGillivray that the 
Convention refers to parents 36 times, with 19 of its substantive articles deferring to 
parents.
186
 Nevertheless, despite the reference in Article 5 to parents’ rights, it is not clear 
what the scope of these rights is and how they are to be balanced against the rights of 
children.
187
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Another relevant article when considering the family unit as a whole is Article 18. This 
Convention Right states that parents have ‘common responsibilities for the upbringing 
and development of the child’ and Article 18(2) states that States need to ‘render 
appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-
rearing responsibilities’. This provision is significant188 because it implies that less 
restrictive alternatives, such as State assistance (see Section 5.2), ought to be considered 
before more serious measures such as non-consensual adoption, take place. Hodgkin and 
Newell, for example, have suggested that to satisfy Article 18 this may mean that the 
State should help with financial benefits, housing, day care, home help and psychiatric 
and professional support where needed.
189
 The role of increased assistance for parents in 
potentially decreasing the need for non-consensual adoption will be considered in more 
depth in Chapters 3-5 of this thesis. 
The case law on adoption in both the courts in England and Wales and the ECtHR 
typically does not refer to UNCRC Article 5 or Article 18. However, both of these 
articles could be considered in cases where parents allege that their own ECHR Article 8 
rights, and potentially those of their children, have been violated. It could be argued that 
if the State fails in its positive obligation under Article 8, to provide ‘appropriate 
assistance’ to the birth parents or wider birth family to help them care for a child (e.g. by 
the provision of financial or practical support from the State), then this may violate the 
rights of children, birth parents and members of the wider birth family.  
UNCRC Article 9 is another important right which refers to the family unit. Article 9 
recognises a principle of family integrity
190
 and acknowledges that a child should only be 
separated from his or her parents when it is ‘necessary for the best interests of the 
child’.191 This may apply in situations where children are neglected or abused by their 
parents or where their parents live apart.
192
 Article 9 provides that:  
‘Article 9  
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1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her 
parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial 
review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such 
separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be 
necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by 
the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be 
made as to the child's place of residence.  
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested 
parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their 
views known.  
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both 
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a 
regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.  
4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as 
the detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising 
from any cause while the person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents 
or of the child, that State Party shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, 
if appropriate, another member of the family with the essential information 
concerning the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the 
provision of the information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. 
States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself 
entail no adverse consequences for the person(s) concerned’. 
Article 9 may also be read in conjunction with Article 27 which recognises ‘the right of 
every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral and social development’. Protection of children’s Article 27 rights may, for 
example, include keeping children with their parents where it is safe to do so. So it may 
be said that homelessness or poverty should not be grounds for removal from their 
parents,
193
 (e.g. where living conditions of the parents may justify a child or children 
being taken into care). Furthermore, even where such removal may be necessary to 
protect a child’s right under Article 27 (or in fact Articles 6 and 19), this does not mean 
that non-consensual adoption will be a necessary or proportionate measure.
194
 UN 
General Comment No. 14, on the best interests principle, states that:  
‘Given the gravity of the impact on the child of separation from his or her parents, 
such separation should only occur as a last resort measure, as when the child is in 
danger of experiencing imminent harm or when otherwise necessary; separation 
should not take place if less intrusive measures could protect the child. Before 
resorting to separation, the State should provide support to the parents in assuming 
their parental responsibilities, and restore or enhance the family’s capacity to take 
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care of the child, unless separation is necessary to protect the child. Economic 
reasons cannot be a justification for separating a child from his or her parents’. 195  
Thus, it could be argued in cases where economic factors (for example, inadequate 
housing) have an adverse impact on a parent’s ability to raise his or her child (see Zhou v. 
Italy,
196
 in Chapter 3 for example), that the removal of a child into care and the 
subsequent non-consensual adoption of a child may be in violation of UNCRC Article 9. 
Articles 5, 9, and 18 not only acknowledge parental interests but suggest that a less 
restrictive alternative to non-consensual adoption must be chosen, where possible, for the 
State to satisfy its obligations under the UNCRC.  
UNCRC Article 9 states that separation will be justified when it is in a child’s best 
interests under Article 3, where the child has been subjected to neglect or abuse.
197
 This 
means that removal of a child into care is clearly consistent with the spirit of Article 9. 
However, if a less restrictive alternative to adoption is available (including but not limited 
to State assistance, kinship care or special guardianship), which is as equally effective as 
adoption, then it could be argued that the separation of the child from his or her parents 
and wider family is potentially a disproportionate measure and when read in conjunction 
with other rights (such as Articles 5, 7 and 8) then Article 9 becomes relevant in non-
consensual adoption cases. In other words, in cases where a less restrictive and equally 
effective alternative is available, adoption is not a ‘necessary’ step. In fact, an adoption in 
such circumstances, may be contrary to the child’s best interests and may even violate 
Article 9. 
The reference to ‘necessary’ in Article 9 interpreted along with the Article 3 best interests 
principle seems similar to the approach taken by the ECtHR, which employs a test of 
proportionality when assessing rights violations and the best interests of children (for 
further discussion see Chapter 3). The ECtHR referred to Article 9 in Saviny v. Ukraine
198
 
(for further detail see Section 3.4.6) and emphasised the need to provide assistance so as 
to enable birth parents to parent more effectively, thereby ensuring that families are kept 
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together, where possible.
199
 Lansdown and Newell have interpreted UNCRC Articles 7 
and 9 as requiring every possible effort to be made to seek security for a child within his 
or her own family and where this is not possible, for the child to at least have contact and 
be able to maintain relationships with family members.
200
 This interpretation suggests 
that the UNCRC requires the least restrictive but equally effective alternative to non-
consensual adoption to be chosen.  
2.3.8 The UNCRC and the Third Optional Protocol 
 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child aims to ensure that countries 
which have signed the UNCRC respect, protect and fulfil the rights in the UNCRC, via a 
reporting mechanism whereby the Committee produces a report on each Member State, 
which must be responded to within a specific timeframe. The UNCRC General Assembly 
recently approved a Third Optional Protocol on a communications procedure which 
enables children to make complaints to the UN Committee on specific violations of their 
Convention Rights by their State to the UN Committee.
201
 This measure has the effect of 
addressing criticisms that the Committee is currently limited in what it can do to address 
violations of children’s rights202 and it fills a ‘lacuna’203 in the law by creating a 
mechanism for aggrieved children to raise rights’ violations.204  
 
Although the Third Optional Protocol has not been ratified by the UK, it is hoped by 
Fortin that this may, one day, make the UNCRC more effective for children.
205
 The 
Protocol raises the potential for adoption cases to be examined by the Committee. 
However, there are still issues which may affect the effectiveness of the Optional 
Protocol. Thus, for instance, children may be unaware that they have rights, or if they are 
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aware, they may not have the practical means to enforce them. Also, children may still 
face the arduous task of having to exhaust domestic remedies first before making use of 
the Option Protocol.
206
 Despite these limitations, there is at least potential for children or 
their birth parents as representatives of children, to use the Optional Protocol to challenge 
an adoption order made without parental consent, on the basis of one or more of the rights 
mentioned above.  
2.4 England and Wales: Children’s Best Interests, Children’s Rights and Parental 
Responsibilities 
2.4.1 The Nature of Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
 
The Children Act 1989, s3 refers to parental responsibility and states that parents have 
‘rights, duties, powers, responsibility and authority… in relation to a child and his 
property’. Although the Children Act recognises that parents have rights, it does not list 
what these rights are or procedures by which these rights ought to be determined. Thus, it 
is necessary to examine case law to assess the status of parental rights in English law. The 
courts in England and Wales have tended to emphasise the importance of the biological 
tie between child and birth parent. In Re KD (a minor) (ward: termination of access),
207
 
for example, Lord Templeman stated that: ‘the best person to bring up the child is the 
natural parent’. This has been interpreted to mean that the court should not oppose claims 
of the birth parent to raise the child unless there is evidence that suggests these rights 
should be suspended.
208
 Re D (Natural Parental Presumption)
209
 is an example of this 
emphasis on the desirability of birth parents raising their children. Here, the Court made a 
residence order in favour of the father, despite the fact that the father had a history of 
drug abuse and had children from other relationships. In applying the welfare checklist, 
the court stressed that the benefits of enabling a child to be raised by a birth parent 
warranted ordering residence in favour of the father, removing the child from its 
grandparents. This approach seemed to emphasise that children should be raised by their 
parents unless there are very compelling reasons to suggest otherwise.  
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However, the weight that should be attached to the relative interests of natural parents 
has, according to Everett and Yeatman, ‘vexed’ the courts for years.210 In the House of 
Lords
211
 decision Re G (Children)
212
 Lady Hale placed a strong emphasis on the 
biological tie between the children and their mother, when considering whether the 
children ought to live with their biological mother.
213
 While emphasising that there is no 
presumption in favour of biological parents, she nonetheless acknowledged its 
importance. She stated that:  
 
‘[The] fact that CG is the natural mother of these children in every sense of the term, 
while raising no presumption in her favour, is undoubtedly an important and 
significant factor in determining what is best for them now and in the future’.214 
 
However, in Re B (a child),
215
 the UK Supreme Court placed less emphasis on the 
importance of the biological tie. In this case, the parents had been separated since the 
child’s birth and the boy had been raised by his grandmother. The issue at stake was 
whether or not the child should remain with his grandmother or go and live with his 
father. Here, the High Court and Court of Appeal in Re B both affirmed the emphasis 
placed in Re G (Children) on the significance of the biological tie and held that the boy 
should live with his father.  
 
However, the UK Supreme Court in Re B overruled the Court of Appeal’s decision. The 
Supreme Court held that it was in the child’s best interests to remain living with his 
grandmother in order to maintain the status quo. The Court did not discuss the rights of 
the different parties (the child, birth parents or the grandmother) but instead solely 
focused on the welfare of the child. It was seen as best for the child’s welfare to remain 
with his grandmother and maintain stable living arrangements rather than disturb the 
status quo so as to be placed with his birth father. This decision demonstrates a shift from 
incorporation of parental preferences within the best interests principle. Bainham has 
criticised this decision for not placing an emphasis on the rights of both children and birth 
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parents to have a mutual right to live together,
216
 which is also an important right in 
adoption cases. 
 
It has been suggested by Everett and Yeatman that Re G still opens the door for raising 
arguments about genetic parentage
217
 and is relevant in non-consensual adoption cases. 
However, because of Re B, it is now unclear how much weight is to be placed on the 
interests of birth parents, in general, within the best interests assessment.
218
 It is also 
unclear how much weight courts will place on the interest that the child may have in 
residing with his or her natural parents. This is especially significant as it was a Supreme 
Court decision, while other key cases placing an emphasis on the importance of the tie 
with natural parents have arisen within the Court of Appeal. However, in the Court of 
Appeal decision of Re E-R (A Child),
219
 King LJ stated explicitly that: ‘there is no “broad 
natural parent presumption” in existence in our law.  
 
It is helpful to look beyond English Law when considering the status of parental rights 
and considering how much weight ought to be placed on parental rights in the context of 
non-consensual adoption cases. The primary international legal resource which addresses 
the rights of birth parents in English law is the European Convention on Human Rights 
which, the principles of which are incorporated into English Law via the Human Rights 
Act 1998. There is a wealth of European jurisprudence which examines the significance 
of ECHR Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing) and ECHR Article 8 (the right to respect 
for private and family life) in adoption cases. It is apparent from the UNCRC (which was 
ratified by the UK) as well as from ECtHR jurisprudence, that one aspect of children’s 
own rights may include a need to enable adults to make decisions on their behalf in order 
to protect their short-term and long-term well-being.
220
 In other words, it will usually be 
the child’s birth parents who will be the primary decision-makers in the child’s life.  
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In general, the UNCRC makes it clear that governments need to respect the rights and 
duties of parents and families who foster the well-being and development of children.
221
 
This is why an emphasis can be found - in the UNCRC, the ECHR and child law in 
England and Wales - on minimal intervention in family life. Parents need to be able to 
exercise rights over their children so that they are able to exercise their responsibilities 
towards children. English Law has reconceptualised parental rights as parental 
responsibilities thereby emphasising their duties as parents.
222
 For example, parents have 
a duty to protect children from neglect and physical and emotional abuse and a duty to 
promote the child’s best interests.223 Parents can be said, however, to need rights (such as 
those under the ECHR and under UNCRC Article 5, for example) as ‘tools’224  to help 
them carry out their responsibilities.  
 
Parents have many rights in relation to their children such as the right to make decisions 
related to their child’s interests,225 which may include the determination of the religion 
and education of the child since parents may wish to influence their child’s beliefs and 
values.
226
 It has been argued that it may even be morally permissible for parents to pursue 
their own interests at some cost to those of their children and that they have may 
exclusive rights to do things with their children, that others may not.
227
 These are all 
important rights which are lost when an adoption order is made. When children are in 
care, birth parents may have a decreased ability to make decisions in their children’s lives 
(with day-to-day decisions made by foster carers or social workers) but there still exists 
the possibility that they may resume these decision-making rights. If one adheres to a 
trusteeship or stewardship model to describe the parent/child relationship, it might be said 
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that if parents are found to be incapable of meeting the needs of their child, it may be 
justifiable for them to lose these rights. Thus, it could be argued that parents do not have 
rights in circumstances where their children have been removed on the basis of neglect 
and/or abuse and placed for adoption. Alternatively, it could be said that parents’ rights 
ought to be suspended while parents are incapable of exercising their duties to protect 
children’s best interests.  
 
According to Brighouse and Swift, the State must not interfere with relationships unless 
‘danger is serious, clear and imminent’.228 While parents clearly have limited authority to 
direct children’s upbringing, the parents’ right to make such choices will be overridden 
when their child is harmed by them.
229
 The rights of parents may, therefore, be 
overridden in the following circumstances: if they are not meeting their child’s needs to 
such a degree that their conduct amounts to a violation of ECHR Article 3,
230
 (the right to 
freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment), if they are actively violating 
the child’s rights (for example, by abuse which satisfies the threshold required under 
ECHR Article 3) or if they are allowing others to violate their child’s rights (under ECHR 
Article 3, for example). The child’s right to be free from harm under Article 3 will 
therefore outweigh parents’ right to parent their children free of State intrusion under 
Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life). According to Brighouse and 
Swift, children and parents’ interests can be regarded as ‘intertwined’.231 Although there 
are both legal and theoretical foundations on which parents’ rights may be based, they are 
primarily linked to parents’ responsibilities and duties towards their children so that they 
are able to meet their children’s needs.  
 
Guggenheim has stressed the importance of the family’s right to autonomy, emphasising 
that all family members are separate individuals but ultimately, they are 
interdependent.
232
 Brighouse and Swift have emphasised the importance of protecting 
family relationships arguing that intrusion from the State ‘depresses the sense of security 
of the relationship’.233 They have described freedom from scrutiny as an important moral 
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claim
234
 and have posited that too much intrusion can shatter familial relationships which 
society would seek to protect. This can, in particular, be seen in the context of making  
adoption orders which are generally permanent and irreversible. It is suggested that 
parental rights may also be acknowledged and protected via recognising the rights of the 
family (i.e. the rights of birth parents and children as a family unit which Henricson and 
Bainham would refer to as ‘collective rights’235). The recognition and protection of these 
rights could take place through ensuring that families have appropriate practical and 
financial assistance from the State including the adequate supply of social housing and 
social security.
236
 Ensuring the adequate provision of appropriate assistance exists 
ultimately promotes parental autonomy and may, in some cases, enable them to raise their 
own children. This particular conception of parental rights informs an important part of 
the analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
2.4.2 The Welfare Principle in England and Wales 
 
The child’s welfare was, at one time, regarded as the ‘dominant matter for the 
consideration of the Court’.237 It was acknowledged in Ward v. Laverty238 that the child’s 
welfare is, in fact, paramount. This acknowledgement that the child’s welfare was the 
Court’s paramount consideration was subsequently provided for in the Guardianship of 
Infants Act 1925, s1 and in the Children Act 1989, s1.  
Before discussing what is meant by ‘welfare’ it is important to note the relationship 
between the terms ‘best interests’ and ‘welfare’. Both the Children Act 1989 and the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 refer to the child’s ‘welfare’ rather than the child’s ‘best 
interests’ when the courts decide which court order to make. In practice though, the terms 
‘best interests’ and ‘welfare’ are interchangeable.239 Reference to ‘welfare’ in key 
legislation is therefore interpreted as referring to the need for a determination of the 
child’s best interests. Under the Adoption Act 1976, s6 (‘old’ law which governed 
adoption in England and Wales), the child’s welfare was the court’s ‘first’ consideration 
rather than its ‘paramount’ consideration.  
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The use of ‘first’ rather than ‘paramount’ was based on the assumption that there might 
be other considerations, than the child’s welfare, which might have relevance in deciding 
whether or not to make an adoption order (e.g. parents’ interests). This change from 
‘first’ to ‘paramount’ reflected government concern that adults’ interests (i.e. parents) 
were being treated as paramount in the adoption process, rather than those of children.
240
 
Section 6 stated that an adoption order should be made where it would ‘safeguard and 
promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood’. The ACA 2002 changed the 
law to bring the welfare test into line with the paramountcy test in the Children Act 1989, 
s1(1). The ACA 2002, s1(2) thus states that in making an adoption order, the ‘paramount 
consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout his 
life’.  
It is helpful to explain what is meant by the terms ‘welfare’ and ‘paramount 
consideration’ since these terms are used in adoption law in England and Wales. Welfare, 
broadly speaking, refers to ensuring the child’s physical, social, emotional and moral 
well-being. This encompasses a range of considerations based on the child’s age and level 
of intelligence and understanding including interests in being healthy,
241
 being protected 
from harm,
242
 and being heard in court proceedings.
243
 ‘Welfare’ is multi-faceted. It 
reflects the value, importance and vulnerability of children
244
 and is a largely paternalistic 
notion.
245
 Munby LJ (as he was then) described welfare in the following terms: 
‘[It] is synonmous with ‘well-being’ and ‘interests’… [It] extends to and embraces 
everything that relates to the child’s development as a human being and to the child’s 
present and future life as a human being. The judge must consider the child’s welfare 
now, throughout the remainder of the child’s minority and into and throughout 
adulthood…’246 
Munby LJ (as he was then) has made it clear that how far into the future the Court will 
need to consider ‘will depend upon the context and nature of the issue’.247 In adoption 
cases, it is apparent from ACA 2002, s1(2) (considered above) that the Court must 
consider the child’s welfare throughout his or her life.    
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The phrasing ‘paramount consideration’ means that when the courts consider the interests 
of others (e.g. parents
248
 or siblings
249
), the interests of the child (or children) in the case 
will be treated as the court’s main consideration and will outweigh others’ interests. For 
example, if adoption is deemed to be in a child’s best interests but clashes with the 
interests of their birth family, the child’s best interests will prevail.250 In J v. C251 it was 
thus emphasised that paramountcy involved taking a course ‘which is most in the 
interests of the child’.252  
In Re P (Contact: Supervision)
253
 it has been emphasised that: ‘the court is concerned 
with the interests of the mother and father only in so far as they bear on the welfare of the 
child’. Thus, when the court treats the child’s welfare as its paramount consideration, it 
indicates that the welfare of the child should be the court’s sole consideration.254 
Although the ACA 2002 s1(4) welfare checklist is similar to the checklist under the CA 
1989, s1(3), the main difference is that the child’s relationship with his or her birth family 
is explicitly recognised within the ACA 2002 (see s1(4)(f)).  
Section 1(4) (the welfare checklist) states that: 
‘The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters (among 
others) 
(a)the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in 
the light of the child’s age and understanding), 
(b)the child’s particular needs, 
(c)the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member 
of the original family and become an adopted person, 
(d)the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the 
court or agency considers relevant, 
(e)any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41)) which the child 
has suffered or is at risk of suffering,  
(f)the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in 
relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, 
including: 
(i)the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its 
doing so, 
(ii)the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to 
provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and 
otherwise to meet the child’s needs, 
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(iii)the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, 
regarding the child’. 
 
S1(4) provides the courts in England and Wales with the discretion to consider the value 
of the child’s relationship with his or her birth family, the birth family’s ability to meet 
the child’s needs and the wishes and feelings of the birth family in determining whether 
or not a non-consensual adoption ought to take place. These are lists which the courts 
have a broad discretion
255
 in applying. Principles from case law on the CA 1989, s1(3) 
welfare checklist are also relevant to the ACA 2002, s1(4) welfare checklist. For 
example, Staughton LJ stated in H v. H (Residence Order: Leave to Remove from the 
Jurisdiction),
256
 that in respect of the welfare checklist under the CA 1989, s1(3) is not to 
be treated ‘like the list of checks which an airline pilot has to make’ but as the 
considerations which are deemed to be important in a specific case. Arguably then, this 
principle also applies to adoption cases.  
The welfare test can be criticised for its vagueness and the lack of guidance on how much 
weight to afford to each factor under the test. However, any disadvantages that the best 
interests assessment may have are amplified in non-consensual adoption cases because of 
the severity and permanence of adoption for children and birth parents. In fact, in the 
Court of Appeal decision of Re B-S (Children),
257
 Munby P went beyond the traditional 
best interests assessment and stated that a balancing approach
258
 was helpful in 
considering different options for children in care including adoption. Munby P explained 
that the balance sheet approach involved weighing up the pros and cons of each available 
option, so that the most proportionate option (i.e. the most appropriate, least restrictive 
option) could be chosen. 
The value of using a balance sheet type of analysis in determining a child’s best interests 
in any complex matter has been endorsed in the UK Supreme Court by Lady Hale.
259
 
Jones has, however, warned that applying a balance sheet approach is by itself 
insufficient to improve the quality of judgments. Application of the balance sheet 
approach would need to be accompanied by detailed analysis of the facts before 
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balancing the different options and reaching a final decision.
260
 Furthermore, the use of a 
balance sheet approach does not guarantee consideration of the interests of others, such as 
birth parents or siblings or their rights under ECHR Article 8, for example.  
After the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 the courts needed to provide a fuller 
explanation of how the application of the ECHR could be reconciled with the 
paramountcy principle, since the former seemed to suggest a need to consider the rights 
of the parents whereas the latter did not.
261
 In Payne v. Payne,
262
 a relocation case in 
which the parents disagreed about whether the child should continue to live in the UK or 
move abroad,
263
 it was held by Thorpe LJ that courts uphold the child’s welfare as the 
paramount consideration even though there will be an ‘inevitable’ conflict with the rights 
of the parents and that the child’s own rights could be encompassed within consideration 
of the child’s welfare.  
Although in Payne v. Payne, the Court suggested that the ECtHR applies the 
paramountcy principle, in Johansen v. Norway
264
 the ECtHR treated the child’s welfare 
as having particular importance and did not regard it as the sole consideration of the 
Court which would automatically justify an interference with a parent’s right under 
ECHR Article 8. Indeed, according to Johansen, welfare may in some cases override the 
parents’ rights but this depends on the nature and seriousness of breach of parents’ rights 
and the relative strength of the child’s interests. Herring has rejected the Court of 
Appeal’s interpretation of Strasbourg jurisprudence in Payne v. Payne, suggesting that 
the ECtHR has always clearly emphasised a balancing exercise where the welfare of the 
child may, but will not always, override parental rights.
265
  
Since the case of Payne v. Payne was decided, further clarification has been provided in 
Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases)
266
 on the analysis to be undertaken by 
the courts in international relocation cases. Ryder LJ has observed that:  
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‘The questions identified in Payne may or may not be relevant on the facts of an 
individual case and the court will be better placed if it concentrates not on 
assumptions or preconceptions but on the statutory welfare question’.267 
He went on to state the appropriate approach to be taken in international relocation cases, 
placing an emphasis on the need to undertake an analysis with reference to 
proportionality: 
‘Where there is more than one proposal before the court, a welfare analysis of each 
proposal will be necessary.  That is neither a new approach nor is it an option.  A 
welfare analysis is a requirement in any decision about a child's upbringing.  The 
sophistication of that analysis will depend on the facts of the case.  Each realistic 
option for the welfare of a child should be validly considered on its own internal 
merits (i.e. an analysis of the welfare factors relating to each option should be 
undertaken).  That  prevents one option (often in a relocation case the proposals from 
the absent or 'left behind' parent) from being sidelined in a linear analysis.  Not only 
is it necessary to consider both parents' proposals on their own merits and by 
reference to what the child has to say but it is also necessary to consider the options 
side by side in a comparative evaluation.  A proposal that may have some but no 
particular merit on its own may still be better than the only other alternative which is 
worse.   
 
…a step as significant as the relocation of a child to a foreign jurisdiction where the 
possibility of a fundamental interference with the relationship between one parent 
and a child is envisaged requires that the parents' plans be scrutinised and evaluated 
by reference to the proportionality of the same… international relocation cases 
engage articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 [ECHR]’.268 
The ECtHR has presumed that the rights of parents and children carry equal weight but 
that interference with a parent’s right may be justified in the light of the child’s 
welfare.
269
 Indeed, as Simmonds has observed, the domestic courts have traditionally 
applied a different approach to decision-making, a different method of reasoning and may 
potentially reach a different conclusion under the welfare principle than might be the case 
when applying an analysis under ECHR Article 8.
270
 However, recent case law may 
demonstrate a shift in the approach of the Courts in England and Wales towards 
proportionality and a greater emphasis on the child’s best interests can be seen in the 
approach of the ECtHR when considering parental rights and children’s welfare in 
adoption cases (see Section 2.2 and Chapter 3).  
2.5 Conclusion 
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The purpose of this chapter has been to explain and analyse children’s best interests and 
children’s and parents’ rights and to show how they may be applied and argued in non-
consensual adoption cases. In doing so, this chapter has served to lay down foundations 
for the discussion and analysis in subsequent chapters as to the circumstances in which 
non-consensual adoption may be regarded as a proportionate measure. As considered in 
Chapter 1 and in this chapter, the welfare (or best interests) of the child under s52(1)(b) 
of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 determines whether or not a non-consensual 
adoption takes place. Therefore, it has been relevant to this thesis to explain what is 
meant by the welfare principle and the way in which it may be applied by the courts in 
England and Wales.  
 
In the ECtHR, the application of the best interests principle (under Article 8(2)) may, in 
some cases, justify interference with parental rights to respect for private and family life 
under ECHR Article 8. Thus, this chapter has considered the best interests principle 
applied by the ECtHR and enshrined within the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (in Article 3). The best interests principle, which is recognised 
internationally, is similar to the welfare principle in England and Wales, and may justify 
the making of an adoption order without parental consent. This chapter has provided a 
detailed discussion and analysis of children’s rights, in particular, under the UNCRC.  
 
This chapter has also provided brief reference to parental rights in England and Wales 
and also under the ECHR and the UNCRC. It has drawn a number of important 
conclusions about the relevance of the UNCRC. While the UNCRC is non-binding in the 
courts in England and Wales, and is considered intermittently by the English courts and 
the ECtHR in adoption matters, it has been argued that many UNCRC rights are relevant 
in non-consensual adoption cases (e.g. Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20 and 21). 
UNCRC Article 20, for example, explicitly states that, where possible, the least restrictive 
measures available to States to protect children from harm ought to be taken.  
 
Furthermore, it is suggested that it is implied within Articles 5, 7, 8, 9 and 18 (as well as 
the UN Guidelines) that the least restrictive measure available to the State must be taken 
so as to ensure, that where possible, families stay together. While it appears that Article 
21 may permit non-consensual adoption solely on the basis of the child’s welfare, a bare 
welfare test is not necessarily sufficient to justify non-consensual adoption. In fact, due to 
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the indivisible and interdependent nature of the Convention, the interpretation of welfare 
must encompass consideration of other UNCRC rights. Thus, State measures such as non-
consensual adoption which are chosen when alternatives are available may not be in 
children’s best interests under UNCRC Article 3. Furthermore, in some cases then, non-
consensual adoption may be regarded as a disproportionate measure in the light of these 
provisions of the UNCRC. 
 
This chapter has not only served as a descriptive chapter which has provided an overview 
of children’s best interests and children’s parental rights which may be relevant in non-
consensual adoption cases, it has also considered the wider implications and potential 
influence of the UNCRC on non-consensual adoption. Having explained the main rights 
which arise in cases before the ECtHR and having considered the approach the Court 
takes towards the best interests principle, the following chapter discusses how ECHR 
rights, the best interests principle and UNCRC rights, have influenced the decision-
making process of the ECtHR.  
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Chapter 3: Adoption Cases in the European Court of 
Human Rights 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg is the last port of call for 
parents who seek to challenge adoption proceedings in England and Wales. The Court’s 
role is not to act as a final court of appeal
271
 and set aside adoption orders, however, but 
to assess whether or not the birth parents’ rights have been violated either by the making 
of an adoption order itself
272
 or by an error with regard to the decision-making process 
leading up to the adoption.
273
 In these cases, the birth parents may allege that an adoption 
itself was a disproportionate measure or that measures taken prior to the adoption (such as 
the making of care orders or the removal of a child into care) violated their rights under 
Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing) and/or Article 8 (the right to respect for private and 
family life).  
 
This chapter assesses what legal rights birth parents and children have under the ECHR 
and whether the scope of these rights ought to be widened. The chapter provides a brief 
analysis of areas for possible development in Strasbourg case law in the context of 
adoption proceedings. This includes the potential relevance of children’s rights under 
Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment) and how these rights may be balanced against other rights which 
children and their parents may claim under Articles 6 and 8. Articles 2 and 3 are not 
currently discussed and applied by the domestic courts and the ECtHR in cases where 
children have been separated from their parents and have been subject to non-consensual 
adoption, even though it would be relevant and appropriate for the courts to do so. 
Although the Court is not bound to consider arguments put before it, this chapter  
considers how examining children’s rights could enrich existing Strasbourg jurisprudence 
generally and, in particular, in adoption cases. An examination of these different ECHR 
rights and how they have been and may be applied to adoption by the ECtHR and by 
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courts and policy-makers in England and Wales will provide a way of evaluating the 
proportionality of non-consensual adoption. 
 
The chapter first considers the Convention Rights which are most relevant to adoption 
proceedings. It next discusses who has argued the Convention rights referred to above, 
how they have been argued and the circumstances in which steps leading to a non-
consensual adoption or even the non-consensual adoption itself, may lead to a violation 
(or violations) of ECHR rights. The chapter also discusses the ECtHR’s approach to 
balancing the different rights and interests of birth parents and children in non-consensual 
adoption cases. 
3.2 The Protection of Children: Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention 
3.2.1 Article 2: Right to Life 
 
‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law’. 
 
Article 2 is a relevant consideration in non-consensual adoption cases since adoption 
typically serves the purpose of protecting the child from harm and may also protect the 
child from risks to his or her life. Article 2 comprises both positive and negative 
obligations. The State has a positive obligation to protect life
274
 and a negative obligation 
to refrain from taking life. Implicit in Article 2 is a positive obligation on the part of the 
State to protect children. It is useful to consider some factual circumstances in which 
Article 2 has been argued to demonstrate that a failure to provide adequate resources to 
sustain the lives of children may constitute a breach of Article 2.  
 
Thus, for instance, in Nencheva and others v. Bulgaria,
275
 15 children and young adults 
living in a State institution died because of a shortage of food, medicine and other basic 
necessities as well as the effects of the cold. The ECtHR held that Article 2 had been 
violated because the State had failed in its positive obligation to protect vulnerable 
children from a serious and immediate threat. States have a positive obligation to be 
proactive and to intervene to protect the lives of children by taking measures of 
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investigation and/or protection. In Kontrova v. Slovakia,
276
 the police’s response to 
reports of domestic violence was held to be inadequate as it had resulted in the death of 
the female victim and her children, at the hands of her husband. The ECtHR held that the 
Slovakian authorities were in breach of their positive obligation under Article 2 as the 
deaths were a direct consequence of police failings. Thus, to meet its positive obligation 
to act to protect children’s lives, the State will sometimes have a duty to intervene in 
cases where children are experiencing severe neglect or abuse – whether it be at the hands 
of the State (such as in the care of an institution) and/or at the hands of a family member 
(such as a parent). It is possible that a State’s failure to intervene when children are at risk 
at the hands of specific individuals,
277
 (including their parents) could give rise to an 
arguable case under Article 2 if the child’s death was foreseeable.278  
 
When children have been removed into care, the ECtHR has commented that there is an 
obligation under Article 8 to reunite these children with their parents where this is 
possible.
279
 However, in cases of severe neglect and/or abuse where a child’s life is 
endangered, returning the child to his or her birth parents would be unthinkable. Such a 
step would potentially threaten the child’s right to life under Article 2, since, in the most 
serious of cases, a child who is returned to an abusive parent (or parents) could be killed. 
If it is decided that a child should not be reunited with his or her parents because of the 
risk of the child suffering from life-threatening neglect and/or abuse then adoption may 
well be in the child’s best interests. In other words, as Sloan has argued, for some 
children, adoption could be a way of protecting a child’s right to life and be part of the 
State’s obligation to ensure the child’s maximum development.280 Thus, the violation of 
the birth parents’ right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 may be 
trumped by the child’s Article 2 right. It is argued in this thesis, however, that Article 2 
should only apply in the most serious cases of neglect and/or abuse. There may be cases 
where children’s lives may not necessarily be endangered at the hands of their parents, 
but they may still have suffered from (or be likely to suffer from) neglect or abuse which 
will harm the child physically and/or emotionally. In such cases then, any rights-based 
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arguments in favour of adoption would instead stem from Articles 3 and 8 (considered 
below).  
3.2.2 Article 3: Right to Freedom from Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. 
 
Many non-consensual adoptions in England and Wales take place after children have 
been removed into care because they were neglected and/or abused by their parents. As 
such steps may be appropriate and necessary to protect children’s Article 3 rights, it is 
therefore important to assess the relevance of Article 3 to the question of the 
proportionality of adoption. Under Article 3, there is an absolute right to freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. ECtHR case law on Article 3 has emphasised 
the State’s duty to intervene to protect children from abuse or neglect at the hands of their 
parents.
281
 This can be seen, for example, in Z and Others v. UK
282
 where a local 
authority failed to intervene early enough to protect four children from severe neglect and 
abuse at the hands of their parents. The local authority had known, for five years, about 
the serious neglect and ill-treatment, but despite having the means to do so, had failed to 
take any effective steps to bring the children’s distress to an end. The social workers were 
reluctant to intervene because they had not established that physical abuse had occurred, 
but only what they regarded as ‘neglectful parenting’.283  
 
The children brought a case against the UK, alleging that the State’s failure to intervene 
to protect them had violated their rights under Article 3. The ECtHR found that the 
children had suffered from emotional and physical abuse and neglect and that the harm 
the children suffered had reached the level of severity prohibited under Article 3. The 
Court stated that: ‘the severity of the damage suffered by the children is inextricably 
linked to the long period of time over which the abuse persisted’.284 The Court held that 
the State had a positive obligation under Article 3 to protect the children from being 
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harmed by their parents. The State had not satisfied its obligation through its failure to 
intervene sooner and consequently, the ECtHR held that the children’s Article 3 right to 
freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment had been violated.  
 
As the above case shows, neglect and/or abuse or risk of it may justify removing children 
into the care of the State, even though this will amount to an interference with the 
parents’ Article 8 right. In some cases, non-consensual adoption may be a necessary and 
proportionate measure to prevent further abuse and further potential violations of Article 
3. In particular, adoption may serve to protect the Article 3 rights of children who have 
been abused by their parents and who risk further abuse if they are returned to their 
parents or maintain relationships with them. Thus, adoption may sometimes be the most 
effective measure to protect children’s Article 3 right.  
 
It is clear that the State has a positive obligation to act to protect children from harm, as is 
seen from Z and Others v. UK. However, there may be cases where even though the 
threshold under Article 3 may be satisfied and it is necessary and proportionate to remove 
children from the care of their parents, such children have the potential to be able to have 
beneficial relationships with their parents. In cases where children have been subjected to 
neglect and/or abuse, not all of them will be harmed by maintaining relationships with 
their parents or even, in some circumstances, being reunited with their parents. It depends 
on the facts in individual cases. This can be seen in Aune v. Norway,
285
 for example, 
where a child retained contact with his mother but could not be raised by her because of 
her drug abuse problems.  
 
Alternatively, in some cases, parental circumstances may change so significantly that it 
may be arguable that it is appropriate for children to be returned to their parents (see 
Section 3.5) and in other cases it may be desirable to seek a less restrictive measure than 
non-consensual adoption which may be just as effective (such as kinship care or special 
guardianship - see Chapter 5). As has been shown in Chapter 2, UNCRC Article 7 (the 
right to know and be cared for by one’s parents), UNCRC Article 8 (the right to 
preservation of one’s identity, which includes family relations) and UNCRC Article 9 
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(the right not to be separated from one’s parents unless it is necessary) are all rights 
which could be argued on the child’s behalf, against non-consensual adoption.  
 
However, it can be a challenge to ensure that the appropriate balance is achieved in 
protecting children’s rights under ECHR Article 3 on the one hand and children’s rights 
to respect for private and family life under ECHR Article 8 and under UNCRC Articles 7, 
8 and 9, on the other. At one end of the spectrum, State intervention whereby a child is 
removed from his or her family home may be a necessary and proportionate measure 
which protects a child from experiencing further neglect or abuse, thereby protecting his 
or her rights under Article 3.
286
 However, at the other end of the spectrum, taking a child 
into care may in some cases be a disproportionate measure which violates the rights of 
both the child under Article 3 and/or Article 8 and his or her parents’ right to respect for 
private and family life under Article 8.
287
 To date, Article 3 has not been considered by 
the ECtHR in the context of adoption proceedings. However, Article 3 has been argued 
by the State as a justification for intervening in family life (which potentially violates 
ECHR Article 8).  
 
This can be seen in P, C and S v. UK,
288
 where a newborn baby (S) was removed into 
care because she was determined by the High Court in England to be at risk of harm and 
who was placed for adoption without parental consent. Here, the UK government argued 
Article 3 in its defence.
289
 In fact, if the State had not taken sufficient precautions to 
protect S, and if S had been subjected to significant harm by her mother in the future, she 
could have argued the existence of an Article 3 violation. The UK government argued 
that the State had a positive obligation to intervene to protect a newborn child from harm 
and risked falling foul of Article 3 if it did not do so. This is a right of S which can be 
seen as distinct from the rights and interests of the parents. An important question, 
however, would be whether removal of S at birth, preventing contact between S and her 
parents and, S’s adoption were necessary and proportionate measures to protect her right 
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under Article 3. It is at least arguable that S could have been protected from harm and that 
the State could have discharged its positive obligation via less restrictive measures.
290
 
 
Article 3 may have further relevance in non-consensual adoption cases. Article 3 could 
potentially be argued, for example, in cases where children face trauma due to being 
taken into care and/or due to the experience of the adoption process itself. Although 
parental distress and humiliation, which may occur when a child is taken into care, will 
not cross the necessary threshold for an Article 3 obligation to arise,
291
 it is arguable that 
such distress and humiliation in the context of adoption cases might engage children’s 
and parents’ rights under Article 3. Thus, if parents and/or their children suffer physical 
or emotional harm due to the children being taken into care and subsequently placed for 
adoption without parental consent, this may satisfy the threshold required to engage 
Article 3 since the ECtHR has recognised that severe mental distress can reach a 
threshold that satisfies Article 3.
292
  
 
Article 3 could also be argued by children who have been abused in care when it would 
have been possible to reunite children with their parents or to place them with birth 
relatives. Such an argument has been successful before the Court of Appeal in England 
and Wales
293
 and it could be raised before the ECtHR. Although neglect and/or abuse 
which is severe enough to engage Article 3 may be a very persuasive factor in favour of 
adoption, in cases where non-consensual adoption has the potential to be traumatic for a 
child and potentially violate the child’s Article 3 right, then a less restrictive alternative to 
adoption ought to be found. This is, for example, argued in respect of Y.C. v. UK
294
 (see 
Section 6.2.2).  
3.3 Procedural Protection of Rights in Adoption Proceedings 
3.3.1 The Relationship between Article 6(1) and Article 8  
 
Birth parents have argued, in some cases, that the procedures for the care proceedings 
and/or the adoption proceedings have violated their rights under Articles 6(1) and/or 
                                                          
290
 See Section 3.3 for further discussion on P, C and S v. UK (Application no. 56547/00) 16 July 2002 and 
Chapter 5 for further discussion on less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption.  
291
 MAK v. UK (Application no. 45901/05) [2010] 2 FLR 451 (ECHR). 
292
 Kurt v. Turkey (Application no. 24276/94) 25 May 1998. 
293
 A and S v Lancashire County Council [2012] EWHC 1689 (Fam). 
294
 (Application no. 4547/10) 13 March 2012. 
66 
 
Article 8. This section first discusses the relevance of Article 6(1) which states that: ‘In 
the determination of his civil rights and obligations… everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law…’ Before considering how Article 8 can also provide procedural 
protection to parents’ (and potentially children’s) rights in adoption cases. This chapter 
discusses the protection that these rights provide for children and parents. 
 
Under Article 6(1), children and parents’ rights to a fair hearing must be protected in 
general, and this therefore includes protection in adoption cases. There are four different 
procedural rights in Article 6(1): a right to court,
295
 a right to be heard by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law,
296
 a right to have fairness in the court process
297
 
and a right for the hearing to take place within a reasonable time.
298
 ECtHR jurisprudence 
has established a number of procedural protections for parents, including in the course of 
adoption proceedings. Thus, there must be fair and effective access to the court and 
decision-making must be transparent with parents being informed of evidence against 
them in the proceedings.
299
 Parents have the right to an oral hearing,
300
 they must be 
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included in the decision-making process, they have the right to legal representation
301
 and 
the decisions must be free from bias.
302
 Since the late 1980s the ECtHR has developed a 
procedural aspect to Article 8 which focuses on protecting the substantive rights which 
are encapsulated in Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life). This was 
articulated in W v. UK
303
 where the ECtHR stated that:  
 
‘…the Court is entitled to have regard to that process by which it has been decided 
that an adoption order should be made, to determine whether it has been conducted 
in a manner that, in all the circumstances, is fair and affords due respect to the 
interests protected by Article 8’.
304
  
 
W v. UK has created procedural safeguards for parents whose children are removed from 
them by the State
305
 and the protection under Article 8(1), in this case, bears similarities 
to Article 6(1). This procedural component to Article 8 has received further elaboration in 
subsequent cases such as in McMichael v. UK
306
 (on the need to release official 
documents to parents) and T.P and K.M v. UK
307
 (on the need for local authorities to 
disclose information to parents and involve them in the decision-making process). In X v. 
Croatia
308
 where a mother who lacked capacity was excluded from adoption proceedings, 
the Court emphasised that the applicant should have had the opportunity to be heard and 
that by being excluded from the proceedings leading up to the adoption, the State had 
violated her Article 8 right. Article 8 offers not only substantive protection of the right to 
respect for private and family life, but may in some cases offer procedural safeguards for 
those substantive rights. This can be seen in P,C and S v. UK, for example, where the 
applicants’ lack of legal representation and the short period of time between the care and 
adoption hearing meant that the parents were unable to be involved in the decision-
making process. This was held to be a breach of the parents’ rights under Article 8 
because there had been insufficient procedural protection of their right to respect for 
private and family life under Article 8.
309
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3.3.2 The Relationship between Article 6(1) and Article 8: P, C and S v. UK 
 
In P, C and S v. UK,
310
 an important case concerning the procedural protection of family 
life, the applicant’s child was taken into care and placed for adoption without the 
mother’s consent. In the UK, P (the mother) had to bring her own case on behalf of 
herself, her husband and daughter, before the English court without legal representation, 
which was held by the ECtHR to violate Article 6(1). When P’s legal representatives 
withdrew from her case, she requested an adjournment to find new counsel but this was 
denied by the Court. She was given a brief adjournment of four days and the High Court 
indicated that she would need to conduct her own case. P went ahead with the case with 
the assistance of a ‘McKenzie’s Friend’.311 The Court held it was not in S’s best interests 
to be returned to her parents because of the risk of harm and freed S for adoption.  
 
The ECtHR held that there were violations of Articles 6 and 8. Article 6(1) was engaged 
because obtaining advice from a lawyer relates to the right of access to a court. The Court 
emphasised that the need for permanence did not justify the ‘draconian’ action of 
conducting complex care proceedings followed by an order freeing S for adoption just 
one week later. The ECtHR criticised the English Court’s approach, describing it as a: 
‘somewhat inflexible and blanket approach, applied without particular consideration of 
the facts of this individual case’.312 The Court also observed that despite being freed for 
adoption, it was five-and-a-half months later that S was placed with a family. The final 
adoption order was then made another six months after S’s placement. Thus, the 
procedures used had been unfair and did not enable the applicants to participate in the 
decision-making process in an effective manner. The Court concluded that the applicant 
had not had fair and effective access to court and there had been an Article 6(1) breach of 
her right and the right of her child.
313
  
 
The ECtHR took what Hewson et al have described as an ‘unusual’314 step by allowing 
the parents to argue on the child’s behalf. In fact, most cases concerning the separation of 
parent and child tend to be brought by the parents in respect of violations of their own 
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rights. It has been described as ‘striking’315 by Hewson et al that the ECtHR stated that 
the child’s Article 6 and 8 rights had been violated due to the fact that her parents were 
not legally represented, despite the fact that S was legally represented throughout the 
legal proceedings. However, the ECtHR’s reasoning demonstrates how it can sometimes 
be genuinely difficult to separate the rights of the parents from those of the child. 
Although there was no direct violation of S’s right it would have been difficult for S to 
maintain a legal tie with her parents and to have her Article 8 rights protected if her 
parents had not had adequate legal representation in the process of care and adoption 
proceedings. In order for S to obtain the best possible chance of having a relationship 
with her parents and having her Article 8 right protected, it would therefore be necessary 
for her parents to have proper legal representation (for further detail on this case, see 
Section 3.4.6). This section considered the procedural protection which may be provided 
to birth parents and children in non-consensual adoption cases. The following section 
considers how substantive rights may be protected under the ECHR.  
 
3.4 The Protection of Substantive Rights in Care and Adoption Proceedings: ECHR 
Article 8  
3.4.1 Article 8 Right to Respect for Private and Family Life: Overview 
 
The discussion below will provide an overview of whose rights are protected by Article 8 
and in what circumstances these rights will be protected. In particular, the following 
sections will consider cases where Article 8 has been argued in care and adoption 
proceedings. Although different issues may be raised in care proceedings when compared 
with adoption proceedings; the focus of this chapter is on whether the initial removal was 
a justified interference with parents’ Article 8 rights and whether children’s continued 
presence in care is a necessary and proportionate interference with parents’ Article 8 
rights. There are similarities between care and adoption proceedings cases which justify 
examining ECtHR cases on care proceedings. Typically, care proceedings precede the 
making of adoption orders without parental consent and (as seen from P, C and S v. 
UK
316
 above) arguments raised in Article 8 cases, alleging that non-consensual adoption 
is not a proportionate measure, may require a consideration of whether the nature of the 
State intervention was a necessary and proportionate measure. Furthermore, both care and 
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adoption proceedings cases raise issues concerning if and when children ought to be 
reunited with their parents and if and when it is appropriate for children to have contact 
with their parents. These issues are important, in the context of this thesis, which focuses 
on when less restrictive (but equally effective measures) to non-consensual adoption may 
be available.  
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 8 is not an absolute right but a ‘qualified’ right. Article 8(2) provides that in 
specified circumstances it may be justifiable and proportionate for a State to interfere 
with individual rights and thus impose limits on them. Under Article 8(2), the Court 
performs an analysis to determine whether a rights violation is necessary and 
proportionate. An adoption order which amounts to an interference with the parents’ 
rights under Article 8(1) may be justified under Article 8(2) by reference to the child’s 
best interests. For instance, in an adoption case, the family court may decide that the child 
has suffered such terrible abuse that he or she should be placed for adoption without 
parental consent. 
 
A significant part of this chapter is devoted to Article 8. This is because Article 8 is 
frequently argued in non-consensual adoption cases either in relation to the adoption itself 
or to the measures which preceded the adoption such as the removal of a child into care 
or a reduction in or termination of contact. It is in the context of Article 8 where issues of 
proportionality typically arise. This chapter will consider when Article 8 may be argued 
and when interference with this right may constitute a necessary and proportionate 
measure from the perspective of the ECtHR. Although the State has a negative obligation 
not to unnecessarily intervene in family life, it also has a positive obligation towards the 
child to intervene to prevent neglect or abuse and to prevent further neglect or abuse from 
occurring.
317
 According to the ECtHR there must be pressing reasons for the interference 
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with family ties
318
 and intervention must be necessary in a democratic society and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of child protection. This means that the State has to 
strike a fair balance between the interest of protecting children on the one hand and 
protecting family life on the other.
319
 Any State intervention which takes place should be 
sufficient to protect the child’s best interests and be proportionate. The discussion in the 
next section will consider the content of Article 8(1) and the process whereby rights 
argued by parents and/or other individuals, may be limited by reference to Article 8(2).  
3.4.2 Article 8 Right to Respect for Private and Family Life: Interpretation and 
Definition 
 
Respect for a private and family life means that the State is under a duty to take positive 
steps to protect these rights.
320
 Under ‘family life’ a range of different relationships are 
protected.
321
 This includes, for example, relationships between children and birth 
parents
322
 and other ‘de facto “family ties” where sufficient constancy is present’.323 The 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR emphasises the importance of the ‘reality’ of family life 
rather than the strict legal and/or biological relationships which exist between parties and 
therefore foster parents,
324
 adoptive parents
325
 and prospective adoptive parents who have 
developed a relationship with a child can also fall within the scope of family life.
326
 The 
ECtHR has, in some cases, also protected the relationship between children and other 
family members, including siblings,
327
 relationships with aunts and uncles
328
 and 
grandparents.
329
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Private life is a broad concept which refers to ‘aspects of an individual’s physical and 
social identity,’330 ‘personal development’331 and ‘the right to establish relationships with 
other human beings’.332 This means that in adoption cases, where fathers find themselves 
unable to establish the right to ‘family life’ with their child, it may nonetheless be 
possible to instead to argue that there is a right to a ‘private life’.333 The right to a private 
life is important for the child too as it covers the extent to which an adoption order can 
impact on the child’s own social and personal identity as the child334 will join another 
family and may have his or her surname and even forename changed. 
 
The right to respect for private and family life also protects a person’s physical and 
psychological wellbeing.
335
 A sound mental state is also included within the scope of 
‘private life’.336 It has been held by the ECtHR that measures which affect an individual’s 
physical integrity or mental health must reach a certain degree of severity to amount to an 
interference with the right to private life.
337
 However, even minor interferences which are 
against a person’s will may fall within the scope of Article 8.338 In evaluating physical 
integrity within Article 8, there is a clear overlap with Article 3. The distinction between 
the two seems to be with the severity of the interference. Therefore, even where the 
alleged child abuse or neglect may not be grave enough to reach the threshold required to 
engage Article 3, it may nevertheless come under Article 8. For example, Article 8 may 
be engaged where a child is not washed, sleeps in soiled sheets, is not appropriately 
dressed or receives inadequate nourishment as such treatment interferes with the child’s 
right to respect for his or her physical integrity.
339
  
 
In practice, the birth mother will typically have a right to family life engaged in relation 
to her child regardless of whether she has ever raised the child.
340
 In X v. Croatia,
341
 the 
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applicant suffered from schizophrenia and gave birth to a daughter. She was divested of 
her legal capacity because of her mental illness. It was found that she would be unable to 
care for the child because of this illness and her drug addiction, neither of which had 
showed signs of improvement. She agreed to being placed under guardianship, regarding 
it as in her own best interests and those of her child. The legal consequence of being 
divested of capacity was that she was also deprived of her parental rights. A decision was 
made that the child should be placed in foster care and that the applicant was in need of a 
carer. Although the applicant was deemed to be unfit to care for her child, contact was 
arranged between them by the national authorities. Proceedings for adoption were 
commenced without the applicant’s knowledge. Under Croatian law, as she had been 
divested of her capacity, she was not a party to the adoption proceedings and authorities 
had no obligation to inform her about the adoption.  
 
The applicant alleged a violation of Article 8 because her daughter had been placed for 
adoption without her knowledge, consent or participation in the adoption proceedings. 
There were no domestic remedies available to her under Croatian law, because the law 
was such that once she was regarded as lacking mental capacity, under Croatian law her 
acts were incapable of producing legal effects. The Croatian government argued that 
Article 8 did not apply because the relationship between mother and daughter had 
deteriorated to such a level that it no longer represented family life and that a blood 
relationship was insufficient for this. The ECtHR disagreed and held that, under Article 8, 
the applicant had the right to family life with her daughter. This case shows that the right 
to a family life under Article 8, is not lost due to lack of mental capacity.  
 
The ECtHR has stated that a biological relationship between father and child is 
insufficient to establish the existence of family life
342
 but the Court will often recognise 
the existence of a right to private life.
343
 This can be seen in Anayo v. Germany,
344
 where 
the applicant had fathered twins with a married woman, who had raised the children with 
her husband but had not allowed the applicant to have contact with his children. The 
Court held that it could not ‘exclude’ the possibility of a family tie since it was not the 
applicant’s fault that he did not have a relationship with the twins. However, it focused 
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primarily on the applicant’s right to a private life, observing that having contact with his 
children still formed an important part of the applicant’s identity and thus, his right to a 
private life.  
 
The Court has previously recognised family life between fathers and their biological 
children, even where the father has not developed a relationship with his child (or 
children).
345
 Thus in Keegan v. Ireland,
346
 the claimant was an unmarried father whose 
child was placed for adoption without his knowledge or consent. The Court held that, 
under Article 8, family life could be established between a father and child even where he 
was not married to the mother and was no longer in a cohabiting relationship with the 
mother at the time of the child’s birth. The Court held that the father’s Article 8 right was 
engaged and that Irish law enabling the adoption to take place in secret, amounted to an 
interference with his Article 8 rights.  
 
As considered in the paragraph above, in family proceedings including adoption 
proceedings, fathers will be able to argue that their right to a ‘family’ or ‘private’ life is 
engaged under Article 8. Similarly, in cases where a mother has not raised her child, it is 
likely that she will be able to argue that a right to a private life has been engaged, even if 
the right to a family life is not applicable. In I.S v. Germany,
347
 for example, the mother 
argued that her right to ‘family life’ was engaged when she sought contact with and 
information about her children who were placed for adoption. The Court held that 
although she had previously had a ‘family life’ with her children, the act of voluntarily 
giving up her newborn children meant that family life had ceased and that a claim under 
the right to ‘private life’ was more appropriate. The cases considered above are important 
because they demonstrate that birth parents can argue that non-consensual adoption may 
violate their Article 8 right, regardless of whether they have managed to establish a 
relationship with their child. This means, for example, that in cases where children are 
removed from their parents immediately after birth, the birth parents can nonetheless 
assert that they have rights under Article 8.  
 
3.4.3 Proportionality Criteria in the European Court of Human Rights 
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As was considered in the introduction of this thesis, proportionality refers to whether or 
not a measure taken in the furtherance of a State objective is commensurate to that 
objective.
348
 When a violation under the ECHR Article 8(1)
349
 right to respect for private 
and family life is alleged, the ECtHR determines whether State interference is ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’ under Article 8(2). Although the terminology used sometimes 
differs, there is broad agreement among academics that there are four stages or tests in the 
proportionality process: a ‘legitimate objective’; a ‘rational connection’; a ‘minimal 
impairment’ and an ‘overall balance’.350 The application of these tests serves to establish 
whether it can be justifiable to limit rights. Each of these tests can be regarded as distinct 
steps in determining the proportionality of measures including adoption orders. 
Considering the fact that the ECHR is a binding Convention and decisions of the ECtHR 
are binding upon the UK, it is helpful to explain the criteria applied by the ECtHR in 
determining whether measures, such as adoption orders, are necessary and proportionate.  
 
A legitimate objective means that there needs to be a sufficiently important reason to  
justify a limitation of a right under Article 8(2). For example, an interference with the 
birth parents’ rights under Article 8 due to non-consensual adoption may, in some cases, 
be justified on the basis of the need to protect the child’s rights, health or morals. 
Removal of the child into care and placement for adoption are measures which have the 
aim of protecting the child in question. The European Court has stressed that taking a 
child into care for the child’s own protection may be legitimate but that it ought to be a 
temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as possible. This demonstrates that the 
State cannot use an objectively legitimate goal to justify all of its conduct. In respect of 
non-consensual adoption, for example, it can be argued that just because such adoption 
satisfies a legitimate objective, it does not mean that it will be regarded as a proportionate 
measure. This is where the next aspect of the proportionality analysis becomes important.  
 
A rational connection means that there has to be a link between the objective and the 
measure taken by the State in pursuit of that objective. R.K and A.K v. UK
351
 suggests that 
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when children are taken into care, the imposition of a care order by a domestic court will 
be rationally connected to the State’s aim of protecting the child. The same could be said 
to be true for adoption orders which may in many cases protect the rights and freedoms of 
the child. This could be argued, for example, in the case of Aune v. Norway
352
 where the 
child had been settled with his prospective parents for several years and regarded them as 
his parents.  
 
Brady has observed that very few cases have hinged upon establishing rational 
connection but he has suggested that in order to satisfy this limb, the proposed measure 
must actually be capable of satisfying the objective pursued.
353
 Certainly, in some cases 
adoption will be capable of meeting the objective pursued; namely to protect the health 
and morals of the child or indeed the child’s best interests. The difficulty is, that an 
objective of protecting the health and morals and the overall best interests of the child, is 
such a vague yet all-encompassing objective, that adoption is likely to automatically 
satisfy this limb. In other words, while adoption may be rationally connected to the aim 
of protecting a child’s long-term welfare, there may be other measures which are 
rationally connected to the State’s aim but which are less intrusive. This is why the next 
limb of the proportionality analysis (‘minimal impairment’) is of particular importance to 
this thesis.  
 
A minimal impairment means that the measure taken (i.e. adoption) did not go further 
than necessary to meet the State’s objective. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘least 
restrictive alternative test’ and it can be regarded as the most onerous form of review 
available to the Court since it requires that the State take the least restrictive alternative 
available to it,
354
 which will be an equally effective means of achieving the State’s aim. 
Adoption may mean, for example, that children not only lose legal ties with their parents 
and other birth family, but that they also lose the opportunity to develop or to continue to 
develop relationships with their birth parents, grandparents, siblings and other family 
members. In Pontes v. Portugal,
355
 the Court considered that alternatives to non-
consensual adoption might have been available (including returning the child home) and 
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that these alternatives should have been considered because they would have been just as 
effective ways of protecting the welfare of the child.  
 
It is suggested that, in fact, there may be cases (such as Zhou v. Italy,
356
 R.M.S v. Spain
357
 
and SH v. Italy
358
), where a child’s best interests appears to dictate providing assistance to 
the parent instead of placing the child for adoption, for example. If children have not been 
neglected or abused by their parents (as in the aforementioned cases), children express a 
desire to remain with their parents (e.g. see Y.C. v. UK
359
) or parents have changed their 
circumstances dramatically in a short period of time (see R and H v. UK
360
), then these 
are factors which may suggest that adoption does not serve children’s best interests and 
that the least restrictive alternative to adoption has not been chosen. 
 
The difficulty with ensuring that the least restrictive alternative to adoption is chosen is 
that, while this may protect the parents’ rights, the least restrictive alternative will not 
necessarily be in the child’s best interests. This can be seen in Aune v. Norway, 
considered briefly above. Considering the severity of the consequences of adoption, it is 
arguably important to ensure that a measure which is less intrusive than non-consensual 
adoption, is also at least as effective at ensuring a child’s welfare is protected in the long-
term. In adoption cases, however, it is argued that less restrictive alternatives which are 
equally effective at meeting children’s needs, including the need for stability and 
permanence, can be found. These alternatives to taking a child into care and placing a 
child for adoption could include, for instance, sole care by one parent,
361
 kinship care 
(care by relatives), special guardianship orders or assistance including financial help, 
counselling and advice (see further in Chapter 5). Also, as adoption orders rarely make 
provision for contact, and, if so, only indirect contact then adoption with direct contact 
may be a less restrictive alternative. It is arguable that any measure which prevents 
parents from raising their children could still have the potential to violate parental rights. 
However, this thesis examines whether measures of intervention which are less restrictive 
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than adoption are more likely to protect parental rights and whether alternatives to 
adoption may be equally effective in protecting children’s best interests. 
 
An ‘overall balance’ involves examining the rights of the individual and weighing them 
against the interests of the community and/or the rights of other individuals. An example 
of how this operates can be seen in Harroudj v. France.
362
 In this case, it was held that 
there was no violation of Article 8 when the French authorities refused to allow a French 
national to adopt a child who was already in her care under an Islamic form of 
guardianship known as ‘kafalah’. The Court held that the balance had been struck in 
recognising the public interest in pluralism and integration of children under kafalah, 
without severing ties with the children’s country of origin. This case demonstrates that a 
balance can be achieved through acknowledging the de facto relationship between an 
adult and child, without the need for an adoption to take place. In this case, adoption 
would not have been a proportionate measure. In a non-consensual adoption case, an 
overall balance would potentially involve balancing parental rights against children’s 
rights and best interests.  
 
Choudhry and Herring have argued that, rather than providing a formal analysis of 
whether or not Article 8 has been violated (which is based on a legitimate objective, a 
rational connection, a minimal impairment, a least restrictive alternative and overall 
balance), the ECtHR should instead apply one of three analytical approaches based on 
these stages. They have suggested that the Court should apply either the least restrictive 
alternative test or the overall balance test or consider whether or not the reasons used to 
justify the State’s measure (i.e. removal of the child from his or her parents or non-
consensual adoption) were ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’ as a whole.363 Choudhry and 
Herring have suggested that this is sometimes referred to as the ‘sufficiency’ standard 
which is usually applied by the Court in Article 8 cases concerning family law matters; 
especially as far as children are concerned.
364
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This ‘sufficiency’ standard is regarded as being less rigorous than the minimal 
impairment or least restrictive alternative test because the Court need not consider 
whether equally effective but less restrictive methods could have been used, other than 
removal from the home or even adoption, to best serve the children’s needs. There is 
however, an insufficient body of case law on adoption in the ECtHR, to draw any firm 
conclusion on the type of analysis favoured by the Court in adoption proceedings. In 
general, the Court appeared to have focused on whether or not adoption has struck the 
overall balance.
365
 However, in cases where poverty and insufficient housing has led to 
adoption the Court appears to have focused on minimal impairment whereas, in other 
family law cases, the Court has applied the ‘sufficiency’ standard. It is suggested that the 
serious and irreversible consequences of adoption are such that the existence of a less 
restrictive alternative to adoption, which may perhaps be equally effective when 
compared with adoption, ought to be taken into account not only by the Court of Human 
Rights but by the family courts in England and Wales.   
 
3.4.4 The Margin of Appreciation  
 
The margin of appreciation is the latitude or discretion
366
 enjoyed by the government in 
its decision-making process.
367
 It is sometimes said to stem from the principle of 
subsidiarity,
368
 which means that the ECtHR acknowledges the diversity of national 
authorities, thereby deferring to them as best placed to make determinations on the needs 
of their own people.
369
 The margin of appreciation amounts to an acknowledgement that 
although Member States will afford protection to Convention rights, they are able to take 
into consideration their own unique circumstances when balancing the different interests 
at stake.  
 
In determining the scope of the margin of appreciation, the ECtHR is influenced by the 
nature of the right at stake. The more important the right, the narrower will be the margin 
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of appreciation. The mutual rights of children and parents, to have a relationship with one 
another, are protected under ECHR Article 8. States may be permitted a wide margin of 
appreciation when a child is initially taken into care, even though this may violate 
parents’ and children’s Article 8 rights.370 In general, the Court tends to afford Member 
States a wide margin of appreciation in respect of children’s welfare and in determining 
what will be in children’s best interests371 including taking a child into care if the child 
has suffered or is at risk of suffering significant harm
372
 and in determining when children 
may be placed for adoption.
373
  
 
In adoption cases, however, the wide margin of appreciation is tempered by a more 
intense standard of proportionality. This can be seen in Keegan v. Ireland,
374
 where an 
adoption order had been made without the natural father’s knowledge or consent. Here, 
the ECtHR stated that notwithstanding the wide margin of appreciation, a high level of 
proof was needed to establish that there were relevant reasons for the adoption. An 
application of this high level of proportionality can also be seen in Johansen v. 
Norway.
375
 In this case, the Court acknowledged that a wide margin of appreciation 
existed when the child was taken into care but that it had been disproportionate to remove 
the parental rights of the mother and place her child in a foster home, with a view to an 
adoption order being made. Despite the Court’s rulings in Keegan and Johansen, the 
Court of Human Rights does not always apply a high standard of proportionality in 
adoption cases which have originally been heard in the UK.
376
  
 
O’Halloran has stated that non-consensual adoption is increasing in England and Wales 
but that it is an unusual
377
 approach when compared with the rest of Europe, where 
adoption is typically a ‘consensual process’.378 This is significant since the width of the 
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margin of appreciation may be influenced by the level of consensus amongst Member 
States about a particular issue. Non-consensual adoption may, in practice, be permitted in 
many Member States but it is less commonly used by other States.
379
 According to Jones, 
the application of the consensus principle can be unpredictable in practice and may 
ultimately grant States a wide freedom of action.
380
 The ECtHR has also been criticised 
for lack of sufficient comparative research, which is problematic since the Court often 
uses the consensus criterion as a means of determining what the margin of appreciation 
will be.
381
 However, both scholars
382
 and judges
383
 have acknowledged that the UK’s 
policy on non-consensual adoption is out of line with the rest of Europe. In fact, the 
ECtHR has yet to directly address the fact that the UK’s policy of adoption for children in 
care is inconsistent with the rest of Europe, despite the fact that several non-consensual 
adoption cases flowing from the UK, have been heard by the ECtHR.
384
  
3.4.5 State Intervention to Assist Families: ECHR Article 8  
 
It can be argued that, in some cases, the State may have a positive obligation under 
ECHR Article 8 to provide assistance to families before placing a child for adoption. In 
cases where children are at risk of harm but have not been harmed by their parents, it is 
arguable that with appropriate practical and/or financial assistance from the State, it may 
be possible for children to remain with their parents. In other words, the availability and 
provision of less restrictive measures to adoption may be equally effective and less likely 
to violate the Article 8 rights of children and their parents. 
 
There are cases which suggest that there may be a positive obligation under Article 8 to 
provide practical and/or financial assistance to help children and parents stay together. 
One such case is Wallova and Walla v. Czech Republic
385
 In this case, the parents were 
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unemployed and as the State authorities regarded their housing as being unsuitable, they 
put in place a supervision order so as to encourage the parents to find suitable housing. 
When the parents failed to do so, their children were taken into care. The parents alleged 
violations of Article 8 because they had been separated from their five children and 
because the State had failed to assist them. The Court held that the separation had been 
caused by difficulties which the authorities could have addressed in another way, which 
would have avoided having to split up the family. The Court suggested alternatives (such 
as monitoring the applicants’ living and hygiene conditions and providing advice) but 
which the State had failed to consider. The Court found that, although the reasons 
provided by the State were relevant to warrant intervention, these reasons had not been 
sufficient to justify the removal of the children into care. Accordingly, it held that there 
had been a violation of the applicants’ Article 8 rights. Potentially, this case could be 
used to support the notion of a wider positive obligation under Article 8 to keep families 
together.
386
  
 
It can also be argued that Article 8 should be interpreted more expansively so as to 
protect children and parents’ rights to continue to live together or at least to be able to 
retain relationships with one another. As considered above in the context of Article 2 (the 
right to life) and Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment), the State has a positive obligation to intervene to safeguard life and to protect 
children from harm. However, the scope of the positive obligation under Article 8 to help 
keep birth families together remains unclear.
387
 What is clear, however, is that there are 
often social problems which lie behind the need for State intervention in the first place. 
There are cases, for example, where poverty leads to neglect
388
 and in such cases, timely 
State assistance may have prevented children from being harmed. It has been argued by 
Kilkelly that if Article 8 was interpreted widely requiring State intervention to assist 
families, this would make protection for children and their families, practical and 
effective.
389
 Expanding the scope of Article 8 could have the potential to decrease neglect 
and abuse and lead to greater utilisation of measures which might be just as effective as 
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non-consensual adoption, but less restrictive. There is increasing evidence of this type of 
approach being taken in European jurisprudence which may, in time, influence the law on 
non-consensual adoption in England and Wales. 
 
In R.M.S v. Spain,
390
 for example, the Court needed to consider the extent to which the 
scope of the positive obligation under Article 8 extends towards the provision of State 
assistance. In this case, a child had been removed into care and placed for adoption 
because of her mother’s poverty and uncertain living arrangements. The Court stated that 
whereas in some cases children in poor living conditions or suffering from material 
deprivation have been removed into care, this had never been the sole reason.
391
 Such 
removal was only justified alongside other factors, such as the parents’ psychological 
state or inability to provide their children with emotional and educational support.
392
  
 
Other factors which, by themselves, could justify intervention could include physical or 
psychological ill-treatment,
393
 sexual abuse,
394
 lack of emotional development,
395
 the 
child having health problems or psychological instability of the parents.
396
 The removal 
and adoption of the child in R.M.S was, therefore, held by the Court to be a 
disproportionate interference with the mother’s Article 8 right to respect for private and 
family life as the State had failed to take sufficient and appropriate measures to secure the 
mother’s right to live with her child. The Court held that the State could have taken less 
restrictive alternative measures such as advising the mother on how to obtain benefits and 
to secure social housing. The decision in R.M.S indicates that poverty and uncertain living 
arrangements are on their own insufficient grounds for taking a child into care and 
placing the child for adoption. Some other factor such as abuse or neglect is needed to 
justify a measure like adoption, which may be a serious interference with the Article 8 
rights of the birth parents.  
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A similar approach was taken in Zhou v. Italy where the Court again needed to consider 
whether there were sufficient grounds to justify interference with parental rights under 
Article 8.
397
 Here, the mother was working mother who had placed her child in the care of 
a neighbouring couple while she went to work. As Social Services did not regard the 
couple as suitable carers for the child, the child was taken into care and placed for 
adoption. Because of the choices the mother had made, she was regarded as being 
incapable of exercising her parental role and fostering the development of her son’s 
personality. The Italian Court subsequently made an adoption order. The mother argued 
that placing her child for adoption and preventing her from seeing her child had violated 
her right to respect for private and family life under Article 8. The ECtHR held that the 
mother’s Article 8 right had been violated and that the State ought to have taken tangible 
measures to attempt to reunite the mother with her son, before placing him for adoption.  
 
In SH v. Italy,
398
 the State intervened and removed three children into care whose mother 
was suffering from depression and was struggling to raise her children. The parents 
accepted that they needed assistance from the child’s grandfather and the Italian social 
services but maintained that it was not necessary for the children to be taken into foster 
care. The Italian equivalent of a children’s guardian recommended, in the light of the 
strong emotional bond which existed between the mother and her children and the fact 
that the mother was willing to have psychotherapy, that the children ought to be reunited 
with their parents. The children were returned to their mother but were removed into 
foster care again because the mother was hospitalised and the grandfather was too ill to 
assist the family. Despite a court-ordered expert report suggesting that the children should 
remain in care and that contact between the children and their parents ought to continue 
(albeit with a support package from Social Services in place), the Italian Court ordered 
that contact should cease and that the children ought to be placed for adoption, on the 
basis of the mother’s mental health problems and the father’s inability to show his 
children affection.  
 
After having appeals rejected by the superior Italian courts, the mother argued before the 
ECtHR that her Article 8 right had been violated as the Italian authorities had failed to 
satisfy their positive obligation to provide support in order to keep the family together. 
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The three children were placed separately which meant that, not only did they lose their 
relationships with their parents, but that they also lost the opportunity to maintain 
relationships with each other. The Court considered that Member States must equip 
themselves with legal powers to ensure compliance with their positive obligations under 
Article 8.
399
 The Court observed that, despite the existence of emotional bonds, the 
family’s willingness to collaborate with Social Services and the existence of an expert 
report recommending that the family should be kept together, the Italian Court had 
ordered the adoption of the three children.
400
 The Court determined that the Italian 
Court’s failure to consider less radical solutions, such as the support package 
recommended by expert testimony, demonstrated that the national authorities had not 
made sufficient attempts to protect the mother-child bond and thus, the mother’s Article 8 
right had been violated. The Court also emphasised that State agencies must, in particular, 
protect, guide and advise vulnerable persons such as those suffering from mental health 
problems.
401
 An interesting aspect of this decision is that the Court emphasised the 
importance of intervention in this case, despite the resource implications of providing 
such support to families.  
 
The ECtHR is increasingly emphasising the importance of the need for States to use less 
restrictive measures than non-consensual adoption but which may be equally effective. A 
wider implication of these decisions, in particular, the recent decision in SH v. Italy, is 
that the positive obligation owed by the State to families may mean that it will become 
necessary for State authorities to attempt to reunite families by means of less restrictive 
alternatives to non-consensual adoption. This decision may have a wider impact in non-
consensual adoption cases in England and Wales, where the State has not sufficiently 
explored the possibility of keeping families together via State assistance (see the 
discussion in Chapter 5, for further detail).   
3.4.6 Removing Children from the Family Home: Article 8  
 
Regardless of the State’s positive obligation to assist children and their parents, 
interference with parents’ rights may sometimes be justified under Article 8(2), for 
example, in cases of severe neglect and abuse (see Section 3.2). These circumstances will 
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make it necessary for the State to take action,
402
 and potentially remove a child from his 
or her family home. Any interventionist measure must, however, be proportionate
403
 and 
arguably there may be cases where measures (which are less restrictive and thus less of 
an interference with children’s and parents’ rights under Article 8(1)) may be used to 
protect children’s rights under ECHR Articles 2 and 3 and their best interests.  
 
In practice, measures of intervention could include the provision of additional help or 
support for the family unit where required,
404
 the reduction and/or the termination of 
contact,
405
 the termination of parental responsibility/rights
406
 and ultimately even 
adoption. There are a number of cases, however, where State measures have been held 
not to be proportionate and the Court has found violations of Article 8.
407
 The cases 
typically challenge the initial separation of the parent and child and any subsequent 
measures which adversely impacted on the ongoing relationship between parent and child 
and the likelihood of them being reunited in the future. 
 
It is helpful to examine some key cases where initial State intervention under Article 8(1) 
has been justified but further measures, such as removal of the child from the family 
home or adoption, have not. In Kutzner v. Germany,
408
 the children were taken into foster 
care because the applicants were not considered to have the requisite intellectual capacity 
to raise their children and because there was emotional under-development in the 
children. The children had been provided with educational support measures which were 
considered to be inadequate and the authorities determined that further intervention was 
required. The Court questioned whether Social Services and the judiciary had given 
sufficient consideration to additional measures of support as an alternative to the more 
serious measure of separating the children from their parents. The parents were not 
permitted to have contact with their children for six months and, although they were 
eventually granted the right to have contact, they were still only allowed to see their 
children twice a month for an hour.  
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The actions taken by the State were held to have been disproportionate, with the Court 
disapproving of the State’s decision to make a care order and, in particular, the manner in 
which it was implemented.
409
 The Court observed that it might have been possible to 
have protected the children’s welfare by offering additional practical support to the 
family from Social Services, rather than taking ‘by far the most extreme measure’.410 It 
also suggested that the limitations on contact would only have served to add to the 
alienation between the children and their parents.
411
 The Court therefore held that even 
though the reasons for intervention were legitimate, they were insufficient to justify such 
a serious interference with family life. The Court therefore found that there had been a 
violation of the parents’ Article 8 rights. 
 
The decision in Kutzner is an example of a State failing to satisfy the proportionality test 
by not considering less restrictive alternatives which would have provided sufficient 
protection for the children’s welfare.412 Kutzner shows that where children are removed 
from parents with learning disabilities, then the relevant authorities must consider 
whether it would be appropriate to provide the family with additional support.
413
 A failure 
to give sufficient consideration to alternative methods of family support which would 
thereby enable children to remain in the family home would be a disproportionate 
interference with parental rights. Kutzner also serves as a warning that it is not justifiable 
to remove children from their parents just because they could be raised in a more 
beneficial environment than that which their parents could provide.
414
 A similar message 
can be found in Haase v Germany
415
 where the Court held that: 
 
‘The fact that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her 
upbringing will not on its own justify a compulsory measure of removal from the 
care of the biological parents; there must exist other circumstances pointing to the 
‘necessity’ for such an interference with the parents’ right under Art 8 to enjoy a 
family life with their child…[B]efore public authorities have recourse to emergency 
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measures in such delicate issues as care orders, the imminent danger should be 
actually established.  It is true that in obvious cases of danger no involvement of the 
parents is called for. However if it is still possible to hear the parents of the children 
and to discuss with them the necessity of the measure, there should be no room for 
an emergency action, in particular when, like in the present case, the danger had 
already existed for a long period’. 
 
There are cases where State intervention may be regarded as being justifiable so as to 
assist parents in raising their children, but not the removal of a child from his or her 
parents. In Saviny v. Ukraine, four children were removed from their blind parents on the 
basis that the children were in ‘danger’. The reason for their removal was that the 
environment the children were living in was regarded as unsatisfactory by the authorities 
because where the children lived was cold, dirty and untidy. The Court held that the 
parents’ Article 8 right had been violated by removing the children into care and that, 
while the reasons for removal were relevant, they were insufficient to justify compulsory 
removal. The Court emphasised that there must be ‘weighty considerations in the 
interests of the child’416 which would justify the children being taken into care. 
Establishing that the child would be removed into a ‘more beneficial environment’417 did 
not justify the State’s action. The Court said that financial assistance and social 
counselling could have been helpful for the parents in this case and it stressed the 
importance of sufficiently exploring ‘less far-reaching alternatives’418 before removing 
the children into care, a measure which was disproportionate under the circumstances.  
 
As considered above, State intervention may be justified to protect children’s welfare 
under Article 8(2) but in some cases, care orders may not be a proportionate measure. In 
other cases, care orders may well be proportionate but the ECtHR takes the view that care 
orders ought to be a temporary measure
419
 and that the State ought to take active steps to 
reunite children with their parents. The State’s positive obligation may extend to 
reuniting parents and children, even where separation has been justified under Article 
8(2).
420
 Olsson v. Sweden (No 2)
421
 is an example of a case where the Court has stated 
that such a positive obligation exists. Olsson concerned three children who were taken 
into care, separated from each other and housed a considerable distance from their parents 
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which made it difficult for regular contact to take place. The initial removal of the 
children was held not to be a violation of Article 8(1) but the restrictions on access 
between 1987 and 1990 were, as at that time, there was no legal provision upon which the 
restriction of access could be based.
422
 However, the Court took into consideration the 
lengthy period of separation between the children and their parents and also the children’s 
objections to being reunited and held that the restrictions on access from 1990 onwards 
did not violate the parents’ rights.  
 
This case is an important demonstration of how the separation of parents and children and 
infrequent contact can make reuniting children and parents difficult or even impossible. 
As the Court stated in Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania
423: ‘the passage of time can have 
irremediable consequences for relations between the children and the parent who does not 
live with them’.424 The reasoning in cases like Olsson and Ignaccolo-Zenide is important 
when assessing the proportionality of adoption orders, since increased efforts by the State 
to reunite children with their parents prior to adoption is less likely to violate the rights of 
children and their parents under Article 8(1). Nonetheless, it is essential for the State to 
strike the appropriate balance and not make endless attempts to reunite children with their 
parents since this could lead to unnecessary delay in the adoption process. 
 
P,C and S v. UK
425
 is one of the most critical judgments that the ECtHR has delivered on 
the UK’s application of procedures on child protection and adoption and was described 
by Hewson et al as a ‘groundbreaking’426 case. This judgment makes it clear that the 
immediate removal of a newborn child at birth is potentially a violation of Article 8 and a 
draconian measure, which will rarely be justified. The removal of S at birth was subjected 
to close scrutiny by the Court which stated that such removal at birth required 
‘exceptional justification’ as it is:  
 
‘…a step which is traumatic for the mother and places her own physical and mental 
health under a strain, and it deprives the new-born baby of close contact with its birth 
mother…’
427
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The Court accepted that the local authority was entitled to apply for an emergency 
protection order,
428
 as there were relevant and sufficient reasons for doing so (i.e. the fact 
that P had been convicted in the USA for harming her son raised doubts about the welfare 
of her unborn child). The intervention and action had been ‘necessary in a democratic 
society to safeguard the health and rights of the child’.429 However, the Court determined 
that the removal of S at birth was not supported by relevant and sufficient reasons. There 
was no suspicion that S would be in danger from her mother immediately after birth. 
According to the Court, it was unnecessary to remove S immediately after birth, and 
supervision would have been sufficient to protect S from harm. Thus, the Court 
concluded that the national authorities had not acted in a manner which was proportionate 
and it was held that there had been a breach of P and C’s Article 8 rights. Even though 
Member States have a wide margin of appreciation in taking measures to protect the 
welfare of children, an intense standard of proportionality will be applied when a 
‘draconian’430 measure, such as the removal of a newborn baby occurs. Thus, without 
compelling reasons for the removal, less restrictive alternatives should be used to protect 
the child’s welfare.  
 
Despite the emphasis the Court placed on the draconian nature of the removal of a child 
at birth, cases like this continue to be heard in the courts in England and Wales.
431
 
Mothers have had their babies removed at birth, or shortly after birth, when there is no 
evidence that the child is at immediate risk of harm or that his or her Article 2 (the right 
to life) or Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) 
rights are likely to be violated (see the discussion in Section 4.4.2 and Section 5.2.2). In 
P, C and S v. UK, a sad aspect of the final decision was that contact between S and her 
parents was stopped. It will be argued in Section 5.5 that non-consensual adoption with 
direct contact may be a less restrictive but equally effective alternative to non-consensual 
adoption without direct contact. This thesis will now go on to consider how the ECtHR 
has addressed the issue of contact between children and parents prior to and after an 
adoption has taken place. 
 
                                                          
428
 See the Children Act 1989, s44. 
429
 P,C and S v. UK [2002] 2 FLR 631 at para 130. 
430
 Ibid at para 98.  
431
 For example: X Council v. B [2004] EWHC 2015 (Fam) [2005] 1 FLR 341; R (G) v. Nottingham City 
Council [2008] EWHC 152 (Admin); Re NL (A Child) (Appeal: Interim Care Order: Facts and Reasons) 
[2014] EWHC 270 (Fam). 
91 
 
3.4.7 Contact between Children and Birth Parents 
 
The ECtHR has emphasised the importance of contact being maintained between children 
and parents, and that State authorities should give adequate consideration to the question 
of whether contact is in a child’s best interests.432 In such cases, the principle of ‘stricter 
scrutiny’433 applies and dictates that whereas initial removal of a child will warrant a wide 
margin of appreciation, any further measures imposing restrictions on the parental-child 
relationship (such as by reducing/terminating contact) must be subject to stricter scrutiny 
and consequently a corresponding narrow margin of appreciation will exist since the 
removal of contact would mean that: ‘the possibilities of reunification will be diminished 
and eventually destroyed’.434 The Court has thus acknowledged that once a child has been 
removed from his or her parents, any further restrictions on their relationship (e.g. 
reduction/termination of contact) may weaken the bond between them and lessen the 
likelihood of them being reunited.
435
 
 
In Eriksson v. Sweden,
436
 the child was placed in a foster home one month after birth 
because the mother had been sentenced to 14 months in prison for dealing in stolen goods 
and for the possession of narcotics. In this case, it was undisputed that the child needed to 
be in care during this time.  However, according to the Court, the ‘severe and lasting 
restrictions’437 on contact violated the mother’s right to respect for private and family life 
under Article 8. Although the initial intervention had been necessary, the restrictions on 
contact were disproportionate in the light of the aim of protecting the child from harm. 
Another example of the Court expressing its disapproval of the State’s limitation of 
contact between a parent and child can be seen in Andersson v Sweden.
438
  
 
In this case, a boy was taken into care because the authorities had concerns about his 
social and emotional development, which, despite being brought to the attention of his 
mother, had not been addressed by her. While in care, he was unable to see his mother 
because contact was prohibited by the authorities as it was regarded as ‘necessary in order 
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to achieve the purposes of the care order’439 which were adversely affected by his 
mother’s attempts to encourage him to run away from care and the fact that he had 
actually run away on several occasions. The mother had been limited to contact by 
telephone and letters (which had also been terminated for a certain period). She and her 
son were successful before the ECtHR in arguing that these restrictions on contact 
violated their Article 8 rights and the Court held that, although national authorities had 
provided general reasons for these measures, the measures were so far-reaching that there 
was a need to provide strong reasons for them to be justified under Article 8(2). As the 
Court found that there were no such reasons, it held that the national authorities had failed 
to establish it was necessary to deprive the applicants of contact and had failed to show 
that these measures had been consistent with reuniting the family. The Court therefore 
held that there had been a violation of Article 8(1) as the restrictions were 
disproportionate and could not be held to be necessary in a democratic society.  
 
ECtHR case law emphasises that the State must endeavour to foster the reunification of 
parents and children, but that this obligation is not absolute.
440
 In some cases before the 
ECtHR, State restrictions on contact between child and parent have been justified under 
Article 8(2). In Levin v. Sweden,
441
 for example, the Court suggested that the parents’ 
right to contact could be restricted depending on the ‘nature and seriousness of children’s 
interests’.442 In Levin, the national authorities were held to be justified in limiting contact 
because of the distress the children suffered when contact took place. Distress suffered by 
the child and an express wish not to have contact appears to be given weight by the Court 
and will justify limiting parents’ rights under Article 8(2). The dissenting judgment of 
Judge Forde in Levin does, however, suggest caution in finding an interference of 
parents’ rights to be proportionate based on a child’s distress at seeing a birth parent 
when in care. Judge Forde suggested that while it may be relevant to take into account a 
child’s distress, the manner in which the State facilitates contact may create distress not 
the contact per se. She said that the speed and extent to which the contact was reduced 
was not proportionate. In her opinion, the national authorities had failed to discharge their 
duty to reunite the children with their birth parents.
443
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The ECtHR has also had to consider whether post-adoption contact ought to be provided, 
in order for the State to satisfy its obligation under Article 8. Aune v. Norway,
444
 provides 
an example of circumstances where non-consensual adoption may be a necessary and 
proportionate measure. In this case, the child was removed from his parents due to the ill 
treatment he had received because of his parents’ drug abuse problems. While in care, he 
developed a bond with his foster parents, who sought to adopt him. The birth mother 
argued before the ECtHR that her Article 8 right was violated because of the deprivation 
of her parental responsibilities and because of the State’s consent to her son being 
adopted by the foster parents. Although the mother accepted that the child was to remain 
in foster care she expressed concern that there would be no guarantee of contact post-
adoption.  
 
The Court held that the boy’s best interests were an overriding requirement which 
justified the making of the adoption order. In the light of the boy’s interest in stability, the 
bonds he had formed with his prospective adoptive parents and the fact that they 
continued to facilitate contact between him and his birth mother, the Court held that it had 
been reasonable for the Norwegian authorities to decide that the interest in placing him 
for adoption outweighed the mother’s interest in assured contact. The Court, therefore, 
held that the mother’s Article 8 right had not been violated and it had been a 
proportionate step for the boy to be adopted. Having outlined the general principles of 
ECtHR case law, it is helpful to examine how they have been applied in UK cases on 
non-consensual adoption which have reached the ECtHR. 
3.5 Guidance on Reuniting Children and Parents in Adoption Cases? 
3.5.1 Overview 
 
As the ECtHR jurisprudence considered above shows, national authorities must take 
reasonable and necessary steps to reunite and facilitate the reuniting of children with their 
parents.
445
 Any measures which prevent children from being returned to and reunited 
with their parents or which reduce the likelihood of them being reunited can be justified 
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only in exceptional circumstances and where it is in the child’s best interests.446 As was 
stated in Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland,
447
 ties should be maintained with family 
members except where the family is shown to be particularly unfit. In other words, there 
must be exceptional circumstances before the State decides that children should be 
permanently removed from their parents. It can be argued that the ECtHR has not 
provided clear guidance on what steps might be ‘reasonable’ for State authorities to take 
in order to facilitate reunification between children and parents and what might constitute 
‘exceptional circumstances’ justifying a permanent separation between children and 
parents. This thesis thus outlines what steps are likely to be, and ought to be, regarded as 
‘reasonable’ for States to take in order to satisfy their positive obligation under Article 8 
to reunite children and their parents. It is also helpful to clarify what might constitute 
‘exceptional circumstances’ for justifying the making of an adoption order. 
3.5.2 Reasonable Steps 
 
It has been emphasised in this chapter that in cases where children have been removed 
from their birth parents by the State, particular in non-consensual adoption cases, that it is 
important to identify whether a State has taken any measures (‘reasonable steps’) to try 
and reunite the child concerned with his or her birth parents (or even to pursue other less 
restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption which may be just as effective, thereby 
ensuring a more proportionate response is taken). 
 
It is argued that the courts ought to consider which measures had been taken by the State. 
This could include, for example, consideration of whether the family had regular visits 
from a social worker, whether the family was given the opportunity to and did actually 
participate in State programmes aimed at helping families, whether the child and parents 
were offered family therapy and/or whether additional financial assistance or housing 
were available for families living in poverty. In R.M.S v. Spain, for example, the Court of 
Human Rights held that insufficient efforts had been made on the part of the authorities to 
help the family obtain suitable housing (see further in Section 3.4.5).  
 
If the State has tried different methods of helping to support the family but has 
nevertheless decided that non-consensual adoption is the best option, then it would be 
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legitimate for the State to argue that reasonable efforts or steps had been made to reunite 
the parents and child. In Johansen v. Norway,
448
 for example, the authorities had made 
numerous attempts to assist the mother in caring for her first child before he was taken 
into care. This information influenced the authorities in deciding to remove the mother’s 
second child into care and to make arrangements for the child’s adoption.  
 
Another relevant case example is Saviny v. Ukraine. In this case, the Court advised that 
‘particular attention should be paid to difficult social and economic circumstances, which 
require more specific support’.449 It was emphasised at the Conference on Child Removal 
Proceedings
450
 in Prague in October 2014 that the authorities ought to be encouraged by 
the Council of Europe to be more pro-active in providing assistance to families in trouble. 
Reference to providing families with appropriate support and keeping families together 
where possible, can also be found in UNCRC Articles 7, 8 and 9 and in the UN 
Guidelines on the Alternative Care of Children. The difficulty is in determining how 
much assistance a State must supply before it decides to use a more restrictive measure 
such as non-consensual adoption.  
 
It would also be helpful, when considering whether or not reasonable steps have been 
taken to reunite children with their parents, for the Court to consider whether contact had 
been supported prior to the adoption or the placement for adoption. The lack of contact 
between children and parents prior to adoption is an issue which has been viewed with 
concern by the Court. Despite the Court’s disapproval, it appears to be accepted practice 
in English law to terminate or reduce contact between children in care and their parents
451
 
where adoption is regarded as being in the child’s best interests. If contact between 
children and their parents was supported throughout the care process this would make it 
easier to argue that reasonable efforts to reunite children and parents had been made and 
that the decision to go ahead with a non-consensual adoption was a proportionate 
measure. In Aune v. Norway,
452
 for example, the mother still had contact with the child 
but, because of the bond the child had developed with the prospective adopters, it was 
determined by the Court that it had been in the child’s best interests to be adopted. The 
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positive obligation to reunite children with their birth families under ECHR Article 8 and 
the importance of facilitating contact would, however, need to be balanced against the 
child’s own rights under Articles 2, 3 and 8.  
 
Authorities ought to investigate to discover whether alternatives to adoption may be 
available (e.g. kinship care, see Chapter 5). The greater the amount of work undertaken 
by authorities to assess and implement where necessary, alternatives to adoption makes it 
more probable that a final adoption decision will be regarded as a reasonable and 
proportionate measure by the ECtHR. In Pontes v. Portugal,
453
 for example, the Court 
held that the authorities had violated Article 8 because as the many alternatives available 
to adoption had not been fully considered, the adoption was not justified. In the Pontes 
case, the parents had five children who were monitored by the Portuguese authorities 
because of the parents’ drug use. Because of the parents’ negligent care, the children were 
taken into care. Subsequently, the parents’ home life improved and their children were 
returned to them except for their son P for whom they had their parental authority 
removed by the State and who was subsequently placed for adoption. The rationale of the 
national authorities was that P had spent three years in care and had developed a close 
relationship with his foster parents, with no ties with his siblings or biological parents.  
 
The parents took their case to the ECtHR arguing that their Article 8 right to a private and 
family had been violated as: their son had never been allowed to spend holidays or 
weekends with his family; contact had been terminated in 2006; their parental authority 
had been removed and P had subsequently been adopted. The Court observed that the 
authorities had failed to consider less radical measures including returning the child to his 
parents and it drew attention to the inconsistency whereby all of the children except P had 
been returned to their parents. There appeared to be no justification for this. The Court 
doubted that it could be in P’s best interests to break up the family or lose a relationship 
with his parents or siblings, when it was clear that he could have been reunited with his 
parents. The Court therefore held that Article 8 had been violated as the adoption had not 
been founded on relevant and sufficient reasons and was not proportionate. This case 
demonstrates that it is crucial that States carry out a thorough analysis of a child’s best 
interests and provide sufficient justification for the termination of contact and subsequent 
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adoption. In Pontes, adoption was clearly not in the child’s best interests because he had 
lost the opportunity to be raised by his birth parents and to develop a relationship with his 
siblings.  
 
Also, as has been argued above, children’s rights ought to be considered. This includes 
rights under the UNCRC (see Chapter 2) and children’s rights under ECHR Article 8 and 
any other relevant ECHR provisions. It is argued that children’s rights are not routinely 
considered in adoption cases at ECtHR level and that they ought to be considered by the 
Court when determining whether or not State authorities have undertaken reasonable 
steps, to reunite the child with his or her birth parents. In general, the Court of Human 
Rights focuses on the rights of the parents and the best interests of the child but gives 
little consideration to the actual rights of the child, for instance the child’s right to have 
his or her voice heard. Thus, although in principle the child’s Article 8 right to respect for 
private and family life is also engaged, and in some cases, the child’s Article 2 right to 
life and Article 3 right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment may be 
relevant, these children’s rights are not typically discussed by the ECtHR in adoption 
cases.
454
 Similarly, although there are certain UNCRC rights which may also be relevant 
for the Court to consider in the context of adoption, these are not examined. For instance: 
Article 7 (the right to know and be cared for by one’s parents), Article 8 (the right to 
identity; specifically, the right to family relations) and Article 9 (concerning parental 
separation). 
 
In adoption cases before the ECtHR, the focus tends to be on the parents’ rights, not those 
of the child and on whether the actions or omissions of the State leading to the non-
consensual adoption or the adoption itself violates parental rights. When deciding 
whether or not reasonable steps have been taken to reunite children with their parents, it 
is suggested in this thesis that the court should place greater emphasis on the length of 
time the child has been raised by his or her birth parents, the quality of the relationship 
between the child and his/her parents and the wishes and views of the child in question. 
Parental-child relationships may range from parents who are unable to provide good 
quality care for the children but who may still have a well-developed bond with the child 
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(this was observed in Y.C v. UK
455
 for example) to those at the other end of the spectrum, 
who have severely abused their children and/or do not have strong bonds (e.g. in Aune v. 
Norway
456
).  
 
There may be cases where children expressly state that they do not want to maintain 
relationships with their birth parents or demonstrate visible signs of distress or regression 
in behaviour, when in their parents’ presence. In such cases, this might be a factor which 
justifies making less strenuous efforts to attempt to reunite a child with his or her parents 
and increases the likelihood that a non-consensual adoption would be a proportionate 
measure. However, this ultimately depends on the facts of the case. In Levin v. Sweden,
457
 
for example, Judge Forde has pointed out that sudden removal from a parent by the 
authorities may be distressing and may contribute to a child’s distress at having contact 
with his or her parents. Thus, while the child’s own explicit and implicit response to his 
or her parents is an important factor which ought to be considered by the Court, it should 
not be determinative.  
 
It is relevant for the Court to consider the reasons for removing a child into care in the 
first place, in other words, prior to adoption. Children may be removed from the family 
home because their parents have neglected and/or abused them and, in such cases, this 
may have a bearing on the proportionality of non-consensual adoption. The factors which 
could be examined by the Court of Human Rights could include, for example, the reason 
for the child’s initial removal into care, whether the removal was based on risk of harm or 
actual harm, the number of occasions the child has been harmed and the severity of the 
harm that may have taken place. In cases where severe abuse has taken place and no 
effort on the part of parents has been made to address their own behaviour which has led 
to such abuse (drug or alcohol addiction, for example) then it should not be incumbent on 
States to make strenuous efforts to reunite children with their parents. Indeed, as stated 
above, it is suggested in such cases that no further consideration of reuniting the family 
would protect the child’s rights under Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 3 (the right 
to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) and would potentially justify 
no further attempts to reunite the family.  
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However, in cases where parents’ circumstances have affected their ability to raise their 
child, then this should be a relevant consideration as to whether or not non-consensual 
adoption complies with human rights. In R.M.S v. Spain,
458
 the Court observed that the 
child who had been removed into care and placed for adoption had not been subjected to 
physical or psychological harm, sexual abuse, had no serious health problems and her 
emotional development was normal. The main basis for taking the child into care was the 
parents’ poverty and difficulty in finding accommodation. As a result, there was a breach 
of the mother’s Article 8 right because of the State’s failure to make adequate and 
effective efforts to explore whether or not it was possible to reunite parent and child. It is 
also helpful to consider Lady Hale’s words In the Matter of B,459 where she stated that: 
 
‘There are cases where the harm suffered or feared is very severe, but it would be 
disproportionate to sever or curtail the family ties because the authorities can protect 
the child in other ways… Conversely, there may be cases where the level of harm is 
not so great, but there is no other way in which the child can be properly protected 
from it’.
460
 
 
In other words, it may be possible in some cases for the State to reunite a child with his or 
her parents and protect the child from the risk of harm or from further harm occurring. In 
such cases, then, it may be possible for children’s rights under ECHR Articles 2 and 3 to 
be protected while also protecting the parents’ and children’s Article 8 rights. However, if 
permanent removal of a child from his or her home environment is essential to protect his 
or her rights under Article 2 and 3, then a non-consensual adoption is likely to be a 
proportionate measure which has the effect of protecting the children’s Convention 
Rights and which does not breach parents’ rights under Article 8. It is submitted that, 
although the ECtHR has to be careful not to substitute its view for that of the national 
court in any given case, it should nonetheless probe more deeply in non-consensual 
adoption cases which could, in turn, have a powerful impact on national adoption law.  
3.5.3 Exceptional Circumstances 
 
It is argued that the test of ‘exceptional circumstances’ which justifies removal of 
children from their family homes, and even adoption, has, in practice, not been a difficult 
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hurdle for domestic authorities to overcome when justifying non-consensual adoption 
before the ECtHR. It has been suggested by Fenton-Glynn, for example, that the 
exceptional circumstances test will often be satisfied if the measure (e.g. an adoption 
order) is regarded by national authorities to be in the child’s best interests.461 At first 
glance this appears to have been borne out, for example, by the discussion in the adoption 
cases of R and H v. UK and Y.C. v. UK, considered in Section 6.2. The fact that this test is 
so easily satisfied may mean that, in some cases, parents’ Article 8 rights are not well-
protected when the State determines that it is in the child’s best interests to be removed 
into care and placed for adoption. It may also mean that a child’s ECHR Article 8 right to 
have a relationship with his or her parents may be violated. However, it should be 
observed that the Court of Human Rights appears to have taken a more deferential 
approach in non-consensual cases arising from England and Wales since the enactment of 
the Adoption and Children Act 2002, when compared with similar cases concerning non-
consensual adoption originating from other European countries (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
 
While a concrete definition of what amounts to ‘exceptional circumstances’ carries the 
risk of creating a straitjacket for Member States, it can be argued that the test is still too 
vague. Whereas on the one hand, it could be regarded as potentially providing protection 
for children by making it easier for the State to intervene to protect children’s rights 
under ECHR Articles 2 and 3, on the other hand it could be argued that these rights could 
be protected via less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption. Thus, it is argued 
that the test of ‘exceptional circumstances’ at present, provides insufficient protection for 
the rights of children and their parents in non-consensual adoption cases. Removal of 
children into care and placement for adoption are very serious steps which, in the case of 
adoption, have irreversible consequences.  
 
As such then, children, parents and, in particular, Member States ought to have a clear 
idea of when the ECtHR will regard these steps as justifiable due to exceptional 
circumstances. This would be helpful not only at the ECtHR level but also at the domestic 
level since many challenges brought by parents (and sometimes also children) may not 
reach the Court of Human Rights. It is argued in this thesis that, although the 
determination of ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires a flexible approach, there is 
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nevertheless a need for greater clarification as to what sort of circumstances will be 
regarded as exceptional for the purposes of Article 8 and other Convention Rights. 
Articles 2 and 3, for example, could have a bearing on this analysis. It is argued that the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test ought to apply only where children’s lives are 
endangered or they are at risk of serious physical or emotional harm. 
 
In a case where a child was removed into care and placed for adoption due to severe 
neglect and/or abuse, this would have the effect of protecting the child’s right under 
Article 3 to protection from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. This can be seen 
in Z v. UK,
462
 for example, where it was necessary to remove the children from their 
parents due to the severe neglect that the children had sustained. However, children may 
suffer emotional harm under Article 3 if they are removed from parents, and they have 
strong bonds with their parents. The emotional harm may be particularly severe in cases 
where children are removed based on the risk of significant harm to their welfare (or a 
court finding that significant harm has, in fact, occurred).  
If the parents’ treatment of the child has engaged children’s rights under Article 3, then 
this may amount to ‘exceptional circumstances’ which justify removal of a child into care 
and the subsequent placement of that child for non-consensual adoption. However, this 
must still be weighed against the potential emotional harm of removing children from 
their parents and placing them for adoption. It can be argued that in Y.C. v. UK, for 
example, the separation of 8-year-old K from his mother could have engaged his right 
under Article 3. This case is significant because it is arguable the circumstances were 
exceptional enough to justify State intervention and removal of the child, but not so 
exceptional that non-consensual adoption was a necessary and proportionate measure (see 
further in Section 6.2.2). Similarly, in cases where the severity of the harm suffered by 
the child or that would be suffered by the child satisfied Article 2, such circumstances 
ought to be regarded as exceptional circumstances which justify non-consensual 
adoption.  
 
In cases where a child’s right to life under Article 2 and his or her right to freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 were engaged as well as his or 
her parents’ rights under Article 8, the child’s rights under Articles 2 and 3 would 
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outweigh those of the parents. Under those circumstances, taking a child into care and 
placing him or her for adoption may be justified in some cases. It is argued that the test of 
exceptional circumstances needs to be clear and ought to apply and provide justification 
for non-consensual adoptions only in circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the 
child’s rights under Article 2 or 3 are under threat.  
 
The Court has in some cases considered whether less restrictive measures could be taken 
which fall short of non-consensual adoption but which may be just as effective in terms 
of outcomes (i.e. protection of children’s rights and best interests). It is suggested that, in 
all cases, there should be a thorough analysis of whether the State has taken reasonable 
steps to reunite children and their parents or whether other less restrictive alternatives 
which may be just as effective exist (as considered above). It is argued in this thesis that 
certain factors may be extracted from the case law considered in the previous sections of 
this chapter, and that the UNCRC rights considered in Chapter 2 may be relevant 
considerations when determining whether steps have been taken to reunite children with 
their parents and ultimately, to help States decide when non-consensual adoption may or 
may not be proportionate. This is particularly important in adoption cases because of the 
long-term, and in fact life-long, consequences adoption has for children and their birth 
parents.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The ECtHR has an important role to play in upholding Convention rights and in assessing 
the proportionality of State measures when children are removed from their parents and 
placed for adoption. The most relevant Convention rights in the context of adoption 
proceedings are Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing) and Article 8 (the 
right to respect for private and family life).  
 
It is apparent from ECtHR case law that the separation of children and parents is 
warranted only in exceptional circumstances and that national authorities must take 
reasonable steps to reunite children with their parents. If States fail to do so, then these 
are circumstances where adoption may violate the Article 8 right of parents and children. 
However, the State’s positive obligation to reunite children with their parents is counter-
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balanced by jurisprudence which justifies limiting the parent and the child’s right to 
respect for private and family life in the name of the child’s own best interests. Thus, in 
cases where neglect or abuse has occurred, or where children have been settled with other 
carers for years, it may not be in the child’s best interests to be reunited with his or her 
parents.  
 
It is apparent that where the neglect or abuse is serious enough to engage the child’s 
rights under ECHR Article 2 or Article 3 a non-consensual adoption may, in some cases, 
not only be in children’s best interests but will also protect children’s rights. However,  
while a non-consensual adoption is, in some cases, the least restrictive measure available, 
there are cases where equally effective less restrictive alternatives are available, which 
would be less likely to violate children’s and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8. It has 
been demonstrated from the case discussion in Sections 3.4.5 and 3.4.6, that the mere fact 
that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment is insufficient to justify 
removal of the child from the family home, let alone non-consensual adoption. This 
chapter has also shown that there is a substantial body of case law (see Section 3.4.6) 
which suggests that the scope of the State’s obligation under ECHR Article 8 to assist 
families prior to removal of the child from the family home or even non-consensual 
adoption may be widening.   
 
Another important issue which has been highlighted in this chapter is the lack of 
consideration of children’s rights in adoption cases. Thus, the alleged violations of 
Convention Rights, in adoption cases, are typically brought by the parents. Children’s 
rights are more frequently argued, however, in the context of cases where States have 
failed to satisfy a positive obligation to intervene to protect children (as demonstrated by 
the discussion of Articles 2 and 3). When cases are brought by parents, rather than 
considering the rights of children, the ECtHR focuses on whether the best interests of the 
child can justify a violation of parental rights. While the Court is clearly not compelled to 
consider children’s rights in these cases, it is suggested that some of these cases 
(especially those discussed in the context of Articles 6 and 8) demonstrate a missed 
opportunity for the development of children’s rights and that focusing solely on 
children’s best interests may serve to replicate some of the problems which exist in the 
law of adoption in England and Wales (see Chapter 2).  
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Because of the importance of the rights at stake and the permanent and irreversible nature 
of adoption, it has been argued that the Court could apply its existing case law in a more 
methodical way (see Section 3.5) when determining whether or not a non-consensual 
adoption is a proportionate measure.  In performing this analysis, it has been argued that 
UNCRC rights (for example Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20 and 21) are all relevant. 
Having outlined the approach applied by the Court of Human Rights in care and adoption 
proceedings, this thesis next considers the relevant legislative frameworks in England and 
Wales and also adoption cases heard in the High Court and the Court of Appeal in 
England and Wales and the Supreme Court in the UK.  
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Chapter 4: Adoption Cases in the Courts in England 
and Wales 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the proportionality of non-consensual adoption in England and 
Wales under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s52(1)(b). It considers how senior 
judges have interpreted and applied proportionality in non-consensual adoption cases and 
what steps might need to be taken prior to non-consensual adoption, for this type of 
adoption to be regarded as a proportionate measure. In order to assess the proportionality 
of the legislation itself and its application, this chapter looks at the ACA 2002, which is 
the focus of this thesis, and the Children and Families Act 2014.
463
  
This chapter considers cases concerning non-consensual adoption in England and Wales, 
with a particular emphasis on Court of Appeal and Supreme Court cases. These cases 
have interpreted key provisions of the ACA 2002 and have provided guidance on 
concepts such as proportionality and rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights and their relationship with non-consensual adoption in England and Wales. This 
chapter will first discuss the Court of Appeal decision of Webster v. Norfolk County 
Council
464
 because it was a case which was, and still is, the subject of academic criticism 
and which highlighted difficult issues raised by non-consensual adoption based solely on 
a child’s welfare rather than the rights of children and parents.  
ANS and another v. ML
465
 is a significant UK Supreme Court decision because it 
indirectly considers the proportionality of the ACA 2002 via its examination of similar 
Scottish legislation
466
 on non-consensual adoption. In the Matter of B (Children)
467
 is 
another important Supreme Court decision which will be discussed. Its significance lies 
in its consideration of how the principle of proportionality should be applied in non-
consensual adoption cases. The chapter also discusses and analyses the Court of Appeal 
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decision of Re B-S (Children)
468
 in which the President of the Family Division of the 
High Court provided important guidance to be applied by the lower courts in non-
consensual adoption cases.  
The chapter considers whether the legislation and courts’ decisions on non-consensual 
adoption have managed to strike the appropriate balance in protecting the rights and best 
interests of children on the one hand and the rights of their parents on the other. This 
discussion does so by exploring whether the ACA 2002 (in particular, s52(1)(b)) can be 
reconciled with the UK’s obligations to children and parents under the ECHR and the 
State’s positive obligation to make efforts to reunite children with their parents where 
possible under Article 8 of that Convention.
469
  
Academics have argued that the current adoption law in England and Wales fails to give 
sufficient consideration to parents’ interests and, in particular, their right to respect for 
private and family life under ECHR Article 8.
470
 Harris-Short has described adoption as 
the ‘most drastic’ and ‘devastating’ family law court order.471 She has also expressed 
concern that the policy of encouraging adoption as quickly as possible can run counter to 
the attempt to reunite parents and children for the purposes of complying with Article 
8.
472
 Due to the gravity and irrevocability of adoption, there is understandable concern 
that in some cases non-consensual adoption may not be a proportionate measure. It is 
important therefore, to consider whether the legislation and case law in England and 
Wales provides sufficient protection for the rights of children and their parents in the 
context of non-consensual adoption. 
4.2 The Adoption Legislation 
4.2.1 The Adoption and Children Act 2002: An Overview 
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The Adoption and Children Act 2002 came fully into force on December 30 2005.
473
 It 
was introduced primarily to bring the law on adoption into line with the Children Act 
1989, s1(1) and UNCRC Article 21 (the right to adoption) by making the child’s welfare 
the paramount consideration in the adoption process
474
 and by introducing a welfare 
checklist (see the ACA 2002, s1(4)) like that in the Children Act 1989. The Act also 
intended to encourage practitioners to engage in permanency planning and to increase the 
adoptions of children in care by tackling delays in the adoption process caused by the 
shortage of adopters, delays in matching children to prospective adopters and delays in 
the court system.
475
 The reforms also sought to improve the support available to 
prospective adopters as increasing post-adoption support was regarded as a means of 
increasing the number of prospective adopters.
476
 Another aim of the Act was: ‘to put the 
child’s rights more to the fore’.477 The new law replaced the old system of freeing orders 
(under the Adoption Act 1976) with placement orders and amended the grounds under 
which a non-consensual adoption could be ordered by the courts. Furthermore, special 
guardianship orders were created by the ACA 2002 and inserted into the Children Act 
1989, ss14A-G to act as an alternative to adoption, and to provide legal security for older 
children in foster care or those living with relatives while enabling such children to 
maintain legal ties with their birth parents (see further in Section 5.4).
478
  
 
The New Labour government viewed adoption as the solution for the problems relating to 
children in care which had been highlighted by the Waterhouse Report. The Waterhouse 
Inquiry investigated the abuse of children in care and the deficiencies in the care provided 
in children’s homes in Wales. Although as Allen has noted, there is arguably not an 
immediate connection between the abuse that these children suffered in children’s homes 
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and the intention to reform adoption law,
479
 there is a clear rationale behind the legal 
reform. In fact, Thomas has observed that the Waterhouse Report stimulated further 
discussion on how to address other problems for children in care,
480
 such as poor 
educational and social outcomes. Dey has suggested that the Waterhouse Report put 
pressure on the government to improve outcomes for children in care via legal reform
481
 
and the government identified adoption of children in care as a potential method of 
addressing the problems identified in the Report.
482
  
 
Tony Blair, the Prime Minister at the time, announced that adoption reform would be a 
priority and that he would lead a major review of adoption law.
483
 He stated that adoption 
was: ‘[L]ess about providing homes for relinquished babies and more concerned with 
providing secure, permanent relationships for some of society’s most vulnerable 
children’.484 The Labour government aimed to increase the number of adoption orders by 
at least 40 per cent by 2005 with the ultimate target of a 50 per cent increase in adoption 
overall.
485
 Having outlined the motivations for and purpose behind the ACA 2002, the 
following section compares the existing law on adoption with the previous law on 
adoption under the Adoption Act 1976 to determine whether or not the new law strikes 
the appropriate balance in protecting children’s best interests and rights on the one hand 
and parents’ rights on the other in the context of non-consensual adoption. 
4.2.2 The ‘Old’ Law and the ‘New’ Law 
 
Under the Adoption Act 1976 children were ‘freed’ for consensual or non-consensual 
adoption via a ‘freeing order’486 under s18 before a final adoption order was made. Once 
a freeing order was made, a child no longer retained legal ties with his or her birth 
family.
487
 The child became a statutory orphan in that he or she was left in a temporary 
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legal limbo before an adoption order was made
488
 and once freed for adoption, there was 
no guarantee of being adopted. After a freeing order, an adoption order could be made 
with parental consent under s16(b)(i) or, alternatively, parental consent could be 
dispensed with and an adoption order could be made under s16(b)(ii) if one of the 
grounds listed in s16(2) was proved, namely that the child’s parent(s) could not be found 
or was incapable of giving agreement; was withholding agreement unreasonably; had 
persistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge parental responsibility for the 
child; had abandoned or neglected the child; had persistently ill-treated the child or had 
seriously ill-treated the child.  
 
Under the ACA 2002, children are no longer ‘freed’ for adoption. Instead, a placement 
order under the ACA 2002, s18 precedes an adoption order and places a child with 
prospective adoptive parents. When a placement order is in force, parental responsibility 
is shared between the local authority, the prospective adopters and the birth parents, but 
will fully vest in the adopters once an adoption order is made by the court. Under the 
ACA 2002, s21(2) a placement order cannot be made unless one of the following applies: 
a) a child is subject to a care order, b) the conditions for making a care order are 
satisfied
489
 or c) the child has no parent or guardian. If one of these conditions is satisfied, 
a placement order can be made under s21(3) if the parents consent to the adoption
490
 or 
parental consent has been dispensed with under s52(1)(b) because the child’s welfare 
requires it.
491
 A placement order remains in place until it is revoked, or a final adoption 
order is made or if the child marries or reaches 18 years of age and as not been 
adopted.
492
 According to Bridge and Swindells, the creation of placement orders sounded 
the ‘death knell’493 of the old adoption system, addressing the ‘legal limbo’494 that 
children previously faced with freeing orders.  
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Under the new law (the ACA 2002), once a placement order is in force, the birth parents 
are able to apply for leave to oppose an adoption order under the ACA 2002, s47(5). If 
parents do not oppose adoption or leave to oppose adoption is not granted, the Court then 
considers the grounds for making an adoption order. The ACA 2002, s52 amended the 
grounds for making an adoption order. One of the grounds from the Adoption Act 1976 
was retained
495
 under s52(1)(a). However, the other grounds were removed and replaced 
with s52(1)(b), namely that ‘the welfare of the child requires consent to be dispensed 
with’. In Re P, Wall LJ explained the meaning of the word ‘requires’ in s52(1)(b):   
 
‘[Requires] is a word which was plainly chosen as best conveying… the essence of 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence. And viewed from that perspective “requires” does 
indeed have the connotation of the imperative, what is demanded rather than what is 
merely optional or reasonable or desirable’.
496
 
 
Wall LJ also stated it has to be shown that ‘the child’s welfare “requires” adoption as 
opposed to something short of adoption’497 and that even where the child’s welfare might 
require statutory intervention or indefinite removal of the child from his family, ‘the same 
circumstances will not necessarily “require” that the child be adopted’.498 The Adoption 
Act 1976, s6, in contrast, had focused on the ‘welfare of the child throughout his 
childhood’ but the ACA 2002, s1(2) states: ‘The paramount consideration of the court or 
adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout his life’. Wall LJ has described 
this as a ‘vital’499 difference. It is argued that basing non-consensual adoption on the 
child’s welfare under the ACA 2002 s52(1)(b) and making the child’s welfare the 
paramount consideration minimises the rights of birth parents in adoption proceedings. It 
is also preferable for child’s interests to be primary and not paramount. Archard has 
highlighted the difficulty of making children’s interests paramount:  
 
‘We should allow that the interests of parents and other adults within the child’s 
society may sometimes outweigh those of the child. The implausibility of thinking 
that a child’s interests are paramount extends to what amounts to a disguised 
discounting of a parent’s interests’.
500
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It can be argued that the 1976 Act provided more protection to parents’ interests than the 
ACA 2002 does. For example, unlike the post-ACA 2002 climate, it was uncommon 
under the Adoption Act 1976 for judges to make adoption orders without parental 
consent.
501
 A review of the case law on non-consensual adoption led Henricson and 
Bainham to conclude that when the 1976 Act was in force, there were many cases where 
a birth parent’s objection to non-consensual adoption was upheld on the basis that 
consent was not unreasonably withheld. This was the case, they argued, even where 
social workers were in favour of adoption due to the need to promote the child’s 
welfare.
502
 Thus, it can be argued that the ACA 2002 has the effect of removing the 
protection of parental interests as the sole focus of the Act, when non-consensual 
adoption takes place, is the child’s welfare not the parent’s interests.503  
 
In fact, the introduction of non-consensual adoption based solely upon the paramountcy 
of the child’s welfare has been and continues to be controversial. Prior to the changes that 
the Labour government sought for adoption law, the Conservative government had also, 
in the early 1990s, considered similar reforms.
504
 Thus, in 1992, The Adoption Review 
recommended that children’s welfare should be the court’s paramount consideration 
except in cases where adoption was taking place without parent consent. In the Review it 
was stated that only where adoption would ‘be marginally better than another option’ 
should the court ‘allow the fact that a parent does not agree to adoption to tip the balance 
in favour of the other option’.505  
 
The appropriateness of making the child’s welfare paramount in non-consensual adoption 
cases has been questioned.
506
 Sloan has observed that: ‘A strict application of the welfare 
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principle could preclude a court from considering the interests of parents when making an 
adoption-related decision’.507 This paramountcy of children’s welfare in the adoption 
process, and the provision permitting non-consensual adoption solely on the basis of 
welfare has been controversial, because adoption orders are permanent and irrevocable. It 
has been pointed out, for example, by Herring et al that it is ‘too low a hurdle’508 because 
it might not be difficult to show that a child would be better off being raised by someone 
other than his or her birth parents.  
 
Another change introduced by the ACA 2002 was the introduction of a welfare checklist. 
The Adoption Act 1976, s6, had provided that the court had a general duty to consider the 
welfare of the child, but the ACA 2002, s1(4) includes a welfare checklist which is 
similar to the welfare checklist under the Children Act 1989, s1(3). The factors in the 
adoption welfare checklist, however, differ from those in the CA 1989 checklist. Of 
particular importance for the purposes of the subject-matter of this thesis on non-
consensual adoption is ACA 2002, s1(4)(c) which provides that the court can consider 
‘the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the 
original family and become an adopted person’. No such provision existed under the 
Adoption Act 1976. 
 
Section 1(4)(f) provides that the court must take into account ‘the wishes and feelings of 
any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person regarding the child’. The Select 
Committee on Adoption has stated that this provision secures the fair balancing of ‘the 
rights and interests of the birth parents in maintaining their existing family life on the one 
hand and the conflicting rights and interests of the child in favour of adoption on the 
other’.509 Under s1(4)(f), the courts may consider a range of different rights such as, for 
instance, those of the parents, siblings, grandparents or other family members. Sloan has 
argued that the ‘extended meaning’ of welfare may guard against precluding the interests 
of parents from adoption matters.
510
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Nonetheless, there may be problems arising from not considering parents’ interests 
independently from those of their children. Reflecting on Re C (A Child) (Adoption: Duty 
of Local Authority),
511
 for example, Sloan has observed that the Court of Appeal ‘took a 
very individualistic view of child welfare, at the expense of a child’s links with her 
biological father… and with her grandparents’.512 An important issue then, is the extent to 
which the ACA 2002 is compatible with the requirements of ECHR Article 8, the right to 
respect for private and family life.
513
 Wall LJ has stated that adoption under the 2002 Act 
must be necessary (defined as somewhere between indispensable on the one hand and 
useful, reasonable and desirable on the other)
514
 and must also ‘be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim of protecting the welfare and interests of the child’.515 
 
Although the ACA 2002, s1(4)(f) indicates that children’s relationships with their parents 
is a relevant factor under the welfare checklist, it may be argued that this sub-section does 
not provide sufficient protection to parental rights in the process of non-consensual 
adoption. It can be argued that the operation of the welfare checklist
516
 should have been 
reviewed to ensure respect for other people’s Article 8 rights; especially those of 
parents.
517
 Harris-Short, for example, has stated that s1(4)(f) is not sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Article 8 because it does not require independent weight to be given to 
parents’ rights.518 These rights which should be considered, for example, are the rights 
children and parents have to develop and maintain relationships with one another (by 
children being raised by their parents or via direct contact) and for parents to be able to 
make decisions in relation to their children. In practice, when a court decides whether or 
not to make an adoption order, parental rights are not balanced equally with the child’s 
rights. Relevant parental rights (such as ECHR Article 8, for example) are considered 
purely in the context of the child’s welfare. When the Court performs its analysis, the 
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approach to adoption is similar to that taken in other cases where orders are made in 
respect of children. The approach, which was endorsed by Wall LJ in Re P,
519
 can be 
highlighted by reference to J v. C,
520
 in which Lord McDermott said: 
 
‘[T]he child’s welfare is to be treated as the top item in a list of items relevant to the 
matter in question… all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of 
parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, 
the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child’.
521
  
 
The Court of Appeal decision in The Matter of Q (A Child)
522
 has also emphasised that 
there is no enhanced welfare test in the context of non-consensual adoption cases even 
though the consequences are permanent and more serious, when compared with orders 
which may be made based on a child’s welfare under the Children Act 1989. The above 
paragraphs have considered the reforms to the law made under the ACA 2002, which are 
relevant to the subject-matter of this thesis. The following section considers relevant 
reforms implemented by the Children and Families Act 2014. 
4.2.3 The Children and Families Act 2014 
 
The Children and Families Act 2014 came into force on April 22, 2014.
523
 It has been 
described by Gilmore and Bainham as ‘deeply ideological legislation’524 which seeks to 
address various policy objectives including the reduction of delay in care and adoption 
proceedings.
525
 It seeks to address these delays by imposing a 26 week limit on care 
proceedings under s14(2)(ii), and by widening the scope of the ‘early permanence’ 
principle, whereby children are placed for adoption as early as possible. It brings forward 
the point at which local authorities will have a duty to consider fostering for adoption 
under s22(9)(A), which consequently brings forward the point at which adoption will be 
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considered. This duty may exist in the first week a child is in care or even before the child 
has been born.
526
 The Act also contains a statutory provision explicitly allowing local 
authorities to stop contact between children in care and their parents under section 8 and a 
provision allowing for post-adoption contact between children and parents under section 
9. The reforms are wide-ranging and have been criticised for their lack of coherence. 
Gilmore and Bainham have described the legislation as a ‘ragbag of apparently 
disconnected adoption provisions’.527 Furthermore, Sloan has argued that these provisions 
on post-adoption contact may, in fact, jeopardise English law’s compatibility with the 
ECHR and the UNCRC (for further discussion see Section 5.5).
528
 
 
Section 7 of the CFA enabled prospective adopters to register their details and inspect a 
register to find a child ‘for whom they could be appropriate adopters’.529 The Action 
Plan
530
 observed that, despite the reforms enacted by the ACA 2002, prospective adopters 
still received insufficient practical and financial support
531
 during the adoption process 
and after the final adoption order.
532
 Thus, the CFA 2014 has increased the funding and 
practical support for prospective adoptive parents. Section 5 provides financial support 
for adopters, after the adoption process has taken place. Under s6, Local authorities have 
a duty to provide information on assessment and post-adoption support to prospective 
adopters. Sections 5-7 not only speed up the process for prospective adopters but the 
provision of increased support is intended to encourage more prospective adopters to 
come forward. Having looked in the section above at the legislation relating to adoption, 
in particular to non-consensual adoption, the following section looks at the relevant case 
law and academic commentary relating to non-consensual adoption.  
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4.3 The Controversy of Webster and Norfolk County Council and others 
4.3.1 Webster v. Norfolk County Council and others 
 
Re J (A Child)
533
 (considered in the introduction to this thesis) highlighted the need for 
public debate and the need for transparency
534
 to avoid injustice in non-consensual 
adoption cases. The best example of such an injustice is Webster v. Norfolk County 
Council and others,
535
 an important case which merits in-depth discussion because of the 
media attention and academic discussion which it has generated. This case demonstrates 
the injustice which may occur when a non-consensual order is made under the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002, s52(1)(b). In this case, the appellants, Mr and Mrs Webster, 
alleged that wrongful adoptions of three of their children had taken place and that in the 
process their rights under ECHR Article 8(1) had been violated.  
 
In 2003, the Websters took their two-year-old son (Child ‘B’) to hospital because he had 
a swollen ankle. They visited two different hospitals which discharged him. They were 
still concerned and returned to the first hospital, where B was X-rayed and six bone 
fractures were discovered. The consultant radiologist suspected non-accidental injury 
(NAI) and informed Social Services who subsequently applied for a care order under the 
Children Act 1989. The court was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the child 
had sustained non-accidental injuries and care orders were made in respect of all three of 
the couple’s children.536 The children were subsequently freed for adoption under the old 
legislation (the Adoption Act 1976) and were subsequently adopted under the ACA 2002, 
s52(1)(b) with the court dispensing with the Websters’ consent on the basis of the 
children’s welfare.  
 
In 2006, when Mrs Webster became pregnant again she and her husband fled to Ireland 
for the child’s birth as they feared that the finding in respect of Child B and the removal 
of all three of their children into care meant that Social Services would remove their 
fourth child and seek to place him or her for adoption. The child, Brandon, was born on 
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27 June, 2007 by which time they had presented a testimony from a medical expert which 
proved that they had not harmed B. The report stated that B’s injuries were caused not by 
NAI, but by iron deficiency and a rare condition known as scurvy caused by the child’s 
unusual diet which consisted solely of soya milk. This evidence, coupled with a positive 
residential assessment
537
 with Brandon, led Holman J to agree that care proceedings 
against them ought to be discontinued.    
 
After this decision, the Websters appealed against the making of care and freeing orders 
in relation to their other three children, alleging that the adoptions amounted to a 
violation of their right to respect for private and family life which was not justified by 
Article 8(2).
538
 They challenged a number of findings made by the judge at first instance, 
Judge Barham. In particular, they challenged the finding that the threshold criteria under 
the CA 1989, s31(2) had been satisfied on the basis of ‘clinical and emotional harm,’539 
thereby enabling the judge to make care orders. They also argued that the judge had been 
wrong not to consider the lack of reference to reunification of the children with their 
parents in the care plan. They argued that the freeing orders would not have been made if 
the medical evidence had been available at that time. Although an adoption order is 
generally regarded as irrevocable, in rare cases of procedural irregularity an adoption 
order may be set aside.
540
 Their counsel argued that the facts of the case amounted to 
exceptional circumstances’541 which thus justified overturning the adoption orders and 
returning the children to their parents.  
 
The judgment was delivered by the Court of Appeal in 2009. Despite acknowledging the 
potential for a violation of Article 8(1) and the evident injustice that had occurred, the 
Court refused to allow the appeal and revoke the adoption order for two reasons. First, on 
a public policy basis, the Court did not want to undermine the social importance of 
adoption. Secondly, the Court determined that it was in the children’s best interests to 
remain with their adoptive parents because of the number of years that they had been 
separated from their parents and because of the emotional attachments they had formed, 
in the meantime, with their adoptive parents. The leading judgment was delivered by 
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Wall LJ. In determining whether or not the adoption orders could be revoked, the Court 
of Appeal considered Swinton LJ’s judgment in Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set 
Aside)
542
 where he drew attention to the irrevocability and finality of adoption orders:  
 
‘There is no case in which it has been held that the court has the inherent power to 
set aside an adoption order by reason of misapprehension or mistake. To invalidate 
an otherwise properly made order would undermine the whole basis on which these 
orders are made, namely they are final and for life as regards to adopters’.
543
 
 
Although the Websters initially sought to have the adoptions set aside and have their 
children returned to them, they later had a change of heart due to the passage of time. 
Wall LJ asserted that, if the parents had sought to have the adoption orders set aside, they 
would not have obtained this remedy, on the basis that reversing the adoption orders 
would run counter to the children’s welfare. He asserted that, after four years with their 
adoptive parents, it would be disruptive to remove the children. While Wall LJ and 
Wilson LJ acknowledged that adoption orders could be reversed in rare cases where 
procedural irregularity had occurred, particularly where there had been a breach of 
natural justice, they would not revoke the adoption orders in this case and they took a 
public policy approach emphasising the social importance of adoption as well as its 
permanence.  
 
Wilson LJ observed that it was too late for the Websters to appeal, emphasising that the 
three children had been settled in new homes for four years and had not seen their 
parents. He also emphasised the ‘vast social importance of not undermining the 
irrevocability of adoption orders’.544 Wall LJ acknowledged that the parents had been 
wrongfully accused of abusing one of their children and, as a result, three of their 
children had been wrongfully and permanently removed from the family home. 
Furthermore, he stated that the three children who had been placed for adoption and their 
brother Brandon, (whom the Websters had been allowed to keep), had missed the 
opportunity of growing up together as a family. He said that this was:  
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‘…deeply worrying, and, on the face of it, a clear breach of their rights to respect for 
their family life under Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’.
545
  
 
Although, Wall LJ referred to cases decided by the ECtHR,
546
 he concluded that ‘the 
European authorities [did] not assist Mr and Mrs Webster’.547 The following section 
explores Wall LJ’s judgment further and in more detail to see whether or not the decision 
can be regarded as proportionate (see below). 
4.3.2 A Critical Analysis of Webster v. Norfolk County Council 
 
The segment of Wall LJ’s judgment on the applicability of the ECHR is, with respect, 
open to criticism. There is no explanation or reasoning with regard to his conclusion 
about the relevance of the ECHR.
548
 Despite reference to the relevant ECHR rights, there 
is no analysis of the European cases and how they might apply to the facts in Webster. 
This author agrees with Herring who has observed that while the result in Webster might 
have been the correct one, ‘the reasoning is not such that would convince the person in 
the street’.549 Diver has also been critical of the decision and has observed that there was 
no attempt to weigh or balance the conflicting familial rights of the children and 
parents.
550
 Thus, without a proper application of the European jurisprudence to the facts 
of the case, or an explanation as to why the authorities did not assist the Websters, it is 
difficult to agree with Wall LJ’s conclusion.  
 
In fact, although Wall LJ referred to Görgülü v. Germany
551
 which cited P, C and S v. 
UK,
552
 he did not consider the relevance of the facts and principles from P, C and S and 
whether they could be of assistance to the Websters. In P, C and S, the ECtHR held that 
the close alliance between the care and freeing orders decreased the likelihood that the 
mother would be reunited with her child and consequently, her right to respect for private 
and family life under Article 8(1) had been violated. Similarly, in Webster, the children 
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were taken into care in December 2003 and were freed for adoption less than a year later 
(in November 2004). Although a key distinction between P, C and S v. UK and Webster 
is that in the former case the mother lacked legal representation, it can be argued that it 
was nonetheless a relevant case for the Court of Appeal to have discussed in the context 
of the Article 8 issues raised in Webster. Wall LJ’s judgment in Webster may be 
contrasted with his later judgment in Re P
553
 in which he more thoroughly considered 
Article 8 and P,C and S while emphasising that the facts of the case were unusual, and 
stated that the ‘juxtaposition’554 of the care and placement orders warranted examining 
the cases with ‘particular care’.555  
 
In Webster, it was understandable that the Court refused to reverse the adoption order due 
to the length of time the children had been with their adoptive parents. However, it could 
be argued that the apparent ‘vast social importance’ of adoption orders is not a strong 
enough justification for not revoking adoption orders in an exceptional case like Webster 
and that adoption of the children was not necessarily a proportionate outcome. This case 
also provides a stark contrast to the Court’s willingness (in rare circumstances) to revoke 
adoptions in rare cases where procedural errors have occurred.
556
 DeBlasio has expressed 
concern about the ruling in Webster:  
 
‘There is something about this case and others like it that lack a missing component 
of justice. It thus raises the question as to whether mistakes which concern the 
separation of children from their parents are simply justified at law in this way; and 
that LAs and the courts can ‘hide behind the law’ in the ACA rather than admit 
mistakes’.
557
  
 
Herring has argued that considering the fact that approximately 5,000 adoptions take 
place each year,
558
 it is questionable whether adoption orders have such huge social 
importance that they ought not to be set aside in exceptional cases like Webster. The 
Council of Europe has expressed concern about the miscarriages of justice that have 
occurred, where children have been adopted without parental consent, particularly in 
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England and Wales. The Council of Europe said the fact that an adoption order made in 
England and Wales could not be reversed in any circumstances was ‘a misunderstanding 
of the “best interests of the child” who actually has a right to return to his/her birth 
family’.559  
 
A recent case which was similar to Webster, was the subject of media attention and, 
potentially, may be another example of a case where the social importance of the 
permanence of adoption may not outweigh an apparent injustice.
560
 Karissa Cox and 
Richard Carter’s six-week old baby was taken into care by Surrey County Council and 
placed for adoption without parental consent, on the basis of non-accidental injury. 
Expert evidence subsequently exonerated the couple as it transpired that the child had a 
rare blood disorder (Von Willebrands II) and a severe vitamin D deficiency. The parents 
were prosecuted for child abuse but the case against them collapsed when evidence of the 
child’s medical condition was discovered. The parents have stated that they will appeal 
against the non-consensual adoption of their child and, if their child is not returned to 
them, they will urge Parliament to pass legislation which will take into account situations 
like theirs.  
 
The Webster case and the above case demonstrate the difficult dilemma Social Services 
and the courts face in protecting children’s rights under ECHR Article 2 (the right to life) 
and Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment), 
while balancing these rights against the rights of children and their parents to have a 
family life under Article 8. As considered in Chapter 2, for example, a welfare test 
applied in the context of adoption cases arguably ought to include a routine consideration 
of a wide range of children’s rights (including but not limited to Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 
and 18). While the removal of the children into care in these cases was evidently 
proportionate, it is questionable whether the courts struck the appropriate balance.  
 
While the analysis here on Webster is based on an examination of the judgments, caution 
must be exercised in reaching definite conclusions about the Cox and Carter case (above) 
                                                          
559
 Olga Borzova, Social services in Europe: legislation and practice of the removal of children from their 
families in Council of Europe member states (Council of Europe, 2015), para 74. 
560
 Ian Johnston and Emily Dugan, ‘Couple wrongly accused of abuse unlikely to see their child again’ (The 
Independent, 8 October 2015) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/couple-who-were-wrongly-
accused-of-abuse-unlikely-to-see-their-child-again-a6685471.html 
122 
 
because it is based on media, not court, reports. A difficulty in this thesis is that many 
adoption cases heard in the lower courts are unreported which makes it difficult to assess 
how many non-consensual adoptions are made where less restrictive but equally effective 
alternatives may have been available. It is important, in future research, to discover how 
often these types of cases occur. While one injustice may be regarded as one injustice too 
many, if, as John Hemming MP has claimed, cases like Webster are not uncommon and 
that more than 1,000 ‘wrongful’ adoptions take place every year561 this would provide a 
compelling justification for policy reform and even law reform to take place to ensure 
that viable alternatives to adoption (such as State assistance or kinship care) have been 
adequately considered while at the same time considering the child’s rights under ECHR 
Articles 2 and 3. The difficulty is that there are few reported cases
562
 where children have 
either been the subject of placement orders before being returned to their parents, or have 
been subject to placement orders and then non-consensual adoption.  
 
Despite the extensive media reports on Webster and the similar case above, it has been 
difficult to gain reliable evidence and form a clear picture of the scale of the problem. 
Likewise, the Council of Europe, has also attempted to investigate the number of justified 
or unwarranted decisions and has concluded that it is not possible to provide an accurate 
estimation.
563
 It can be argued, however, that although it may be difficult to make an 
accurate estimation, this is far from impossible to achieve. Considering the serious 
consequences of adoption and the potential injustice, more research needs to be 
undertaken to determine whether other cases like Webster may not have reached the 
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superior courts and have consequently gone unreported. This would make it possible to 
assess the scale of the problem. Regardless of whether Webster can be regarded as a one-
off case or indicates a systemic problem,
564
 it can be argued that the Websters’ rights 
under Article 8 did not receive sufficient protection. In other countries, their rights might 
have been better protected, and as Diver has argued, a case like Webster might have been 
treated differently in another jurisdiction:  
 
‘Had such a case [like Webster] perhaps occurred in a jurisdiction where the duty to 
preserve genetic ties was enshrined in statute, either on the basis of parental rights, 
paramountcy or constitutional protection of the family unit, the Webster children 
might well have been returned to their birth parents, or at least permitted to engage in 
some meaningful level of contact with them, perhaps on the basis of fresh, 
exonerating evidence subsequently arising over the issue of the alleged child 
abuse’.
565
 
 
In Webster, the issue of proportionality was not considered by the Court of Appeal in the 
way that it has been in subsequent judgments such as in Re B-S Children.
566
 It is argued 
in this thesis that a key issue which should have underpinned the Court of Appeal’s 
decision-making is the extent to which the non-consensual adoption was a proportionate 
measure and whether or not the Webster children could have been protected from harm 
through less restrictive measures than non-consensual adoption. It was clear in this case, 
that the grandparents had put themselves forward as potential carers for the three 
children. However, as Section 5.3 of this thesis shows, other family members (such as 
grandparents) are sometimes ruled out as possible carers for children because of their 
unwillingness to recognise and accept that the birth parents have actually abused the 
children (something which would have proved to have been true in the Webster case). 
However, a failure to accept that the birth parents have abused their children is often a 
reason why birth relatives are ruled out as carers.  
 
Webster also raises important questions about whether non-consensual adoption is 
proportionate when it results in a loss of contact between children and their parents (see 
further in Chapter 3). While with regard to Webster, it may be argued that the removal of 
their three children and their placement for adoption was not a necessary and 
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proportionate measure, in some cases an adoption order may be justified but termination 
of contact might not be. Thus, while State intervention and removal from the family home 
may have been justified to protect the children from harm, terminating contact between 
the Websters and their children was not. Herring has expressed similar reservations and 
has argued that the termination of the contact was a potential violation of the Article 8(1) 
rights of both the children and their parents.
567
 Despite the clear potential for a breach of 
the children and parents’ Article 8 rights, the lack of contact while the children were in 
care and lack of post-adoption contact were not analysed by the Court of Appeal. This is 
unsatisfactory as termination of contact will make it difficult to reunite children and their 
parents and may even lead to a non-consensual adoption being regarded as appropriate in 
the circumstances as the bond between parent and child will have been broken.
568
  
 
Diver has been critical of the Court of Appeal’s lack of reference to contact between 
members of the Webster family, observing that it was unclear whether two of the siblings 
who had been adopted were in contact with their other sibling, who had been adopted 
separately.
569
 Contact between children and parents is an important component of 
children and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8 and ought to have been considered and 
analysed by the Court of Appeal in this case, even if it would have decided that contact 
was not in the children’s best interests.   
 
Another important issue raised by the Webster case which applies to other cases on non-
consensual adoption is that adoption was arguably not the least restrictive measure 
available. One aspect in this case, which has not been the subject of academic comment, 
relates to the issue of whether the grandparents would have been suitable alternative 
carers instead of placing the children for adoption. However, although the grandparents 
were assessed as carers, placement with them was not permitted because they found it 
difficult to accept that the Websters had neglected their children. Social Services were of 
the view that the grandparents would be unable to meet the children’s needs and that the 
arrangement would be ‘confusing’ for the children. It is not clear exactly why this 
arrangement was confusing or why it would not have been possible for sufficient 
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safeguards to have been put in place. Although this might have been true and the 
grandparents might not have been suitable kinship carers, there ought perhaps to have 
been a more thorough analysis of this possibility, as placement with the grandparents 
would have been a less restrictive alternative to non-consensual adoption. In fact, 
Bainham has also criticised the Webster decision as it demonstrates the dangers of 
making adoption orders too readily without first exploring alternative options.
570
  
 
Cases such as Webster raise questions about the proportionality of non-consensual 
adoption. Bainham has argued that in the light of the Webster case: ‘there should be 
urgent reconsideration of the doubtful official policy which prefers public law adoption as 
the best long-term option for “looked after” children’.571 Delahunty and Tyler have stated 
that there may be cases where parents cannot accept a finding of fact that they have 
abused their children and may challenge a judgment, despite having neglected and/or 
abused their children. However, they have proposed that there is a need to ‘weed out’ 
cases where ‘no realistic argument’ exists but to welcome reconsideration of cases like 
Webster where ‘there is a real possibility the system has previously got it wrong. No other 
approach will safeguard the affected children’s interests’.572  
 
In other words, in order to ensure that a non-consensual adoption order is a proportionate 
measure, it is necessary to conduct a more thorough scrutiny of cases of this nature.
573
 
This could be achieved by reference to principles from the ECtHR (considered in Section 
3.5) and also by reference to children’s rights in the UNCRC. A consideration and 
application of these factors in adoption cases would provide greater protection not only 
for parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8 but also for children’s rights under both the 
ECHR and the UNCRC (in particular, Articles 7, 8 and 9). Having considered the issues 
raised by the Webster case, it is important to examine how the law on non-consensual 
adoption and proportionality has been addressed by the Court of Appeal in England and 
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Wales and the UK Supreme Court in subsequent cases. This is addressed in the pages that 
follow.  
4.4 The Proportionality of Non-Consensual Adoption: Legal Challenges in the 
Supreme Court 
4.4.1 ANS and another v. ML 
ANS and another v. ML
574
 is a UK Supreme Court decision which considers the 
proportionality of the Scottish equivalent of the Adoption and the Children Act 2002. 
While Scotland is not governed by the same law of adoption as England and Wales, the 
final appeal court in the land for Scottish cases is the Supreme Court of England and 
Wales, thus this judgment is relevant to all courts in the UK.
575
 This case is significant 
because it considered whether the legislation on non-consensual adoption itself was 
proportionate.  
In ANS, the appellant was a mother whose child has been placed for adoption without her 
consent. Here, the Supreme Court was invited to assess the compatibility of the Adoption 
and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, s31(3)(d) with ECHR Article 8, which was similar to 
and in fact based on the ACA 2002, s52(1). S31(3)(d) stated: ‘where neither of those 
subsections [4 or 5] applies, the welfare of the child otherwise requires the consent to be 
dispensed with’. In contrast to Webster, where the parents challenged the reasons behind 
making the adoption orders, ANS involved a challenge to the adoption legislation itself. In 
ANS, the mother claimed that the effect of s31(3)(d) was that there could be permanent 
severance to the parent/child bond. She argued that, as this severance was based solely on 
the child’s welfare, then the non-consensual adoption therefore violated her right under 
ECHR Article 8. The key issue was whether or not s31(3)(d) itself represented a 
proportionate interference with parents’ rights under Article 8.  
 
The Court’s analysis rested on the presumption that the 2007 Act would not have been 
enacted to place the UK in breach of international obligations and that it was in keeping 
with international obligations
576
 that the child’s welfare was the paramount 
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consideration.
577
 The Court held that the statutory provision was compatible with the 
ECHR and wider international obligations (under the UNCRC, Article 21 the right to 
adoption, for example). In ANS, Lord Reed referred to the ECtHR in YC v. UK,
578
 which 
had approved similar adoption legislation in England and Wales. In the European Court’s 
judgment, it had indicated that there were a number of factors laid down in the checklist 
under s1(4) of the 2002 Act which reflect the various elements in assessing 
proportionality, e.g. the age, maturity and wishes of the child, the likely effect on the 
child of ceasing to be a member of his original family and the relationship the child has 
with relatives.  
 
Lord Reed opined that the ECtHR had deemed the application of s1(4), in conjunction 
with s52(1)(b) to be in accordance with law. Thus, the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
appeared to be that since the European Court had accepted that s1(4) of the ACA 2002 
was in accordance with law, and broadly reflected the elements required for 
proportionality, then so also was s31(3)(d). Y.C. v. UK ought not to have been used to 
support the lawfulness and the proportionality of s31(3)(d) since this provision was not 
equivalent to s1(4) and more importantly, in Y.C. v. UK, the ECtHR was not invited to 
question either whether s52(1)(b) was in accordance with law,
579
 or whether the non-
consensual adoption in that case was in accordance with law. The issues of the case 
focused on the necessity and proportionality of the State’s actions (for further discussion 
of this case, see Chapter 6). 
 
In ANS, the Supreme Court reflected on Keegan v. Ireland,
580
 where the ECtHR had 
previously made it clear that adoption could only take place in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’. Similarly, Y.C. v. UK emphasised that familial ties could not be severed 
unless there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ to justify permanent separation:  
 
‘[F]amily ties may only be severed in exceptional circumstances and that everything 
must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ 
the family…’
581
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However, despite a repeated emphasis on the need for ‘exceptional circumstances’ where 
familial ties are to be severed, such as in the case of adoption, Lord Reed did not 
emphasise this important principle stemming from the European jurisprudence (see 
Chapter 3). Lord Reed asserted that ‘exceptional circumstances’ was not a ‘legal test but 
an observation about the rarity of the circumstances in which the compulsory severing of 
family ties will be in accordance with article 8’.582 With the greatest possible respect, it is 
argued that this is a misinterpretation of Strasbourg jurisprudence. Fenton-Glynn, for 
example, is of the view that ‘exceptional circumstances’ is very clearly a test, even 
though it may be one which is easy to satisfy on the basis of the child’s best interests.583  
 
An important part of the court’s analysis in ANS rested upon its interpretation of what 
was meant by ‘requires’ in the context of dispensing with parental consent to adoption 
under s31(3)(d) of the Scottish adoption legislation. The leading judgment was delivered 
by Lord Reed who referred to the notion of proportionality and dispensing with consent 
to adoption:  
 
‘The court must be satisfied that the interference with the rights of the parents is 
proportionate: in other words, that nothing less than adoption will suffice. If the 
child’s welfare can be equally well secured by a less drastic intervention, then it 
cannot be said that the child’s welfare ‘requires’ that consent to adoption should be 
dispensed with’.
584
  
 
The Supreme Court observed that the word ‘requires’ used in the Scottish legislation is 
used in the ACA 2002 s52(1)(b) and that it also reflected the language used by the 
ECtHR.
585
 Furthermore, Lord Reed stated that, when the Scottish Act was drafted, the 
wording was based on the ACA 2002, s52(1)(b) but it was amended to reflect the fact that 
it ought to be subject to a necessity test equivalent to that in ECHR Article 8.
586
 The 
Supreme Court also observed that Wall LJ, in a Court of Appeal decision, had previously 
held that the ACA 2002, s52(1)(b) was compatible with the ECHR.
587
 Lord Reed opined 
that the 2007 Act conveyed ‘the essence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence’588 and as the 
less detailed provision of s52(1)(b) had been regarded by Wall LJ as compatible with 
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Article 8, the Supreme Court held that s31(3)(d) of the 2007 Act was also compatible 
with ECHR Article 8.
589
  
 
It can be argued that the ANS decision does provide some protection for parents’ 
interests
590
 for two main reasons. First of all, because it acknowledges that a court ought 
to start with a less interventionist approach and secondly, because it places some 
emphasis on the Court of Human Rights’ decision in Y.C. v. UK.591 However, closer 
scrutiny of the decision reveals that, not unlike the Webster decision, there is a lack of in-
depth analysis of the rights of children and parents that one might expect, considering the 
seriousness of the issue at stake. Thus, Ifezue and Rajabali, for example, have pointed out 
that while the Supreme Court takes in ANS into account parental interests, ‘this is only 
done on a superficial basis’.592 This is demonstrated, for example, in its analysis of the 
decision of Y.C, in which the ECtHR stated that the factors to be considered in adoption 
cases included the wishes of the child, the likely effect of ceasing to be a member of the 
original family and the child’s existing relationships with family members. Despite this 
emphasis in Y.C, the paramountcy of the child’s welfare in the adoption process and how 
this could justify overriding the interests of the parents was emphasised in ANS, thereby 
reducing the significance of parental rights.  
 
The decision in ANS amounts primarily to a traditional black-letter law analysis of the 
law, despite increasing obligations to consider rights as required by the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (see Chapter 2 for further explanation). The Supreme Court focused primarily 
on analysing whether or not the legislation justified non-consensual adoption rather than 
on whether or not the mother’s Article 8 right had been violated. While one might not 
disagree with the Court’s interpretation of the legislation itself, and the Court may not 
have been compelled to provide further analysis of ECHR rights, the decision provided 
the Supreme Court with a perfect opportunity to explore the circumstances in which non-
consensual adoption may or may not be a proportionate interference with parental rights 
and also to consider the role of children’s rights in non-consensual adoption cases.  
As was argued in Chapter 2, compliance with the best interests principle under UNCRC 
Article 3, applied in the context of adoption under UNCRC Article 21, may actually 
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require a more detailed analysis of factors which are relevant in a decision about whether 
or not a child should be adopted. ANS was an important case since it affirmed that the 
ACA 2002 was in fact Convention compliant. Subsequent case law in the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeal has started to consider what type of analysis needs to be 
undertaken and what measures ought to be taken for a non-consensual adoption to be 
regarded as a proportionate measure. In the following case, the UK Supreme Court had to 
consider whether or not the rights of the child and the parents had been violated under 
ECHR Article 8 in relation to a non-consensual adoption.  
4.4.2 In the Matter of B (Children) 
In the Matter of B (Children)
593
 is an important case because it is the first time the UK 
Supreme Court has provided a detailed assessment of the significance of ECHR Article 
8(1) and the principle of proportionality in a non-consensual adoption case. In this case, 
the Court considered whether the parents’ and child’s Article 8(1) right to respect for 
private and family life were relevant at the threshold stage of care proceedings under the 
Children Act 1989, s31(2). The Court also considered the applicability of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, s6 (under which public authorities are duty bound to act compatibly 
with Convention Rights). The Supreme Court had to decide whether it was required to 
carry out a fresh determination of the issues at stake, rather than a secondary review, in 
order to assess whether the non-consensual adoption had been a proportionate 
interference with the rights of a newborn baby (‘Amelia’) and her parents under ECHR 
Article 8.  
The child, Amelia, was removed into care under the CA 1989, s31 and subsequently 
placed for adoption under the ACA 2002, s52(1)(b). Primarily because of the mother’s 
factitious disorder,
 594
 but also because of the father’s drug use, Social Services argued 
that Amelia was at risk of emotional harm and she was removed into care. While she was 
in care, both parents visited Amelia regularly and sought to be reunited with her. Social 
Services considered it would be in her best interests to be adopted and the High Court 
granted an adoption order. The parents appealed to the Court of Appeal which affirmed 
the trial judge’s decision. They subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court which was 
invited to consider whether Article 8(1) was relevant at the threshold stage of care 
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proceedings and whether, under the HRA 1998, s6, an appellate court needed to conduct 
a fresh determination instead of a secondary review when a violation of a Convention 
Right has been alleged.  
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by a majority
595
 of 4-1 (with Lady Hale 
dissenting). The Court held that the grounds for the care order had been made out and 
that, due to the mother’s disorder and the risk of emotional harm to her child, Amelia 
should be placed for adoption. However, it was held that a high degree of justification 
would be needed under Article 8 for a child to be placed for adoption against the birth 
parents’ wishes. In order for the adoption to take place, the child’s interests must render 
this necessary. The Supreme Court held that Article 8 did not apply at the first stage when 
determining whether the s31 threshold for making a care order has been crossed, but it 
applied at the second stage when a court was conducting the welfare assessment.
596
  
The Supreme Court thus considered whether or not the parents’ Article 8 rights had been 
violated in the course of the welfare assessment. Lord Neuberger opined that ‘no 
substantive order is made without all Convention rights being taken into account’.597 Lord 
Neuberger cited English case law, drawing attention to the fact that it is recognised that it 
is best for children to be raised by their birth parents (see Section 2.4.1).
598
 Despite the 
existence of this principle, the facts in this case justified departing from this assumption. 
Lord Neuberger concluded that the risk of the harm to the child amounted to defective 
parenting which satisfied the threshold under the CA 1989, s31(2). The Supreme Court 
thus held that the making of the care order did not violate Amelia’s or her parents’ rights 
under ECHR Article 8.  
In terms of whether the non-consensual adoption violated the Article 8 rights of Amelia 
and her parents, Lord Wilson discussed Y.C. v. UK.
599
 He considered how this case had a 
bearing on the proportionality assessment in non-consensual adoption cases. He observed 
that para 134 of the judgment in Y.C ‘…demonstrates the high degree of justification 
which article 8 demands of a determination that a child should be adopted or placed in 
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care with a view to adoption’.600 Lord Wilson opined that European jurisprudence was 
‘parallel’601 with domestic law which emphasises that it must be necessary to make an 
adoption order. In terms of the proportionality principle, Lord Wilson
602
 considered 
Kutzner v. Germany
603
 where it was stated by the ECtHR that the authorities had violated 
Article 8(1) where they had not ‘given sufficient consideration to additional measures of 
support as an alternative’604 to adoption. Lord Wilson stated that a three month 
adjournment to explore the possibility of reuniting Amelia with her parents might have 
been a proportionate response but accepted Judge Cryan’s view that Amelia could not be 
reunited with her parents because further exploration would have been unsuccessful due 
to the ‘barriers erected by the parents’.605 In other words, the judge had concluded that the 
parents would be unwilling to cooperate with the relevant authorities (i.e. Social 
Services). 
Lord Neuberger reached a similar conclusion but, in the course of his reasoning referred 
to the UNCRC
606
 and emphasised that ‘before making an adoption order in such a case, 
the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities (or others) 
providing the requisite assistance and support’.607 Despite the fact that the judgment was 
not favourable to Amelia’s parents, Lord Neuberger’s words may carry some weight in 
future cases. In fact, this judgment, along with UNCRC and ECtHR jurisprudence, could 
potentially be used to argue that authorities in England and Wales have a positive 
obligation under both the ECHR and the UNCRC to provide State assistance to keep 
families together.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court also held that the HRA 1998, s6 did not require the 
appellate courts to consider issues afresh which related to ECHR rights. Appellate courts 
were only required to review the lower court’s decision. The majority of the Supreme 
Court held that, while the Court had a duty under the HRA 1998, s6, to ensure that there 
was no violation of Article 8, the appropriate test was to consider simply whether the 
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lower court exceeded its discretion and to determine whether the lower court was ‘wrong’ 
in its decision.
608
 Lord Neuberger stated that:   
‘[T]he fact that a Convention right is involved does not require an appellate domestic 
court to consider again the issue of proportionality for itself…. [T]he court system as 
a whole must fairly determine for itself whether the requirement of proportionality is 
met, but that does not mean that each court up the appeal chain does so’.
609
  
Although Lord Kerr was in the majority and dismissed the appeal, he disagreed with the 
majority on the second argument in relation to the need for appellate courts to consider 
issues afresh. He argued that under the HRA 1998, s6, appellate courts might be required 
to perform their own assessment of proportionality. He opined that: 
‘[A]n appellate court cannot avoid the imperative of section 6 of HRA by viewing 
the matter of proportionality through the prism of the defensibility of the trial judge's 
decision. An appeal in an adoption case requires the appellate court to confront the 
possibility that its decision could involve the infringement of a Convention right. 
The duty not to act in a way which is incompatible with such a right gives rise to an 
inevitable, concomitant duty to inquire whether the order that the court makes would 
have that consequence. That is an inquiry which cannot be satisfactorily answered by 
the conclusion that another agency has so decided. The inquiry must require the 
appellate court to decide for itself if the freeing order is proportionate/necessary’.610 
Lady Hale provided the sole voice of dissent, with an opinion which was a striking 
contrast to that of the majority.
611
 Lady Hale agreed with the majority that the threshold 
had been crossed. Nonetheless, she held that this did not mean that nothing else but 
adoption would do for the child, as from her perspective, ‘nothing else’612 had been tried. 
She held that an adoption order was not a proportionate measure on the facts of the case; 
and that the potential for social workers to take other measures to protect Amelia which 
would have enabled her to have been returned to her parents had not been properly 
examined.
613
 In other words, in her opinion, it would have been possible for a less 
restrictive measure to have been chosen instead of non-consensual adoption. Lady Hale 
accepted the threshold had been crossed in this case but stated that an adoption order was 
not justified. She disagreed with the majority of the Supreme Court and, like Lord Kerr, 
indicated that the Court had the jurisdiction to do more than merely review the decision 
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of the lower court when performing a proportionality analysis. According to Lady Hale, 
the Court had the discretion to reconsider the issue on the basis of the material put before 
it.  
Despite referring to Amelia’s Article 8 rights and a ‘relatively rare’614 reference to the 
UNCRC, there was no analysis of what these rights were (except for a brief reference to 
Article 21 and its emphasis on paramountcy
615
). Furthermore, there was no reference to 
how such rights could be weighed and whether or not such rights were relevant 
considerations in the welfare assessment under s31, which preceded the adoption. It could 
be said, for example, that Amelia’s right under UNCRC Article 7 (to know and be cared 
for by her parents) and her right under UNCRC Article 9 (not to be separated from her 
parents) are rights which could have been referred to in the Court’s analysis of the case. 
Amelia lost the opportunity to be raised by or at least maintain contact with her parents, 
even though contact, had taken place since her birth and had been positive.  
In contrast to ANS, the UK Supreme Court in the case of In the Matter of B (Children) 
gave a more detailed analysis of proportionality and of non-consensual adoption and a 
more in-depth discussion of relevant ECHR rights. However, one aspect of the decision 
which is disappointing is that the Supreme Court gave limited attention to the child’s 
rights (despite the fact that the parents argued that not only had their Article 8 right been 
violated, but so had the Article 8 right of their daughter). Overall though, this case can be 
used to support arguments made in both Chapters 2 and 3 which have emphasised that the 
State has a positive obligation not only to respect and protect the rights of children and 
parents in adoption cases, but also to consider, and where appropriate, apply less 
restrictive alternatives before making an adoption order. Having outlined the significance 
of the Supreme Court jurisprudence on non-consensual adoption, the following section 
considers the guidance on non-consensual adoption which has been provided by the Court 
of Appeal in England and Wales. 
4.5 Court of Appeal Guidance on Non-Consensual Adoption: Re B-S (Children) 
4.5.1 The Guidance 
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Re B-S (Children)
616
 concerned an appeal by a mother whose two children had been 
removed into care in 2011 and in respect of whom care and placement orders were made. 
The mother’s consent to adoption was dispensed with and she applied under the ACA 
2002, s45(7) for leave to oppose the adoptions, arguing that her circumstances had 
changed. At first instance, her claim was refused by Parker J on the basis that, even 
though her circumstances had changed, her application to oppose the adoption would not 
have succeeded because of the bonds that the children had formed with their prospective 
adopters.  
 
The mother appealed to the Court of Appeal on seven different grounds which included 
arguments based on ECHR Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing) and ECHR Article 8 (the 
right to respect for private and family life). Munby P rejected the mother’s appeal on all 
seven grounds but laid down important guidelines for adoption proceedings in the lower 
court. At a NAGALRO
617
 Conference held in Birmingham in March 2015, Munby P 
described the case as one of the most ‘important’ in terms of practice. In Re B-S 
(Children), Munby P acknowledged his ‘misgivings’618 about how lower courts had been 
addressing non-consensual adoptions and criticised them for their ‘lack of attention’619 to 
previous judgments and provided guidance on the matter.  
 
Munby P stated that, where there had been no welfare analysis considering realistic 
options and no evaluation of the proportionality of the adoption, then the decision-making 
would be ‘flawed’620 because an interference with Article 8 would not be justified. 
Munby P referred to the importance of ECtHR jurisprudence and the need to ensure that 
the State satisfied its obligation under Article 8 so as to ensure that legal ties between 
children and parents were severed only in exceptional circumstances and reasonable 
efforts were made to rebuild these relationships.
621
 Munby P’s judgment was highly 
critical of the inadequacy of the analysis of the lower courts with reference to four cases 
where failures to provide leave to challenge adoption without parental consent had been 
based on what he regarded to be inadequate judicial analysis. Furthermore, he was critical 
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of the courts’ tendency to place too much reliance on the evidence of Social Services, 
which is often insufficient and which he described as ‘sloppy practice’.622  
 
In Re B-S, the Court held that a high threshold would need to be reached before it could 
be determined that the child’s welfare ‘requires’ parental consent to be dispensed with. In 
Re B-S, reference was made to Lady Hale in Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: 
Threshold Criteria)
623
 where she stressed that application of the ACA 2002 and ECHR 
Article 8 require dispensing with parental consent only if ‘nothing else will do’. 
Reference was also made to Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent)
624
 where Wall 
LJ stressed that to ‘require’ intervention or even long-term removal of a child did not 
necessarily mean that an adoption order would be required. In other words, just because a 
care order was necessary, would not mean that a non-consensual adoption would be 
necessary and proportionate.  
 
In sum, the decision in Re B-S has provided very important guidance on how the courts 
should exercise their powers and conduct their reasoning when deciding whether or not to 
make an adoption order. Munby P said that, first of all, it would be necessary for the 
courts to conduct a proper weighing up of the pros and cons of each potential option for a 
child in what is known as a ‘balance sheet’625 approach (see Chapter 2). Secondly, the 
courts should provide a reasoned judgment which should demonstrate a ‘global holistic’ 
approach whereby it considers the different options available to meet the child’s needs. 
The decision in Re B-S therefore requires the consideration of at least one less restrictive 
than adoption and the balance sheet approach assists in determining whether the 
alternative is equally effective.  
4.5.2 Change of Circumstances 
 
Re B-S (Children)
626
 has also had an impact on the legal test to be applied when parents 
apply for leave to revoke a placement order and when they oppose the making of a final 
adoption order. It is important to consider this aspect of the decision as it increases the 
protection of parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8, in that it provides parents with a 
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meaningful form of legal recourse where their circumstances have changed and they seek 
to be reunited with their children.
627
 The ACA 2002, s24(2)  provides that: ‘an application 
may not be made by a person other than the child or local authority’ to revoke a 
placement order unless (a) the court has given leave to apply and (b) the child is not 
placed for adoption by the authority. Under the ACA 2002, s24(3) the court cannot 
revoke a placement order ‘unless satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances 
since the order was made’. In order to obtain leave to revoke a placement order, the birth 
parents must prove that a change of circumstances has occurred within the family. Where 
an application for an adoption order has been made, parents can no longer submit an 
application under s24 but instead have the opportunity to challenge the making of the 
adoption order itself. The ACA 2002, s47 states the conditions for making an adoption 
order. S47(3) and s47(3) provide that parents (or guardians) may not oppose the making 
of an adoption order without the court’s permission. In determining whether or not to 
permit parents to oppose the making of an adoption order, the court will consider whether 
or not there has been a change of circumstances.
628
 
 
In assessing whether or not there has been a change of circumstances, the court has to 
consider whether the applicant (typically one or both of the birth parents) has a real 
prospect of success in their application. In deciding whether or not to give permission to 
an application, the welfare of the child must be considered and a two-stage test is 
applied.
629
 First, the court asks if there has been a change in circumstances. If not, this is 
the end of the court’s analysis and the application is dismissed. If the answer is yes, the 
court must ask if leave to oppose the placement order should be given by evaluating: 
‘…whether the parent's prospects of success are more than just fanciful, whether they 
have solidity’.630 The child’s welfare will be the paramount consideration and in 
evaluating welfare, the court will consider the current state of affairs and what may 
happen in the future. If the child’s welfare will be adversely affected by an application to 
oppose adoption, permission will not be granted.
631
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In Re W (Adoption: Set aside and leave to Oppose),
632
 Thorpe LJ stressed that only 
‘exceptionally rare circumstances’633 would justify disrupting a placement for adoption. 
In Re B-S (Children),
634
 McFarlane LJ’s perspective was that the approach outlined by 
Thorpe LJ was untenable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Re B, because the 
jurisdiction under the ACA 2002, s47(5) was only triggered when children had been 
placed for adoption and in such a placement for a minimum of 10 weeks. He viewed 
s47(5) as intended to provide parents with a meaningful remedy against the making of an 
adoption order. Re B-S shows that a change of circumstances need not be ‘significant’635 
for permission to be granted to oppose a placement or adoption order. This is because 
permission does not guarantee that parents will succeed in their application and prevent 
an adoption order from being made; it merely provides them with an opportunity to 
challenge it. The way in which a ‘change of circumstances’ may be interpreted by the 
courts is significant since a restrictive interpretation of ‘change of circumstances’ means 
that few parents would be able to appeal against a non-consensual adoption. The 
conclusion in Re B-S, however, arguably increases the likelihood that parents may be able 
to successfully argue that their circumstances have changed. The impact of this decision 
then, is that it provides more protection to birth parents in the context of non-consensual 
adoption in both cases where parents seek leave to revoke placement orders and to oppose 
adoption orders. 
4.5.3 A Change of Approach? 
 
At first glance, the decision in Re B-S appears to encourage caution in making adoption 
orders
636
 and to emphasise thorough exploration of alternatives to adoption. Arguably, Re 
B-S also increases the protection of parents’ rights in relation to the opposition of 
adoption orders, since the courts may be more willing to grant permission to oppose an 
adoption order.
637
 Sloan has suggested too, that the decisions in Re B and Re B-S have 
                                                          
632
 [2010] EWCA Civ 1535. Also see: Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1431 which suggested 
circumstances which might justify leave to appeal against adoption would be ‘stringent’.  
633
 Re W & Re H [2013] EWCA Civ 1177 at para 17.  
634
 [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
635
 Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s 47(5)) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 FLR at para 8.  
636
 Jonathan Herring, Rebecca Probert and Stephen Gilmore, Great Debates in Family Law (London: 
Palgrave, 2015), p146. 
637
 Kim Holt and Nancy Kelly, ‘When adoption without parental consent breaches human rights: 
implications of Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 963 on decision making and permanency planning for 
children’ [2015] 37 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 228. 
139 
 
increased the likelihood of the judiciary’s approach in non-consensual adoption cases 
being compatible with the UNCRC.
638
  
 
The emphasis on legislative provisions (both in the ACA 2002 and the CFA 2014) to 
decrease delay in the adoption process and the government’s clear commitment to 
adoption policy suggest that adoption is the government’s preferred choice for 
permanence for children in care. In Re B-S the Court has firmly stated that there ought not 
to be a presumption about what option is in the child’s best interests. In fact, the Court in 
Re B-S has emphasised that adoption ought to be a last resort rather than a first 
consideration. Sloan has thus argued that there may be some conflict between the 
government’s pro-adoption policy as seen within the legislation and the courts’ approach 
to adoption.
639
  
 
According to Bainham and Markham until the decision in Re B-S, the lower courts have 
often paid only ‘lip service’ to human rights requirements in adoption cases. They have 
suggested that this ruling puts pressure on judges to make balanced decisions based on 
proper evidence, for otherwise their decisions may be appealed by parents.
640
 Although 
the High Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court decisions have also emphasised 
that adoption ought to be a measure of last resort, the lower courts have not always 
treated it as such.
641
 Re B-S is likely to have a considerable influence on the lower courts 
as it has laid down specific guidance on non-consensual adoption.  
 
Sprinz has argued that a possible result of the guidance in Re B-S is that there may be 
fewer adoptions with the consequence that more children will remain in long-term foster 
care in order to ensure that ties with birth parents are not severed and that children remain 
in direct contact with them.
642
 Despite the existence of Court of Appeal guidance, Sprinz 
has observed that the High Court has re-stated the key principles from Re B-S in many 
cases, because the Family Proceedings (Magistrates) Courts and County Courts are still 
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not following the authority of Re B-S.643 This is cause for concern as it may mean that 
some non-consensual adoptions are still taking place when less restrictive alternatives are 
available. In other words, some adoptions may not be human rights compliant in that they 
are not necessary and proportionate, and some children and parents may have had their 
legal and family ties unfairly and unnecessarily severed.  
 
Another consequence of Re B-S is that there has been a significant increase in litigation 
by birth parents opposed to the adoption of their children.
644
 In fact, there have been 
many subsequent cases where the Court of Appeal has allowed parents’ appeals against 
adoption orders.
645
 In Re E,
646
 for instance, a mother appealed against care and placement 
orders. The Court of Appeal applied the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Re B
647
 
and looked at the proportionality of the outcome, based on the evidence in the case. The 
child had been removed because of a finding of fact that the mother’s boyfriend had 
caused harm to the child. The mother had continued to live with her boyfriend, before 
finding alternative suitable accommodation. The Court held that the adoption of a young 
child who was securely attached to the mother (who was seen as a loving and capable 
mother) was not a proportionate outcome.  
 
In another case, Re J,
648
 the Court of Appeal considered a grandmother’s appeal against 
care and placement orders in respect of a 21 month old child. The Court stressed ECHR 
Article 8 was important in this context and it had to be shown that the adoption was 
‘necessary’. The Court allowed the appeal, since on the facts it was not clear why it was 
necessary for an adoption to take place or why the child could not have been placed with 
the birth family. These decisions demonstrate that the courts are recognising the 
requirements of proportionality, a legal principle which has long existed but which has 
not always been considered by the lower courts.  
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In Re Y (Children),
649
 Ryder LJ suggested it is not necessary for the Family Court to 
undertake a separate human rights proportionality evaluation balancing the effects of the 
interference on each individual’s Article 8 right in private law cases, where there are no 
public law consequences. This is unlike adoption cases where there is public authority 
involvement as the HRA 1998, s6 provides that: ‘it is unlawful for a public authority to 
act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right’. By implication then, Ryder 
LJ’s judgment has the potential to be used as authority for the proposition that when 
making adoption orders, which do have public law consequences, then the courts must 
consider the rights of children and their parents so as to determine the proportionality of 
the adoption order.  
 
The present position of the Court of Appeal, in the light of the decision in Re B-S, is that 
a holistic approach taking into consideration a range of different options does not require 
the courts to consider every possible option, but simply options which are ‘realistically 
possible’.650 Despite appearing to advocate the need for more stringent judicial control 
over when non-consensual adoption ought to take place in Re B-S, in Re R (A Child)
651
 
Munby P addressed ‘myths’ which might ultimately lead to fewer adoptions being made. 
These included the idea that there might be a higher threshold to satisfy than there had 
been prior to the decision in Re B-S before a child could be placed for adoption or that 
more assessments would be needed before kinship carers could be ruled out. He asserted 
that despite the importance of his judgment in Re B-S, that he had not intended to 
discourage the making of adoption orders. Munby P thus emphasised that local 
authorities ‘must not shy away from seeking, nor courts from making’652 adoption orders 
where it was necessary to do so.  
 
Despite the welcome clarification that Re B-S provided, (namely that adoption should be 
regarded as a last resort and that the quality of social work assessments and judicial 
reasoning needed to improve), concern has been expressed that the judgment in Re B-S 
has been used inappropriately to criticise social workers and local authorities.
653
 Thus for 
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instance, Holt and Kelly have argued that social workers’ decisions are under scrutiny in 
the wake of B-S.
654
 Furthermore, Masson has pointed out that it is not just local 
authorities, but also judges, who are under pressure because of the additional hearings 
which now take place after B-S and because higher standards of judicial reasoning are 
now expected.
655
 The biggest impact, however, is the fact that 47 per cent fewer children 
were placed for adoption in the months following the decision.
656
 For the first time since 
2011, the annual statistics from the Department for Education, demonstrate an overall 
decline in the number of children who are being placed for adoption (i.e. placement 
orders have been made).
657
  
 
While the number of children who have been adopted has since increased, the rate of the 
increase was only 5 per cent between 2014 and 2015, compared with 26 per cent between 
2013 and 2014.
658
 The National Adoption Leadership Board has attributed the decrease in 
the number of adoptions to the decisions in Re B and Re B-S.
659
 NAGALRO has 
suggested that pre-B-S, special guardianship and kinship carers were ruled out as carers 
for ‘quite spurious reasons’660 without being afforded the chance to make representations 
to the court. Now, more special guardianship orders are made (see further discussion in 
Section 5.4). It is apparent then, that the Re B-S decision has had a considerable impact 
on the number of adoptions which have been made and challenges existing government 
policy on adoption. This following section considers some specific issues which have 
been raised by the legislation and the case law on non-consensual adoption.  
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4.6 Adoption law – more adoptions and more quickly 
4.6.1 Overview of more adoptions and more quickly 
 
This section considers three issues which impact on the proportionality of non-consensual 
adoption and which, it is argued, have increased the likelihood that non-consensual 
adoption orders will take place in circumstances where less restrictive alternatives might 
have been available. These issues are: the potential for social engineering to occur in the 
context of non-consensual adoption; the impact of the 26-week limit in care and adoption 
proceedings; how new provisions which explicitly limit contact between children in care 
and their parents and how pre and post-adoption proceedings may impact on the 
proportionality of non-consensual adoption. 
4.6.2 Non-Consensual Adoption: A Proportionate Measure or Social Engineering? 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis discussed the importance of European jurisprudence which, under 
the Human Rights Act 1998, s2, must be taken into account during court decision-making 
in England and Wales. In Pontes v. Portugal,
661
 R.M.S. v. Spain,
662
 Zhou v. Italy
663
 and 
S.H. v. Italy,
664
 for example, the ECtHR has held that Member States ought to seek less 
restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption. In Kutzner v. Germany
665
 and Haase 
v. Germany,
666
 the ECtHR emphasised that merely showing a child could be placed in a 
‘more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing’667 would not, in and of itself, 
justify the compulsory removal of a child and thus arguably, would not justify an even 
more serious intervention with children’s and parents’ ECHR Article 8 rights to respect 
for private and family life, such as a non-consensual adoption. In other words then, the 
ECtHR is against social engineering (i.e. deciding that a child would be better off living 
away from his or her birth parents). A similar perspective can be found from case law in 
England and Wales. Lady Hale, for example, has stated that social engineering must not 
lead to the removal of children from their parents:  
 
‘…it is not enough that the social workers, the experts or the court think that a child 
would be better off living with another family. That would be social engineering of a 
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kind which is not permitted in a democratic society. The jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights requires that there be a ‘pressing social need’ for 
intervention and that the intervention be proportionate to that need…’
668  
 
Prior to the enactment of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, Barton argued that the 
Adoption and Children Bill’s emphasis on the child’s welfare (see the ACA 2002 
s52(1)(b)) over adoption based on failings of the parent had the potential to encourage 
social engineering.
669
 After the enactment of the ACA, others expressed similar concerns. 
DeBlasio, for instance, has argued that: ‘[E]ven with the ‘balancing’ of rights by way of 
the welfare checklist, there is no doubt that the provisions [of the ACA 2002] live 
dangerously close to legitimising social engineering’.670 Dale has also claimed that non-
consensual adoption has ‘significant human rights and social engineering implications’.671  
 
The concern about social engineering in non-consensual adoption cases is not merely an 
academic concern. This is an issue which has also been raised in the Court of Appeal
672
 
and the Supreme Court. This can be seen in Re A (A Child),
673
 for example. In this case, a 
boy was removed into care and was due to be adopted because the father was considered 
an unsuitable role model and was unable to raise his child due to his previous convictions. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the concerns expressed by social workers were 
relevant but that there was a need for a careful analysis of the information. Non-
consensual adoption was not regarded to be a proportionate response to the concerns 
about the father’s ability to parent. In Re A (A Child)674 Sir James Munby, the President 
of the Family Division of the High Court, expressed concern about social engineering and 
approved of the judgment in North East Lincolnshire Council v G & L
675
 where Jack J 
stated that: 
 
‘[T]he courts are not in the business of social engineering. The courts are not in the 
business of providing children with perfect homes. If we took into care and placed 
for adoption every child whose parents had had a domestic spat and every child 
whose parents on occasion had drunk too much then the care system would be 
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overwhelmed and there would not be enough adoptive parents. So we have to have a 
degree of realism about prospective carers who come before the courts’.
676
 
 
Munby P reminded the lower courts of the key principle laid down in Y.C. v UK
677
 which 
is that: 
‘Family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything 
must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to 'rebuild' the family. It 
is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his 
upbringing. However, where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child's health 
and development, a parent is not entitled under article 8 to insist that such ties be 
maintained.’ 
Lady Hale has expressed similar concerns about social engineering in her powerful 
dissent in the UK Supreme Court decision of In the Matter of B (Children)
678
 which 
demonstrates the relationship between care and non-consensual adoption orders.
679
 An 
issue in care proceedings, which impacts on adoption proceedings, is that there is a fine 
line between necessary intervention and social engineering. In B (Children) she made it 
plain that parents’ negative character traits and behaviour would not always justify 
removal of their children from the family home: 
 
‘We are all frail human beings, with our fair share of unattractive character traits, 
which sometimes manifest themselves in bad behaviours which may be copied by 
our children. But the State does not and cannot take away the children of all the 
people who commit crimes, who abuse alcohol or drugs, who suffer from physical or 
mental illnesses or disabilities, or who espouse anti-social political or religious 
beliefs’.
680
  
 
Furthermore, Porter has expressed wider concerns that social engineering may have 
played a role in the increasing number of care proceedings involving children from 
Eastern Europe,
681
 some of whom may be placed for adoption.
682
 Eastern European 
children sometimes come from countries where poverty is endemic and, while these  
standards of living may be acceptable in those countries, they may not be regarded as 
acceptable in England and Wales. As a result, it may be difficult for some parents to 
reach the expected standards of living and parenting which are regarded as acceptable in 
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England and Wales.
683
 Porter has argued that there is a perception by countries such as 
Slovakia
684
 that the English authorities are taking into care and holding onto ‘white’ 
children who are adoptable.
685
 Furthermore, in recent years, there has been increasing 
media attention given to cases concerning children placed for adoption, born to parents 
who are not of English origin
686
 and there has also been increased litigation on this 
subject in England and Wales, with some children being returned to their parents while 
others have been placed for adoption. The issue of if and when it will be appropriate for 
children born to parents of different nationalities to be adopted has been raised before the 
Council of Europe
687
 and the European Parliament. Fenton-Glynn has drawn attention to 
this:  
 
‘The English adoption system has caused tension between the government and 
several other EU Member States, in particular Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. 
Concerns have also been expressed by Nigeria in this regard’.
688
  
 
It is thus argued that social engineering is not merely an academic concern but is a real 
problem in non-consensual adoption cases, and a problem which may impact on whether 
or not the courts decide to choose a less restrictive (but equally effective) alternative to 
such adoptions. Where there is concern about parents’ ability to raise their children due to 
different perceptions of parenting standards, then assistance from the State might be a 
more appropriate and less restrictive form of intervention. In other words, it would be a 
more proportionate response. Such situations raise the potential for parents and children 
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to argue that their rights under ECHR Article 8 have been violated, particularly in cases 
where insufficient assistance has been provided by the State (see the discussion in 
Chapter 3, for example).  
4.6.3 The 26 Week Limit on Care Proceedings: More Non-Consensual Adoptions? 
 
An important aim behind adoption legislation in England and Wales (i.e. the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002 and the Children and Families Act 2014) is to reduce delay in the 
adoption process, so as to reduce the length of time that children remained in care and in 
a state of uncertainty. The UK government has engaged in a pro-adoption policy, which 
aims to speed up the adoption process. This may be well-intentioned and beneficial for 
some children but there is a danger that some children will be rushed into adoption 
without less draconian alternatives being explored and implemented (e.g. reuniting 
children with their birth parents or placing them with other birth relatives). Section 
14(2)(ii) of the CFA 2014 is worthy of further scrutiny because the 26-week limit in care 
proceedings has the potential to decrease delay in adoption proceedings, but it may lead 
to children in care being placed for adoption, when they could have been returned to their 
families or placed with birth relatives. In general, academic opinions on the 26-week limit 
have been mixed.
689
 It is argued that the change in the law, while intended to protect 
children’s best interests, may not achieve the intended effect and may even have the 
potential to violate children and parents’ ECHR Article 8 rights.690  
 
The CFA 2014, s14(2)(ii) states that care proceedings must be concluded within 26-
weeks of the date of the initial application. Although this time limit concerns care 
proceedings, not adoption proceedings, it is relevant to the proportionality of non-
consensual adoption because swifter care proceedings means that adoption proceedings 
are also likely to be concluded at a much earlier stage. Masson has acknowledged that 
while delays reduce the likelihood of finding and settling children into a new family, in 
some cases delay may be ‘constructive’ as it may provide parents with times to resolve 
                                                          
689
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their problems and enable social workers to fully explore different care options that may 
be available.
691
 In other words, this in-built delay allows for potentially equally effective, 
but less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoptions, which are less likely to 
violate parents’ and children’s ECHR Article 8 rights, to be used. Thus, removing delay 
in care proceedings and, potentially, in adoption proceedings may mean that children are 
placed for adoption when additional time may have enabled them to be returned to their 
parents or for birth relatives to have been identified as carers.  
 
Furthermore, Holt and Kelly have argued that working with families might be more 
beneficial for children than removing delay in care proceedings via statutory reform.
692
 
They have argued that ‘the focus appears to be increasingly upon achieving targets rather 
than engaging in face-to-face contact with children and their families’.693 Gilmore and 
Bainham have argued that care proceedings involve matters which have great importance 
to parents and ought not be rushed. They have argued that speeding up the process may 
not give parents sufficient time to come to terms with their children being take into care 
and may lead to an increase in contested care proceedings.
694
  
 
Holt and Kelly have also raised concerns that this statutory limit may simply mean that 
the delay may occur much earlier in the process and that children could be left with their 
parents and remain at risk of harm while local authorities build their case.
695
 Holt et al 
have argued that delay in taking a child into care may have the knock-on effect that 
children then wait longer for a permanent adoptive placement once the proceedings have 
been concluded.
696
 If such consequences were to occur because of the 26-week limit, 
children may be able to argue that their rights under Article 3 (the right to freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) have been violated.  
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4.6.4 The Relationship between Human Rights, Parental Contact and Non-Consensual 
Adoption 
 
It is important to consider sections 8-9 of the Children and Families Act 2014 and assess 
the impact that they may have on non-consensual adoption cases. It has been seen from 
the case law above that it is typical for contact between children in care and their parents 
to dwindle prior to adoption and it is unusual for post-adoption contact to occur. It is 
argued, in this section, that the new statutory provisions on contact in the CFA 2014 may 
further decrease the likelihood of contact between children and parents pre and post-
adoption proceedings. This is undesirable, since reducing contact prior to a non-
consensual adoption order weakens the bonds between children and their parents, thereby 
making it easier to justify a non-consensual adoption order. Furthermore, in 
circumstances where non-consensual adoption is a necessary and proportionate measure, 
it can be argued that this does not necessarily mean that terminating contact between 
children and their parents will also be a proportionate measure. In fact, it is suggested that 
in cases (such as in Aune v. Norway,
697
 for example) that permitting contact between 
children and their parents increases the likelihood that non-consensual adoption will be a 
proportionate measure.  
 
Although section 8 of the CFA 2014 on parental contact with children in care does not 
overtly refer to adoption, it does have a bearing on the adoption process and amends the 
Children Act 1989, s34. The CFA 2014, s8 concerns contact between children in care and 
their birth parents which may take place prior to the adoption process and provides that 
local authorities are ‘authorised to refuse to allow contact between the child and a person 
mentioned…’ and that local authorities are not required ‘…to endeavour to promote 
contact between the child and that person’. This means that it is not necessary for a local 
authority to promote contact between a child and its birth parents. Reduced contact 
between a child and his or her birth parents means it is likely to weaken the relationship 
between them. This may, in some cases, make it easier to justify making an adoption 
order and raises questions as the proportionality of the legislation.  
 
Interestingly, while section 8 permits explicit limitation of contact between children and 
parents, it does not elaborate on the types of situations in which it will be appropriate to 
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refuse to allow contact. Furthermore, it is suggested that a requirement that local 
authorities do not need to ‘endeavour to promote contact’ is vague in nature, since it is 
unclear what local authorities’ duties are in relation to contact between children and their 
parents. It can also be argued that section 8 appears to contradict ECtHR jurisprudence on 
contact between children and parents, which emphasises that restrictions on contact may 
in some cases violate the ECHR Article 8 rights of children and parents (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4.7 for further discussion). The ECtHR has, for example, made it apparent that 
once a child has been removed from his or her parents, reduction or termination of 
contact may weaken the bond between them and lessen the likelihood of them being 
reunited which may, constitute a violation of Article 8.
698
 
 
In contrast to section 8 of the CFA 2014, section 9 of the Act explicitly recognises post-
adoption contact within English law. It allows for making a contact order which can be 
enforced against adopters under s9(2)(a) in favour of the following persons listed under 
s9(3) which include: a blood relative, former guardian, someone who has had parental 
responsibility for the child, any person entitled to make an order under s26 or anyone 
with whom the child has lived for a period of at least one year. Under s 9(2)(b), however, 
the court can make an order prohibiting any of these persons from having contact with a 
child.  
 
These provisions do not appear to confer additional powers on the courts, since the courts 
have long been empowered to make orders in relation to contact or to prohibit contact 
under the Children Act 1989, s8, (via a no contact order or a prohibited steps order, 
prohibiting contact, for example). However, the courts have tended not to do so because 
of concerns about the impact it would have on adoptive parents, who would need to 
facilitate contact arrangements.
699
 Section 9 is thus seen by Dodgson as a ‘symbolic’700 
acknowledgement of the importance of maintaining relationships with birth family in the 
wake of adoption. However, the simultaneous strengthening of local authorities’ powers 
to prevent contact, arguably, may make this provision on post-adoption contact 
meaningless since if contact is stopped between children and parents prior to adoption, it 
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will be more difficult to argue that contact then ought to take place after the adoption 
order has been made. It will be interesting to see whether the CFA 2014, s9 will in fact 
encourage the courts to make more post-adoption contact orders in favour of birth parents 
or whether it will make no practical difference to the courts’ apparent reluctance to make 
orders enforcing post-adoption contact.  
 
The House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation has identified a 
problematic aspect of s8. Many children are not adopted with their siblings and in such 
cases, direct contact may be important to maintain these relationships. The Committee 
has expressed concern that the new clause has the potential to operate as ‘a barrier to 
maintaining such contacts’.701 It has identified that under the new clause, parents and also 
siblings, would need to seek permission from the court to make a contact application. It 
has drawn attention to the fact that in practice, the ability of children to seek contact with 
a brother or sister via a court order ‘may be constrained in practice’.702 However, the 
difficulty is that, in some cases, such contact may be burdensome on adoptive parents, as 
contact with siblings can make children’s behaviour more difficult to manage.703  
 
It will be interesting to see whether s8 will be the subject of future litigation under ECHR 
Article 8, since to say that local authorities do not have ‘to endeavour to promote contact 
between the child and that person’ appears to contradict the approach taken by the 
ECtHR, which stresses both the importance of protecting relationships between children 
and parents and enabling contact to take place (see the discussion in Chapter 3). A report 
by the Children’s Commissioner of England observed that under the current law, post-
adoption contact is neither encouraged nor discouraged, which is in line with UNCRC 
Article 9 which concerns the separation of children from his or her from parents.
704
 The 
Commissioner has stated that the current law on contact is compliant with both the ECHR 
and the UNCRC, but has suggested that more emphasis should be placed on taking a ‘full 
account’ of children’s wishes and feelings about contact705 in line with the requirements 
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under UNCRC Article 3 on the best interests of the child and UNCRC Article 12 on the 
views of the child.
706
 Therefore, in some cases, adoption without parental consent which 
does not provide for contact between children and their birth parents (and or their 
siblings), may not be proportionate.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined and analysed the key legislation on non-consensual adoption 
and whether or not these provisions strike the appropriate balance in protecting the best 
interests and rights of children on the one hand and the rights of parents on the other. 
Analysis of the Adoption Act 1976, the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the 
Children and Families Act 2014 has shown that there has been a shift away from 
protecting the rights of parents and towards protection of the best interests of children 
(rather than their rights). The current adoption legislation has the right aim; namely to 
create stability and permanence for children in care, at the earliest possible point in time. 
However, adoption will not always be in the best interests of children in care. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the discussion above, the CFA 2014 has some features 
which may be subjected to future challenges under the ECHR via the Human Rights Act 
1998 and perhaps even before the ECtHR. 
 
This chapter has also discussed adoption cases heard in the courts in England and Wales, 
with a specific focus on cases heard in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. While 
the birth parents did not always manage to achieve a reversal of a non-consensual 
adoption, let alone have their children returned to them, these cases have nonetheless laid 
down important principles for the lower courts (such as the Family Proceedings Court, 
the County Court and the High Court) to follow when making an adoption order without 
parental consent. Re B-S (Children)
707
 is an important Court of Appeal case which 
emphasised that non-consensual adoption ought to be a measure of last resort and that a 
balance sheet approach ought to be applied. It has been observed in this chapter, however, 
that despite being the persons most affected by adoption proceedings, children’s rights 
are afforded very little direct consideration in the courts’ judgments. Even where 
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reference is made to children’s rights in adoption cases heard in England and Wales,708 
the courts tend to perform a limited analysis of what these rights are and how they may be 
balanced against parents’ rights, for example, under ECHR Article 8.  
 
It has been observed that there is a potential clash between government policy which 
advocates adoption as the best option for children in care, while recent case law seems to 
emphasise adoption as a measure of last resort.
709
 This raises the questions of how the 
potential clash between government policy and judicial principle will be resolved in the 
future. Despite the issues raised by the ACA 2002 and the CFA 2014 and potential 
incompatibility of some aspects of the CFA 2014 with ECHR Article 8 (and the 
UNCRC
710
), the pro-adoption trend appears set to continue. The Education and Adoption 
Bill 2015-16, which is passing through the UK Parliament is set to make another change 
under s15, which will require councils to combine their adoption functions with other 
councils, so as to increase the potential matches between prospective adopter and child. 
This is likely to mean that more adoptions would take place, more quickly. This is 
because, like the other measures enacted under the ACA 2002 and the CFA 2014, the 
EAB, s15 is another provision which aims to address delays in the adoption process.  
 
The intention behind both the ACA 2002 and the CFA 2014 may have been to create 
stability and permanence for children in care, who may otherwise face uncertainty and 
poor prospects in the future. The changes enacted by the CFA 2014, Part 1 provide 
support to prospective adoptive parents, increase the number of prospective adopters and 
aim to decrease delay in the adoption process. However, it is argued in this thesis that the 
UK government ought to assess whether or not reducing delay and promoting adoption 
serves the best interests of all children in care. In doing so, the government could 
examine whether a different approach considering alternatives to adoption might better 
serve children’s best interests and protect the rights of children and their birth parents 
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under ECHR Article 8. This thesis will now go on to consider less restrictive alternatives 
to non-consensual adoption which may, in some circumstances, be equally effective when 
compared with non-consensual adoption.  
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Chapter 5: Alternatives to Non-Consensual Adoption 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 showed that in some cases, English judges have expressed concern about the 
proportionality of non-consensual adoption.
711
 For example, Sir James Munby, President 
of the Family Division of the High Court, has stated that non-consensual adoption should 
be a measure of ‘last resort’.712 He has also emphasised the need to consider alternatives 
to adoption which are ‘realistically possible’713 and has reminded the lower courts that 
they should consider such alternatives. Also, Lady Hale, a member of the UK Supreme 
Court, has emphasised that any order (including an adoption order) should be 
proportionate to the needs of the child.
714
  
A similar message has also been conveyed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which was 
considered in Chapter 3. The Court has emphasised that some work must be undertaken 
by the State to keep families together because of the State’s positive obligation under 
Article 8 to make reasonable efforts to reunite children with their parents.
715
 The failure 
of Member States to use alternatives to adoption led the ECtHR in Pontes v. Portugal,
716
 
R.M.S. v. Spain,
717
 and Zhou v. Italy
718
 to conclude that the adoption orders made in these 
cases amounted to violations of the parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8.  
This thesis is based on the premise that a proportionality analysis undertaken by the 
domestic courts in England and Wales (and by the ECtHR) should consider whether less 
restrictive but equally effective alternatives to non-consensual adoption are available. If 
so, then it may be concluded that non-consensual adoption cannot be a necessary and 
proportionate measure. Thus, this chapter considers less restrictive alternatives to non-
consensual adoption, which achieve the same objective of ensuring stability and 
                                                          
711
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permanence for children in care, thereby protecting their best interests and reducing the 
likelihood of violating the rights of children and parents. This chapter will consider the 
different long-term alternatives to adoption such as State assistance, kinship care, special 
guardianship orders or adoption with direct contact. In doing so, it will analyse whether it 
can be said that these less restrictive alternatives are in fact equally effective when 
compared with non-consensual adoption and if so, in what types of cases or situations 
these alternatives might be appropriate.  
It will be argued that these alternatives to non-consensual adoption may, in some 
circumstances, be equally effective and be less restrictive and thus less likely to violate 
children’s and parents’ ECHR Article 8 rights. Furthermore, this chapter will also 
consider and assess the potential resources implications of using less restrictive 
alternatives to non-consensual adoption. In the course of this discussion, consideration 
will be given to whether or not these alternatives are cost-effective and less expensive 
than non-consensual adoption since even if these measures may be regarded as more 
proportionate, economic factors may mean that the State is reluctant to use these 
alternatives.  
5.2 State Assistance in England and Wales 
5.2.1 Overview of State Assistance  
 
It is important to consider State assistance (i.e. social care services enabling children to 
remain in their parents’ care) as an alternative to adoption, because there may be cases 
where early intervention reduces the likelihood of children being taken into care in the  
first place. Bainham has argued that although child protection and family autonomy 
appear to be conflicting ideas, they are not necessarily conflicting as public involvement 
of a supportive nature may assist both children and parents.
719
 In fact, intervention (which 
is less restrictive than adoption) may protect children and parents from potential 
violations of their ECHR Article 8 rights. State assistance, which may be temporary or 
permanent and financial or practical, has the benefit of protecting family groups who are 
likely to be affected by the law on non-consensual adoption. In particular, it can help 
vulnerable groups of persons, such as those living in poverty, individuals with a learning 
disability, physical disability, mental illness or some other type of impairment which may 
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impact on their ability to raise their children.
720
 Financial and practical assistance from 
the State may also potentially help kinship carers in situations where birth parents are 
unable to raise their children (see Sections 5.3.3 and 5.6).  
 
It is clear from the Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 8 that there may be cases where 
the State is under a positive obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite children with 
their parents, which may include the need to provide State assistance.
721
 There is, 
however, a need to ensure that assistance to the family unit is not at the expense of the 
child’s welfare. The House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption, for example, has 
acknowledged that there is a tension between the time spent helping parents address their 
problems (such as drug or alcohol addiction) and the negative impact on the child of 
delay in a final decision about whether he or she can be raised safely by his or her parents 
or should be placed for adoption. Certainly, if the State does not make reasonable efforts 
to attempt to reunite children with their parents then it may fail to satisfy its positive 
obligation under ECHR Article 8. However, if the State invests too much time in trying to 
reunite children and parents in order to avoid adoption it may breach the child’s rights. 
Thus, in some cases, leaving a child with or returning a child to abusive or neglectful 
parents may not be appropriate at all, and may potentially violate the child’s rights under 
Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.  
5.2.2 Types of State Assistance  
 
The Children Act 1989 aims to protect both the rights of parents and children in England 
and Wales. Part III of the Act recognises the importance of support services for children 
and families so that court intervention will be a last resort. Such support could, for 
instance, include home-based assistance, day care,
722
 placement with a child-minder,
723
 
kinship care or payments to the family.
724
 Provision of assistance from the State is 
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potentially a less restrictive alternative to non-consensual adoption and there is 
considerable support in favour of promoting measures which help families stay together. 
Thoburn, for example, has argued that providing intensive services to address parental 
problems results in speedier outcomes for children, regardless of whether the final 
outcome is rehabilitation with the birth family or placement for adoption.
725
 Similarly, 
Munro has stated that:  
 
‘with good practice and trying to help families you can reach a quicker decision 
about whether they can use help, whereas if you are not actively trying to engage 
them in change, then you cannot work out whether they can change or not’.726  
 
In other words, early State intervention may avoid children being taken into care and 
being adopted without parental consent. This is particularly relevant for mothers of 
newborn babies as research by Broadhurst et al demonstrates that there has been a 
significant rise in the number of newborns subject to care proceedings in England. In 
2008, 802 newborn babies were removed into care but in 2013, this figure had increased 
to 2,018.
727
 While it is unknown what percentage of these babies were adopted, 
Broadhurst et al identified that adoption was one of the options available to the State and 
that if a mother had previously had a child placed for adoption, this increased the 
likelihood that any subsequent children she had would also be adopted. It is clear that 
newborns are vulnerable and are in the most need of protection from the State,
728
 so the 
State must intervene to protect their rights under ECHR Articles 2 and 3.  
 
However, early State intervention which is less restrictive than non-consensual adoption 
decreases the likelihood of babies and children being subjected to neglect and abuse.
729
 
State intervention, even prior to the child’s birth, in the form of practical assistance from 
Social Services such as parenting classes or other forms of therapeutic intervention (such 
as counselling or psychotherapy) could increase the likelihood that a parent or parents 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ssewamala, Lindsay Stark and Mark Canavera, ‘Economic dimensions of child protection and well-being’ 
[2014] 47 Children and Youth Services Review 103.  
725
 House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, 2
nd
 Report of Session 2012-13 Adoption: 
Post-Legislative Scrutiny, (TSO, 2013). 
726
 Ibid.  Also see: Munro Review of Child Protection (Final Report May 2011). 
727
 Karen Broadhurst, Bachar Alrough, Emily Yeend, Judith Harwin, Mike Shaw, Mark Pilling, Claire 
Mason and Sophie Kershaw, ‘Connecting Events in Time to Identify a Hidden Population: Birth Mothers 
and Their Children in Recurrent Care Proceedings in England’ [2015] 45 British Journal of Social Work 
2241. 
728
 Chris Cuthbert, Gwynne Rayns and Kate Stanley, All Babies Count: Protection and Prevention for 
Vulnerable Babies (NSPCC Report, November 2011). 
729
 Ravi Chandiramani, ‘Bang for the buck’ [2012] Children and Young People Now 25.  
159 
 
will develop the parenting skills required for raising the child. This type of intervention 
could have enabled Amelia, in the case of In The Matter of B
730
 (see Section 4.4.2), to 
have been raised by her birth parents. The difficulty is that while the scope of the State’s 
positive obligation to provide assistance under ECHR Article 8 is widening (see Section 
3.4.5), it is unclear what assistance would need to be provided in individual cases so as to 
satisfy this obligation. It seems likely, however, that the positive obligation only exists in 
respect of children who have already been born. Social Services may advise that a child 
ought to be removed at birth but arguably the State has no legal obligation to intervene to 
assist pregnant women in becoming better parents to their unborn children when they do 
not, in the eyes of the law, have children in need of protection.
731
  
 
Despite the pro-adoption policy in respect of children in care, there are several different 
programmes in England and Wales to assist parents whose children are at risk of being 
taken into care and, in some circumstances, may potentially be placed for adoption 
without parental consent.
732
 For example, the Family Nurse Partnership programme, 
established in 2007, provides specially trained nurses to help families from early 
pregnancy until the child is two years old.
733
 Research has shown that, where 
professionals work with parents and assist them via education, training or therapeutic 
intervention (e.g. counselling), children are more likely to be returned home to their 
parents. Even in cases where this is not possible, subsequent siblings born to the same 
parents are less likely to be abused.
734
 This is significant in circumstances where mothers 
have repeat pregnancies, for example. In such cases then, concurrent planning (see 
below) might be a way of protecting the best interests of children whom cannot be 
returned to their parents, while giving parents another opportunity to parent effectively in 
the future, thereby providing protection to parents’ ECHR Article 8 rights.   
 
                                                          
730
 [2013] UKSC 33. 
731
 Vo v. France (Application no. 53924/00).  
732
 See, for example: Salford City Council’s ‘Strengthening Families’ project (Warrington, Gardner and 
Garraway, 2014) https://www.salford.gov.uk/familyintervention.htm and Suffolk County Council’s 
‘Positive Choices’ (Suffolk Children and Young People’s Service, 2010) 
https://www.suffolk.gov.uk/council-and-democracy/council-news/show/programme-to-support-suffolks-
vulnerable-recurrent-mothers-shows-real-success 
733
 House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, 2
nd
 Report of Session 2012-13 Adoption: 
Post-Legislative Scrutiny, (TSO, 2013). Also, see: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_1185
30 
734
 House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, 2
nd
 Report of Session 2012-13 Adoption: 
Post-Legislative Scrutiny, (TSO, 2013). 
160 
 
There is evidence which shows that State assistance helps families stay together. For 
example, a project undertaken by Barnados found that in 78 per cent of the cases that they 
looked at, children could be reunited with birth parents if parents were given adequate 
support in maintaining themselves, e.g. housing, education, residential units, child-
minding, benefits, support networks, and/or a social worker.
735
 This project suggests that, 
with support from local authorities, it is more likely that children will be able to continue 
to live with their birth parents, thereby protecting children and parents’ ECHR Article 8 
rights and also the child’s UNCRC rights, namely under: Article 7 (to know and be cared 
for by his/her parents); Article 8 (to know his/her identity); and Article 9 (not to be 
unnecessarily separated from his/her parents).  
 
However, despite the apparent benefits of the above-mentioned programmes, it is argued 
that limited State resources may affect the number of such schemes available to parents. 
Doughty, for instance, has observed that government funding is used to support the pro-
adoption policy instead of helping vulnerable families.
736
 In fact, the Adoption Reform 
Grant resulted in £150 million of funding being taken away from the Early Intervention 
Grant, which was aimed at keeping children and parents together.
737
 The Select 
Committee on Adoption has warned that investment in adoption should not be at the 
expense of the financial resources used to help children remain with their birth families. 
The Committee has stated that where there is evidence of a parental capacity to change, 
financial investment in reuniting children with their parents reduces the number of 
children in care and the numbers of children waiting for an alternative placement.  
 
The Committee emphasised the need to strike the appropriate balance between providing 
parents with enough time to address their problems and respecting the child’s need for a 
secure attachment. According to the Committee, this balance could be achieved if social 
workers conducted a ‘robust assessment of parental capacity to change’.738 In written 
evidence presented to the Committee, TACT
739
 and Action for Children
740
 both 
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recommended more wide-ranging legal reforms to permanency for children in care. 
Action for Children argued in favour of a system whereby adoption is not regarded as 
being the preferred care option but instead ‘a system which has at its heart a drive to find 
the right placement for each individual child, rather than creating a false hierarchy of 
care—where adoption is interpreted as being the preferred care option’.741 
 
The Select Committee on Adoption has expressed concern that focusing solely on 
adoption may mean there is ‘a real risk of overlooking the needs of the vast majority of 
children in care for whom adoption [was] not appropriate’.742 This can be seen, for 
example, in respect of older children (for example, children aged between 10 and 15) who 
are less likely to be placed for adoption anyway and, for whom, options such as 
counselling, therapeutic family support, counselling, therapeutic family support or foster 
care will be more effective alternatives.
743
 Therefore, it is clear that adoption is not the 
only route to permanence for children in care and that other equally effective options 
(such as long-term fostering, kinship care or special guardianship) are available for 
children who cannot be raised by their parents. Thus, less restrictive alternatives to non-
consensual adoption, which may be equally effective, ought to be considered and 
implemented where appropriate.  
 
In fact, the government ought to invest more financial resources in supporting families 
than in placing children for adoption, since doing so may prevent children from going 
into care in the first place.
744
 The Select Committee on Adoption, for example, strongly 
recommended that adoption and all of its viable alternatives should be given equal 
attention and appropriate financial investment.
745
 Similarly, Sloan has argued that 
applying State resources more widely instead of focusing solely on adoption could lead to 
better outcomes for the best interests and rights of children and the rights of their birth 
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parents.
746
 Larizadeh has also advocated that more support ought to be available for 
parents on the basis that ‘miracles do happen’ where parents are provided with the tools 
to care for their children.
747
 Arguably too, under UNCRC Article 20 (considered in 
Chapter 2), the State ought to assist families and provide the least restrictive alternative 
available to non-consensual adoption, where it is possible to do so.  
 
The question then is what level of effort is needed by the State in order to satisfy its 
positive obligation under ECHR Article 8. Lord Scott said in Re G
748
 that ‘there was no 
article 8 right to be made a better parent at public expense’. Yet, it is arguable that s20 of 
the Children Act 1989, under which local authorities have a duty to provide 
accommodation for specific children in need, has relevance in this context. This provision 
could potentially be read in conjunction with Article 8 to require such State assistance so 
as to help children in need under s17 of the Children Act 1989.
749
 Although Re G still 
amounts to good law, cases can be found where an emphasis has been placed on 
providing parents with assistance so as to help their children, even if the existence of or 
scope of such a right has not been fully considered. For example, the Court of Appeal in 
EH v. LB Greenwich,
750
 allowed the parents’ appeal against a care and placement order in 
relation to their child because they were given insufficient help with their child, despite 
evidence of good parenting.
751
 Although the Court did not state that the parents had a 
right to assistance under Article 8, it stated that non-abusive parents ought to receive 
proper support at the earliest possible stage, provided they have ‘sufficient qualities’752 to 
be good parents. However, the Court did not refer to what sorts of qualities were 
‘sufficient’ in order for parents to receive such support and assistance.  
 
Larizadeh has persuasively argued that the decision in EH suggests that, even if the State 
does not have a positive obligation under Article 8 to help improve parenting, there is at 
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least a ‘social responsibility at public expense to support parents to improve’.753 This is 
supported by the discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis. In Section 3.4.5, for example, it 
was argued that recent case law decisions heard in the ECtHR show that the national 
authorities’ positive obligation under ECHR Article 8 to reunite families (which may in 
some cases include the need to provide State assistance) is widening.
754
 Furthermore, in 
Re B-S (Children)
755
 (see Chapter 4) the Court of Appeal held that local authorities must, 
treat adoption as a last resort and use measures other than adoption to protect a child’s 
welfare, where possible. It can be argued that the need to, where possible, use less 
restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption is becoming an important part of the 
proportionality process (see Chapter 3).  
 
It can be argued that State assistance increases the likelihood that local authorities will 
have satisfied their positive obligation under Article 8 to undertake reasonable steps to 
reunite families.
756
 If reasonable steps have been taken by the State to keep a family 
together but this has failed to improve children’s well-being, then it may be necessary and 
proportionate for children to be placed for adoption without parental consent. For 
example, there may be cases where, despite the efforts of the State to intervene, the 
neglect or abuse suffered by children may have reached a stage at which Article 2 (the 
right to life) or Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment) is engaged and the State may violate these rights if the children are not 
removed from their parents (see discussion in Section 3.2). An example where it is 
suggested that reasonable steps were taken by the State to keep a family together, can be 
seen in LA v DG & Ors.
757
 In this case, six children were taken into care, three of whom 
were placed for adoption because of neglect. In the care of their parents, the children 
suffered from emotional and intellectual delay and health problems because their parents 
did not always seek the medical treatment required. Their living conditions were poor and 
the parents suffered with financial problems.  
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The parents challenged the adoption orders but failed, because, despite 10 months of 
State assistance (including financial assistance and housing), the children still had 
delayed emotional and intellectual development. In the circumstances, it was held to be in 
the children’s best interests to be permanently removed from their parents and placed for 
adoption. In this case, the parents themselves had stopped attending contact sessions with 
their children and left the country. Only one of the children appeared to express 
sentiments suggesting that she missed her parents but the others were described as being 
‘unduly concerned’758 by the absence of their parents. Although the Family Division of 
the High Court did not refer to the ECHR in this case, it is arguable that the concrete 
steps that the State took to keep the family together in the form of financial and housing 
assistance amounted to reasonable efforts to keep the family together within the meaning 
of the State’s positive obligation under Article 8. In fact, if the local authority had spent 
more time trying to keep the family together the children could have argued that their 
own rights under Article 3 had been violated (see Chapter 3 for further discussion).
759
 
Therefore, in this case, it can be concluded that the State had first attempted to explore 
less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption and had made concerted efforts to 
keep the family together.  
 
Although continued State assistance might not be appropriate in every case (as seen 
above) it is clear that State assistance may keep families together. The benefits of a 
greater emphasis on preventative work and putting resources into assisting birth families 
are also evidenced by the approach utilised by European countries which favour State 
assistance and preventative measures over adoption, including non-consensual adoption. 
Thus, a comparative international study by Warman, shows that other European 
countries, such as France and the Netherlands, devote more financial resources to family 
support and reunification in comparison to England and Wales.
760
 However, France’s 
preference for long-term fostering can be criticised, as it is favoured even in 
circumstances where serious neglect and abuse have occurred.
761
 In some circumstances, 
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it might be in the best interests of some children if the authorities in France were more 
inclined to consider adoption and even non-consensual adoption where it is not possible 
for children to be reunited with their parents or placed with birth relatives.  
 
In Nordic countries, one reason why non-consensual adoption is less prevalent in these 
countries is because their preventative services are much more advanced than elsewhere 
in Europe.
762
 For instance, in Sweden,
763
 Norway
764
 and Denmark
765
 the adoption of 
children in care is virtually unheard of
766
 and resources tend to be set aside to help birth 
parents keep their children and to maintain the family unit.
767
 In Norway, only 80-100 
children are adopted annually and most of these are infants born to drug-abusing 
parents.
768
 In Norway, the State has a guaranteed minimum standard of income, 
livelihood and housing accommodation for families,
769
 all of which are likely to improve 
the standard of living of families, prevent children from being harmed and may regarded 
as less restrictive forms of intervention into family life when compared with non-
consensual adoption.  
 
In Sweden, a key difference between its care system and the care system in England and 
Wales, is not only that there is greater availability of preventative services, but very few 
children are taken into care via coercive intervention of the State. Most children in care 
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are there with the consent of their parents
770
 and while children may be placed away from 
home without parental consent under the Social Services Act 1980, the Swedish Board of 
Social Welfare has emphasised the importance of reunion between children and parents 
where possible.
771
 However, the approach towards child protection in Sweden is not 
without criticism. For example, the Nordic Committee for Human Rights has expressed 
concern about the high numbers of children removed into care, in potential violation of 
children’s right to respect for private and family life under ECHR Article 8.772  
 
Furthermore, the Czech Republic and Lithuania have voiced similar criticisms about the 
Norwegian child protection system unnecessarily taking children into care.
773
 It can be 
argued that these complaints are similar to those of Eastern European countries who have 
challenged the use of non-consensual adoptions in England and Wales (see Section 
4.6.2). Thus, while other countries may favour less restrictive alternatives to non-
consensual adoption and place an emphasis on State assistance, this does not mean that 
children’s and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8 or the UNCRC are necessarily 
protected.  Regardless of any criticism that may be made about State intervention in other 
European countries, this intervention is not as draconian as non-consensual adoption. 
While every European country has a mechanism for enabling non-consensual adoption, 
Fenton-Glynn has pointed out that other European countries do not exercise this power to 
the extent that the courts in England and Wales do.
774
  
It can be concluded from the discussion above, that countries in Europe manage to protect 
children without resorting to non-consensual adoption. However, the examples of France 
and Sweden highlight that other European countries may face their own challenges in 
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deciding how best to protect the welfare of children. The examples considered above 
demonstrate that it is not just England and Wales which struggle to ensure that children 
are protected from harm (and to protect their rights under ECHR Articles 2 and 3) while 
protecting children and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8. A method of State 
assistance, known as concurrent planning, has increased in popularity in England and 
Wales. This practice has the potential to strike the balance between protecting children’s 
best interests and rights on the one hand and parental rights on the other. Concurrent 
planning is considered in the following section.  
5.2.3 Concurrent Planning 
 
One way in which the State can provide assistance to parents and protect their rights 
under ECHR Article 8, while avoiding the potential pitfalls of violating the child’s rights 
under Article 2, 3 or 6(1) of the ECHR is through concurrent planning. Concurrent 
planning is where a local authority simultaneously plans for two possible options for the 
child. This could, for example, involve working towards returning children in care to their 
birth parents while at the same time establishing an alternative plan such as non-
consensual adoption.
775
 Concurrent planning has been used by local authorities for many 
years and was endorsed by the government in its Action Plan For Tackling Delay in 
Adoption.  
 
An important case concerning concurrent planning was the Court of Appeal decision of 
Re P (A Child),
776
 in which the local authority considered two different options: non-
consensual adoption and long-term foster care. In this case, the mother argued that dual 
planning was inconsistent with the framework of the ACA 2002, in particular s52(1)(b) 
and s22(1)(d). Wall LJ however, confirmed the appropriateness of dual planning since it 
shortens the period of time a child remains in limbo. He also confirmed that this approach 
is compatible with birth parents’ Article 8 rights and Strasbourg jurisprudence generally. 
There are clear benefits in using concurrent planning, in particular that it enables different 
options to be explored early on and local authorities are likely to be more expedient in 
ensuring that a child’s needs are met.777 The House of Lords Select Committee on 
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Adoption Legislation approved of concurrent planning, suggesting that it: ‘provides 
significant benefits in terms of enabling early attachments, minimising disruption, and 
reducing delay’.778  
 
It is helpful to consider the benefits of concurrent planning by referring to a concurrent 
planning project led by the charity Coram. Under the scheme, children in care were 
placed with prospective adoptive parents but had frequent contact with their birth parents. 
This scheme was typically used by parents with mental health problems and drug 
addictions. The parents were provided with assistance in developing parenting skills and, 
if they managed to turn their lives around within a year, the children were returned to 
them. Extended family members who might be able to care for the child were identified 
early on. If the parents were unable to improve their parenting skills or no alternative 
carers within the family were available, then the children were placed for adoption.  
 
Between 2000 and 2011, Coram arranged 59 placements of which 57 were successful.
779
 
Three of the 57 children were returned to their birth parents and the other 54 remained 
with their prospective adopters and were adopted by them.
780
 Compared with the usual 
delays in the adoption process this scheme meant that an adoption was finalised, on 
average, when a child was aged 17 months not the national average of 3 years, 7 
months.
781
 The findings from the Coram study suggest that concurrent planning leads to 
more efficient adoption outcomes. This is in line with the government’s pro-adoption 
policy which emphasises minimising delay in the process of adoption (see Chapter 4) 
which, it has been considered, may not be an appropriate way of protecting the best 
interests of children in care.  
 
At first glance, concurrent planning seems to provide respect for birth parents’ and wider 
birth family’s rights under ECHR Article 8. It appears to do so by ensuring that birth 
parents and the extended family have an ongoing relationship with their children prior to 
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adoption as well as a chance of being reunited with their children.
782
 Furthermore, the 
exploration of viable kinship care options enables children to have the potential 
opportunity to have blood ties acknowledged and respected, thereby protecting children’s 
right to know and be cared for by their family and their right to know their identity under 
Articles 7 and 8 respectively of the UNCRC. Concurrent planning also acknowledges 
children’s best interests under the welfare checklist in ACA 2002, s1(4) such as child’s 
needs under s1(4)(b) to be provided with a stable and permanent home, as soon as 
possible, without delay (as is required by the ACA 2002, s1(3)).  
 
Concurrent planning ensures that a child is protected from neglect and abuse and is able 
to form a secure attachment to a carer should a parent be unable to care for him/her.
783
 
Concurrent planning also respects the rights of the child and birth parents to have a 
relationship (e.g. protecting rights under UNCRC Articles 7, 8 and 9) and increases the 
likelihood that the State will satisfy its positive obligation under ECHR Article 8 to make 
reasonable efforts to reunite children with their parents. However, in cases where a non-
consensual adoption is determined to be in the child’s best interests, the child’s right to 
know his or her identity under UNCRC Article 8 will not be protected, since adoptive 
parents are not under an obligation to inform the child that he or she is adopted and the 
adoption ultimately results in the loss of legal ties with his or her parents which is, it is 
submitted, an important part of a child’s identity.  
 
Concern has been expressed, however, that concurrent planning is not necessarily 
Convention compliant. O’Halloran, for example, has argued that by allowing attachments 
to form with prospective adopters that this may prejudice the welfare principle and make 
it less likely that children will be returned to their birth parents and even pre-empt the 
court’s decision-making process, thereby violating parents’ rights under ECHR Articles 6 
and 8.
784
 Furthermore, a potential disadvantage of concurrent planning which, the Coram 
project demonstrated (see above), was there was no guarantee that a child would have 
post-adoption contact with his or her parents, even where contact is positive. Contact 
itself, prior to the non-consensual adoption, has also been controversial. For instance, 
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Kenrick has argued that contact may, in the context of concurrent planning, be distressing 
to babies and young children but that it is difficult to assess the long-term impact that 
such contact has on children.
785
 
 
Another issue with the Coram project is the way in which it was funded. Moss has 
suggested that Coram received a £35,000 payment for each adoption.
786
 In other words, if 
Coram’s support package failed to reunite children with their parents, they would receive 
money from the government.
787
 This observation raises questions about the potential for a 
conflict of interest. In addition, it is important to observe that the rates of reunification of 
child and birth parent in this particular concurrent planning was low;
788
 only three 
children were returned to their parents. While the scheme clearly provided parents with a 
second chance, the low success rate (only three children were returned to their parents) 
raises questions about its effectiveness and about whether this scheme provided sufficient 
protection for children’s and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8.  
 
The criticism of concurrent planning in general, and specifically in the context of the 
Coram project is relevant because there has been growth in the use of concurrent 
planning. Since the success of the pilot study,
789
 the government decided to provide 
funding to Coram so that it become a National Centre for Excellence in Early 
Permanence,
790
 which means that the charity’s role in achieving permanence for children 
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in care via concurrent planning and, where appropriate, adoption has grown and continues 
to grow.
791
 In order to reach firm conclusions on the effectiveness of this project for 
protecting the rights of children and parents, or the cost-effectiveness of this type of 
project. It would be helpful to have more detail about the specific methods Coram used to 
help parents in improving their skills, the frequency of these classes and whether the 
parents found the classes helpful.  
 
It can be argued that offering parents the chance to take parenting classes and providing 
assistance in attending classes would enable parents to continue to develop relationships 
with their children. This could mean, for example, that any assistance provided takes into 
account impediments or aspects of daily life which may affect parents’ ability to attend 
classes such as work commitments, specific disabilities, physical or mental illness, drug 
or alcohol addiction. Furthermore, parents who take these classes but who are still 
regarded as unfit to raise a child may improve their parenting skills sufficiently to be able 
to parent any children born in the future. An important part of a concurrent planning 
project then, ought to be whether or not parents who have had children adopted are able 
to keep subsequent children because of the new skills they have learned in parenting 
classes.
792
  
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that a concurrent planning scheme which provides 
effective parenting classes increases the likelihood that the State will satisfy its positive 
obligation under ECHR Article 8 to attempt to reunite children with their parents. While 
concurrent planning may speed up the adoption process and raise issues about potential 
breaches of parental rights, if effective parenting classes are delivered and post-adoption 
contact is a possibility, concurrent planning is an option which provides better protection 
to both parents’ and children’s Article 8 rights, than non-consensual adoption without this 
form of State assistance. There are, however, cases where despite the provision of State 
assistance, children cannot be safely reunited with their parents and thus it is essential to 
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consider other less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption such as kinship 
care and special guardianship. These are considered in the following sections.  
 
5.3 Kinship Care 
 
5.3.1 An Overview of Kinship Care 
 
Kinship care may be an alternative to non-consensual adoption where the child has 
relatives available and willing to care for him or her. Kinship care is where a relative 
cares for the child, when the child’s birth parents are unwilling or unable to do so. Under 
English Law, a ‘relative’ is a step-parent, an aunt or uncle related by blood, sibling or 
grandparent. Cousins and aunts and uncles who are not related by blood, are not included 
within this definition of ‘relative’ under English Law. When carers are relatives of the 
child, there is no requirement to notify the local authority. It is thought that most kinship 
arrangements are informal in nature.
793
  
 
The use of formal kinship placements is a relatively recent phenomenon
794
 and there are 
many ways it can be formally recognised: via a private fostering arrangement, where a 
looked after child is placed in kinship foster care, through a child arrangements order
795
 a 
special guardianship order,
796
 or even an adoption order.
797
 Changes to policy and 
legislation have given a clear message to social workers that wherever possible children 
should be placed in the care of their birth family or friends of the family.
798
 The White 
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Paper Care Matters: Time for Change emphasised the ‘gateway approach’799 which 
involved looking at family and friends first, where children were in care. It can be argued, 
however, that further legal developments such as the Children and Families Act 2014 
suggest otherwise (see Section 4.2.3). 
 
It can be argued that kinship placements are as, if not more effective, than placement with 
unrelated foster carers in terms of both behavioural development and mental health 
functioning and that this is supported by research.
800
 It is clear that kinship care is 
associated with greater continuity, stability and security than non-kinship care.
801
 If 
children are placed with the wider family, research suggests these placements last longer 
than other types of placement, such as placement in foster care with families previously 
unknown to them.
802
 Statistically, where local authorities opt for kinship care in a child’s 
care plan, these care plans have the highest likelihood of being fulfilled – 78 per cent.803 
Kinship care also prevents a loss of roots and connection with the birth family.
804
 The 
House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation has observed that children in 
kinship care ‘do as well if not better than those in unrelated foster care, in terms of their 
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health, school attendance and performance, self-esteem and personal and social 
relationships’.805 
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that less restrictive alternatives to non-
consensual adoption (such as kinship care) should be used if they are as equally effective 
as non-consensual adoption. This argument can be supported by reference to Bainham, 
who has argued that human rights ‘militate against’ adoption and towards a less drastic 
means which might preserve kinship links and contacts.
806
 When adoption takes place, it 
is uncommon for children to maintain relationships with their birth parents or wider birth 
family. Thus, kinship care enables children to maintain relationships with birth relatives 
and in some cases, may be able to develop relationships with their birth parents, even if 
they do not live with them.  
 
Research demonstrates that when children are cared for by relatives, contact is more 
frequent and more enduring than when children are placed in foster care with adults 
unknown to them.
807
 Although parental contact may decline over time, even in kinship 
placements,
808
 Farmer and Moyers found that after a two-year period in a kinship 
placement, 70 per cent of the children in the care of family and friends still had contact 
with their mother and 49 per cent had contact with their father.
809
 Research suggests that 
kinship carers tend to have a high degree of commitment to maintaining contact between 
children and their birth parents, even when the circumstances may be challenging.
810
 
Hunt et al conducted a study on kinship care and examined measures such as placement 
stability, placement quality, relationship quality (between children and kinship carers) 
and child well-being. They found that 58 per cent of kinship placements scored positively 
across all of the measures and 76 per cent of the children had positive relationships with 
their kinship carers, even when placements ended. They state that kinship care provides a 
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‘safe, effective and permanent’811 care option for children and is a viable method of 
permanence which ought to be promoted. 
 
The fact that children in care often have ‘serious physical, mental health, developmental 
and psychosocial problems’,812 however, means that once kinship carers take these 
children into their homes, they often have difficulties with them because they lack the 
support to deal with such challenging behaviour. As O’Brien has pointed out, the effort 
and resources invested in ensuring family continuity is not always sufficient to mitigate 
the effects of multiple care placements prior to kinship care. Thus, while kinship care 
placements are associated with fewer breakdowns when compared with foster care 
placements, she has suggested that rate of breakdown in kinship care increases after the 
first year that the child is in that placement.
813
 This is because the kinship carers’ 
parenting skills may not be sufficient to address the children’s challenging behaviour.814 
Furthermore, research suggests that kinship carers have reported experiencing difficulties 
such as isolation, stigma, pain and depression
815
 and in some circumstances, stress from 
managing contact with children’s birth parents.816  
 
Despite the benefits of kinship care, carers may face challenges without the same level of 
support provided by local authorities to foster carers and prospective adoptive parents. In 
some circumstances then, kinship care may not necessarily serve children’s best interests 
even if it protects various relationship rights (in particular, UNCRC Article 7) and it may 
be less effective than non-consensual adoption for which substantial local authority 
support is available before, during and after the adoption process. However, O’Brien has 
argued that this problem could be addressed by providing financial support and 
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appropriate support with children’s emotional issues, e.g. ‘attachment, loss, challenging 
behaviour, life-cycle transitions/changes’.817 An important question to ask but to which 
there is not a clear answer, is the extent to which local authorities have a positive 
obligation under ECHR Article 8 to provide State assistance to kinship carers. This issue 
has not been directly addressed in the ECtHR even though it has been argued that the 
scope of this type of positive obligation towards parents is widening (see Section 3.4.5). 
 
It can be argued that, with appropriate investment, kinship care may, in some 
circumstances, strike a better balance in protecting children’s rights under Article 2, 3 and 
6 on the one hand and the Article 8 rights of the children and parents on the other. In 
other words, greater investment may lead to the greater availability of less restrictive 
alternatives which are just as effective as non-consensual adoption (for further 
consideration of the limitations on and importance of financial support for birth parents, 
kinship carers and other carers, see Section 5.3.3). This option has the benefit of 
protecting children from neglect or abuse at the hands of their parents, while allowing for 
the possibility of maintaining or developing relationships between children and their birth 
parents. It may also protect the child’s right to contact with their parents and the child’s 
right to know his or her own identity under UNCRC Article 8. Due to its benefits for 
families, described above, kinship care is potentially an equally effective method in 
protecting children’s welfare when compared with non-consensual adoption. However, 
based on the jurisprudence considered in Chapters 3 and 4, while it is clear that the State 
must provide assistance to birth parents, the precise scope of this positive obligation (and 
whether or not it applies to other birth relatives, for example) is unclear. 
 
In the light of the benefits of kinship care, it is surprising that there is still variation in 
local authorities’ use of it. Although some local authorities in England and Wales are 
increasing the use of kinship care,
818
 and statistically the use of formal kinship 
arrangements is increasing,
819
 many local authorities still do not make enquiries within a 
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child’s wider family before deciding that adoption is in a child’s best interests.820 
Luckock and Broadhurst conducted a case study examining 12 adoptions without parental 
consent. They found that some local authorities had reactive approaches
821
 to the 
assessment of suitability of kinship carers. They stated that the local authorities in the 
study could have been more proactive in initiating a search for relatives of children in 
care and that when searches were initiated, the local authorities could have made more 
concerted efforts to place children with relatives.
822
 It has been observed by Hunt et al, 
that identifying potential kinship carers prior to care proceedings might also speed up the 
process of securing permanence for children who cannot be raised by their parents.
823
 
Furthermore, even where social workers are aware of alternative carers, they are reluctant 
to inform them that the child is in care, against the wishes of the parent.
824
  
 
Munby P has stated that some parents are reluctant to reveal, even to family members, 
that their child is in care because parents are in a ‘bubble of deniability’.825 He suggested 
that, in some cases, parents hope to have their children returned to them. They may also 
feel ashamed that their children have been taken into care and may seek to hide this from 
their families.
826
 Munby P has argued that the difficulty in identifying potential kinship 
carers could be avoided by less pointed questioning and by asking birth parents general 
questions about their family to build a genogram,
827
 rather than telling them that their 
child is going to be adopted unless other potential carers can be found.
828
 It is clear 
though, that these problems may lead to delay in identifying kinship carers, which means 
that children may spend longer in care and may be adopted without parental consent 
where a less restrictive and potentially equally effective alternative to non-consensual 
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adoption might have been available. Furthermore, if local authorities assess birth family 
members as potential carers for children in care, local authorities do not always provide 
documentation of their concerns prior to the assessments
829
 and, where the outcome of the 
assessment is negative because they are not necessarily parties to proceedings concerning 
the children, local authorities may make other arrangements for children including 
fostering for adoption arrangements. 
 
The duty to consider fostering for adoption (i.e. when children are placed with foster 
carers with the intention that they may be adopted by their foster carers) under the 
Children and Families Act 2014, s2(3) may mean that local authorities do not look for 
kinship carers and this may result in fewer children being placed with family members. 
This provision not only has the potential to violate the Article 8 rights of children and 
their birth relatives, but may violate several provisions under the UNCRC which are, 
according to Sloan, ‘designed to protect children’s kinship links’.830 Lindley has argued 
in favour of a statutory duty to assess birth relatives before children are placed for 
adoption with non-related carers.
831
 She has also suggested that kinship carers ought to be 
identified early on, pre-proceedings at Family Group Conferences via a standardised 
viability tool.
832
 This would strike the balance between avoiding undue delay in the 
adoption process where there are no suitable kinship carers for the child while ensuring, 
that where possible, children are raised within their birth families and that de facto and 
legal ties are maintained.  
 
One difficulty in the context of kinship care is that birth relatives, such as grandparents, 
may face obstacles in becoming kinship carers. Thus, Lindley has suggested that children 
may lose the opportunity of being raised within their birth families because their relatives 
may not have access to enough information and advice on how to proceed.
833
 This is 
particularly relevant in terms of children whose families have origins elsewhere in 
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Europe. For example, there has been an increase in families from former Soviet bloc 
countries, such as Slovakia and Lithuania, coming to England and Wales; and concern 
has been expressed about increased care proceedings in relation to children from Eastern 
Europe.
834
 In these cases, special guardianship orders (considered below in Section 5.4) 
might be a less restrictive but equally effective alternative to non-consensual adoption.  
 
Even though there is little doubt in most cases that kinship carers will protect children 
from harm, they are often ruled out as carers due to a refusal on their part to accept that 
their kin could have neglected or abused a child.
835
 This is because, in some cases, 
kinship carers may fail to adhere to contact restrictions (preventing birth parents from 
seeing their children at all or allowing only supervised contact, for example) which may 
result in harm to the child.
836
 Another issue in the context of kinship care is the wide 
variability in assessments for kinship care which means that relatives may be assessed via 
a 20 minute phone call or a more thorough face-to-face meeting or meetings. It is 
essential that Social Services across England and Wales develop an efficient, standardised 
approach towards identifying suitable kinship carers, since where children are adopted 
instead of being cared for by viable kinship carers, this may give rise to a successful 
claim under ECHR Article 8. Overall, it is apparent from the discussion in this section 
that, in some cases, children remain in the care of the State or are placed for non-
consensual adoption when it might have been possible for them to have remained with 
their parents with the help of State assistance or have been placed with other relatives, 
including grandparents (see below). 
5.3.2 Grandparents as Kinship Carers 
 
Grandparents are increasingly playing an important role in the provision of care for 
children whose parents are unwilling or unable to care for them. Mitchell, for example, 
has observed that it is common for grandparents to seek to care for grandchildren who are 
being looked after by a local authority.
837
 It has been suggested by Gautier et al that the 
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majority of kinship carers are in fact grandparents,
838
 which means it is important to 
consider the various issues which arise in relation to grandparents in the context of 
kinship care and adoption. In practice, grandparents and other relatives (as considered 
above) may face difficulties in participating in the court process
839
 because they are not 
automatic parties to care proceedings. Instead, they must first obtain permission from the 
court before they can make an application.  
 
An important case to consider in this context is C (A Child).
840
 In this case, the 
grandparents appealed against an order placing their grandchild for adoption. They 
believed insufficient consideration had been given to the successful parenting of two of 
their children in the ultimate decision to place the grandchild for adoption instead of 
placing the child with them. They argued that the judge was plainly wrong and sought 
another assessment. Thorpe LJ dismissed the grandparents’ appeal on the basis that it 
would need to be an exceptional case for the Court to conclude that the judge was plainly 
wrong, especially as the basis of the grandparents’ argument had been that the judge had 
placed too much weight on one relevant factor and too little emphasis on another.   
 
However, Thorpe LJ acknowledged that the family must have felt that M was deprived of 
his right and all of the benefits of advantages that being placed with his grandparents 
would have offered. Although Thorpe LJ considered that M’s own rights might have been 
affected by the non-consensual adoption, he did not provide detail on the specific rights 
and benefits that M had been deprived of (such as, for example, under the ECHR and the 
UNCRC) and nor did he consider whether the difficulties in placing M with his 
grandparents could have been overcome with assistance by the local authority. It can be 
argued that M’s ECHR Article 8 right to a family life (as well as the same rights of the 
grandparents) may have been violated by the adoption. Although ordering another 
assessment of M’s grandparents had the potential to violate M’s rights under Article 6(1) 
due to the potential delay, his Article 8 right may have been violated as, if his 
grandparents’ assessment had been found to be positive, he could have been raised by his 
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birth family which would have been a less restrictive measure when compared with non-
consensual adoption.   
 
Placing children in the care of their grandparents may, in many cases, provide a less 
restrictive but equally effective alternative to non-consensual adoption. However, there 
appears to be prejudice recognising grandparents’ viability as potential carers. Tingle has 
observed that, in some cases, grandparents are regarded as unsuitable to care for their 
grandchildren for reasons such as being too ‘old’.841 Pryor has emphasised that 
grandparents may be viable carers, has suggested that grandparents may often be a good 
choice to care for children where they are relatively young, healthy and have good energy 
levels.
842
 By implication then, grandparents who are older, have health problems 
including disabilities, could still be ruled out as carers for their grandchildren. Such 
perceptions fail to take into account other relevant factors such as practical and financial 
resources which may be available to grandparents or the possibility of State assistance 
which could help them.  
It can be argued that age and poor health are not sufficient reasons to rule out 
grandparents as carers and that more research must be conducted in this context. 
NAGALRO have pointed out that, social workers may be ‘prejudiced’843 against some 
relatives, particularly grandmothers, perceiving them as the cause of the birth parent’s 
problem in not being able to raise his or her child. Another obstacle to placement with 
grandparents and other members of the birth family is that they might find it difficult to 
accept that the children have been neglected and abused. While this might be a relevant 
factor to be considered by Social Services and the courts, it should not be a determinative 
factor when deciding where to place a child. It is strongly argued that more research 
needs to be undertaken to identify the extent of the difficulties that grandparents may face 
in becoming kinship carers, since grandparent care might in some cases be a more 
proportionate measure than non-consensual adoption.  
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5.3.3 Financial Support for Kinship Carers 
 
The status of kinship carers is important because it has an impact on how much financial 
help they will receive from the State. Carers who raise children with a special 
guardianship, residence or adoption order in place are typically dependent on means-
tested allowances which tend to be lower than the allowances received by foster carers.
844
 
Research shows that allowances which are paid under the Children Act 1989, s17 are 
especially low.
845
 The availability and awareness of financial support available for 
relatives who have children placed with them is important as research suggests the 
children’s relatives are likely to receive less support from social workers than unrelated 
carers,
846
 and are more likely to experience greater economic difficulties
847
 and problems 
with accommodation.
848
 The Local Government Ombudsman Report, Family Values: 
council services to family and friends who care for others’ children states that 145,000 
children are cared for by adults who are not their parents
849
 and is critical of how families 
and foster carers are treated by local authorities. The Report cites an example of a case 
where a grandmother, who filed for bankruptcy because she had to give up work to care 
for her grandchild, ended up being paid £45,000 by the local authority to cover the years 
she had not been paid.
850
  
 
It can be argued that the Children and Families Act 2014 includes provisions which 
further encourage non-consensual adoption, instead of encouraging the use of less 
restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption. It was suggested by the Local 
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Ombudsman Report, for example, that the CFA 2014 could have been used as an 
opportunity to provide a national financial allowance so that children can be raised by 
family (or friends), rather than be forced into the care system because their relatives are 
unable to afford to look after them. It also suggested that local authorities should have 
new duties to provide support services for children raised by family or friends who are 
unable to live with their birth parents, regardless of their legal status.
851
  
 
Furthermore, the Report proposed that these carers should have the right to paid leave 
when they take on children as the government is doing for adopters so that they do not 
have to give up work and become financially dependent on the State. The extent to which 
relatives should have financial support from local authorities has been controversial, 
although the High Court has ruled that family and friends should not be precluded from 
receiving fostering allowance.
852
 It is unclear though whether local authorities are under a 
duty to provide birth relatives with information about the support which they are entitled 
to receive. If there was such a duty to relatives this might encourage more of them to 
become kinship carers, thereby decreasing the need for a restrictive form of intervention 
such as non-consensual adoption.  
Although case law under Article 8 has traditionally focused on protecting relationships 
between children and their birth parents, it could be argued that children have wider 
rights under ECHR Article 8. If the State does not proactively initiate and sustain a search 
or provide financial and practical support to kinship carers, it could be argued that the 
child’s UNCRC Article 7 (right to know and be raised by one’s parents) and Article 8 
(right to know one’s identity) are also engaged. Furthermore, it could potentially be 
argued that ECHR Article 8 could also be relevant in the context of kinship care. It has 
been shown through the discussion of ECtHR case law (see Chapter 3) that the State is 
required to be more pro-active in keeping families together and must take practical 
measures (such as housing, therapeutic intervention or ongoing support from social 
workers) and invest more financial resources, in individual cases, so as to keep families 
together under its positive obligation under Article 8.
853
 Although the cases considered in 
Chapter 3 were argued by birth parents, there is potential for kinship carers to also argue 
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that their Article 8 right is engaged and may be violated in cases where they do not 
receive sufficient State assistance. 
 
It can be argued that it is very important for local authorities not only to be proactive in 
finding kinship carers for children in care, but to provide efficient and thorough viability 
assessments and to ensure that relatives are aware of the financial and practical support 
they are entitled to receive. Children in such kinship care arrangements may be regarded 
as ‘in need’ and receive short term or long term support from Children’s Services under 
the CA 1989, s17, for example. Thus, where birth relatives are unable to care for children 
because of a lack of financial support, despite the powers available to local authorities, it 
could be argued that such relatives could present a case that the State has violated the 
ECHR Article 8 rights of the child, as the State has a positive obligation to keep a family 
together where possible. In such circumstances, if non-consensual adoption did take place 
when a less restrictive but equally effective alternative might have been available, it is 
argued that this might amount to a disproportionate interference with children’s and 
parents’ Article 8 rights. The difficulty is that the State’s ability to fulfil its positive 
obligation under Article 8 may be limited by its lack of financial resources. This is why, it 
is argued that further research is required to determine the relative cost of different 
options for children in care because, in practice, financial limitations may have an impact 
on the permanence measure which is chosen for a child (for further discussion on this 
issue, see Section 5.6).  
 
5.4 Special Guardianship Orders 
5.4.1 Special Guardianship Orders  
 
Special guardianship is another alternative to non-consensual adoption in cases where 
children cannot live with their parents.
854
 A special guardianship order (SGO) has been 
described by Ward LJ as ‘a half-way house between a residence order and an adoption 
order’.855 An SGO is an alternative to an adoption order which enables children to retain 
their legal tie with their birth parents, while under the care of another (e.g. relative, friend 
of the family or foster carer). Special guardianship was inserted into the CA 1989 (ss14A-
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14G). This order primarily protects older children in care for whom adoption is not an 
option.
856
 An SGO is different from adoption in a number of ways: it is not irrevocable, it 
can suspend parental responsibility but an SGO will not extinguish it, an SGO will not 
alter the relationship with natural family, the birth parents can still have contact under the 
control of the court, children can retain their own name and there is no right, as there is 
with adoption, to inherit under intestacy. Special guardianship thus offers both security 
and permanence which were previously only found with adoption.
857
 It envisages 
continuance in the connection between children and their birth family.
858
 It is quite 
common for kinship care (considered above) to later lead to the application for an 
SGO.
859
 This is because adoption by members of the birth family (e.g. aunts and uncles, 
siblings, grandparents) is often seen as inappropriate because it may distort family 
relationships.
860
 
 
In Re S (A Child)
861
 the Court of Appeal reviewed three separate cases and provided key 
guidance on the use of SGOs. The Court stated that courts considering whether to make 
an SGO or an adoption order, must provide full reasons for choosing one order over 
another. In Re S, the Court stressed that there were differences in the status of the two 
types of orders which should be borne in mind when applying the welfare checklist under 
both the CA 1989, s1(3) and the ACA 2002, s1(4). It was observed that there was no 
specific guidance from legislation dictating the circumstances in which either an adoption 
or an SGO should apply. Therefore, the courts would need to ask which order would 
better serve the welfare of the child. 
 
The Court reflected on the human rights considerations that arise when considering 
whether to make an adoption or SGO. Wall LJ observed that an SGO is ‘less intrusive’ 
than adoption and amounts to a ‘less fundamental interference with existing legal 
relationships’.862 When Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life is at 
stake, courts must decide whether the interference with family life is proportionate in the 
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light of the harm the child faces. Wall LJ observed that when choosing whether to make 
an adoption order or SGO that Article 8:  
 
‘…is unlikely to add anything to the considerations contained in the respective 
welfare checklists… However, in some cases, the fact that the welfare objective can 
be achieved with less disruption of existing family relationships can properly be 
regarded as helping tip the balance’.  
 
However, he has stressed that an SGO ‘did not always provide the same permanency of 
protection as adoption . . . which in a finely balanced case, could well tip the scales in 
favour of adoption’.863 There are cases where an SGO might provide safety and stability 
for children while allowing them to maintain relationships with family members. Sloan 
has suggested that a SGO in favour of prospective adopters may be appropriate where 
adoption is not in the child’s best interests or it would be incompatible with the child’s 
rights under the UNCRC (e.g. Articles 7, 8 and 9) or the ECHR (e.g. Article 8).
864
 This 
could apply, for example, when children are older and/or have established bonds with 
their birth parents, siblings or other family members or express a desire not to be adopted. 
SGOs are commonly made in favour of family members
865
 but may also be suitable for 
long-term foster carers who may or may not also be kinship carers. 
 
An examination of paragraph 18 of the Explanatory Notes to the ACA 2002 reveals that a 
purpose behind special guardianship is to accommodate the needs of families from 
cultures where adoption is rejected. It has been suggested though, that this purpose is not 
readily apparent from the legislation and the exception is ‘almost hidden’.866 Other 
cultures use methods other than adoption to meet children’s long-term needs and regard 
them to be as effective at meeting a child’s need for stability, without severing the legal 
tie between the child and his/her birth parents. Thus, SGOs may be regarded as an 
equivalent arrangement (to ‘kafalah’ under Islamic Law, for example).867 While in some 
cases, SGOs may not offer the permanence of an adoption, which may be required by 
                                                          
863
 Ibid  at paras 65-68. 
864
 Brian Sloan, ‘Conflicting Rights: English Adoption Law and the Implementation of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child’ [2013] 25 CFLQ 40. 
865
 See, for example: Surrey County Council v. Al-Hilli & Others [2013] EWHC 3404 (Fam); B (Children) 
[2014] EWCA Civ 814; Department for Education, Special guardianship review: report on findings, 
Government consultation response (Department for Education, 2015). 
866
 Meena Bhamra, The Challenges of Justice in Diverse Societies: Constitutionalism and Pluralism 
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2011) p103. 
867
 Kerry O’Halloran, The Politics of Adoption: International Perspectives on Law Policy and Practice, 3rd 
edn, (Brisbane: Springer, 2015) p5. 
187 
 
some children, it is argued that it may, in some cases, be equally effective at protecting 
children’s best interests and rights when compared with non-consensual adoption. An 
SGO may be regarded as a less restrictive alternative to the making of an adoption order 
without parental consent,
868
 which also potentially protects children’s rights under the 
UNCRC (such as Articles 7 and 8). In Harroudj v. France,
869
 the ECtHR asserted that 
kafalah struck the appropriate balance between acknowledging the de facto relationship 
between a child and his or her carers and preserving the child’s tie to his or her countries 
of origin.  
 
It can be argued that an SGO can be an appropriate measure even in circumstances where 
the child’s country of origin does not prohibit adoption but generally in cases where, for a 
number of reasons, adoption may not be in a child’s best interests. In A (Children),870 it 
was argued, albeit unsuccessfully by the parents, that adoption was not a proportionate 
measure or in the best interests of the child, but that an SGO ought to have been made 
instead. Munby P has suggested that adoption should only take place if special 
guardianship would fail to meet the needs of the child. He stated that: ‘One should 
consider special guardianship first, and address adoption only if satisfied that special 
guardianship will not suffice’.871 This emphasis on SGOs is powerful support for the 
argument that for a non-consensual adoption to be a proportionate measure, least 
restrictive alternatives must be considered first.   
 
Munby P has observed that there used to be a perception that adoption would be 
appropriate in the majority of cases and that SGOs would be for special cases only. He 
has argued that this ought to be the other way around, namely that adoption orders ought 
to be made where SGOs would not be appropriate.
872
 In 2006, only 372 SGOs were made 
compared to 2,746 adoption orders.
873
 However, there is evidence that the use of SGOs is 
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steadily increasing.
874
 Figures from March 2013 show that 9.6 per cent of children left 
care through special guardianship compared to 14 per cent by means of adoption orders 
and 5.8 per cent through residence orders.
875
 In 2014, 3,330 children left care via an SGO, 
accounting for 11 per cent of children ceasing to be looked after in care, compared to just 
1,290 leaving care via an SGO in 2010.
876
 This demonstrates then, that the number of 
SGOs made in 2014 is more than double the number made in 2010.  
 
This increase may be attributed to the decision of Re B-S (Children) and can be regarded 
as desirable as special guardianship is undoubtedly a less restrictive alternative to non-
consensual adoption. Furthermore, it has the potential to be an equally effective measure 
at protecting children’s best interests and rights in cases involving children raised within 
different cultures or older children who have strong ties with their birth parents.
877
 There 
are many benefits to SGOs such as the fact that children do not have to face the stigma of 
being in the care system and have an increased sense of security.
878
 Furthermore, as stated 
above, an SGO is more likely to be compliant with ECHR Article 8 because it enables 
children to retain legal ties with their parents. Special guardianship also has the benefit 
that it may be a possible alternative for children from cultures which reject adoption. This 
can be seen in Islamic law which has practice of kafalah instead of adoption, which 
allows for others to be the primary carer of a child and to be a substitute family.
879
 
England and Wales are becoming increasingly culturally diverse, which means it is 
helpful to consider how adoption orders might be viewed by other cultures. In some 
cases, special guardianship may be a better way of respecting a child and the child’s birth 
family’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under ECHR Article 9.  
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It is clear that SGOs have advantages and, as Gilmore and Bainham have argued, there 
ought to be more ‘proactive promotion’880 of SGOs. There are, however, issues affecting 
the success of these orders. Thus, SGOs tend to work best when they are made in favour 
of carers whom children know. It has been argued that where children are placed with 
carers with whom they do not have a prior relationship, there is a higher risk of 
breakdown in the placement.
881
 Further research needs to be undertaken to establish 
whether, in such cases, SGOs were less effective for those children than adoption 
placements would have been. Another concern with respect to the effectiveness of SGOs 
when compared against non-consensual adoption is the thoroughness of the assessment 
process. NAGALRO has argued that viability assessments for potential carers are 
variable in quality and may be ‘inappropriately influenced by the preconceptions of the 
assessor’ and the time constraints of the child’s social worker.882  
 
NAGALRO has suggested that this issue could be resolved by applying a higher standard 
when considering whether relatives or non-relatives of the child ought to be special 
guardians.
883
 NAGALRO has argued that the assessment process for kinship carers 
should be as rigorous as the assessment process for other unrelated carers such as 
adopters.
884
 It has suggested that there ought to be DBS checks, for example. Whilst this 
may provide increased protection for children’s best interests and rights (for example, 
under ECHR Article 2 and to protect them from physical harm under ECHR Article 3), it 
is arguable that if alternatives to non-consensual adoption become just as lengthy to 
arrange as non-consensual adoption, then this would lead to further delay in achieving 
permanence for children
885
 which is not in their best interests.   
 
Concern has also been expressed that the motive behind the increase in the making of 
SGOs may not be to protect children’s welfare. It has been argued by the charity TACT, 
for example, that in some cases local authorities are aggressively pursuing SGOs, often 
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encouraging foster carers to become special guardians so that they can pay these carers 
less money.
886
 However, as considered above in Section 5.3.3, kinship carers are now 
entitled to claim as much money for a child’s care as foster carers. It is unclear, for 
example, if a kinship carer who is also a special guardian is entitled to claim the same 
amount of funding. This issue is not within the scope of this thesis and will not be 
explored further. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the legal provisions relating to  
financial provision for kinship carers, foster carers and special guardians needs to be 
clarified.  
 
The discussion above has shown that State assistance, kinship care, special guardianship 
or a combination of these alternatives are less restrictive measures when compared with 
non-consensual adoption. It has also been argued that these measures may be just as 
effective at protecting children’s best interests whilst also protecting parental rights under 
ECHR Article 8 and children’s rights under ECHR Articles 2, 3 and 8. It is argued that 
these alternatives may be ruled out too quickly or might not be considered at all. Also, 
resource implications should not prevent the use of less detrimental alternatives – 
especially as there is a strong possibility, based on the evidence considered above, that 
these alternatives are not necessarily more expensive than non-consensual adoption.  
Having outlined various alternatives to non-consensual adoption which enable children to 
retain legal ties with their parents, it is important to acknowledge that there may be cases 
where non-consensual adoption is in fact a necessary and proportionate measure. In some 
non-consensual adoption cases, however, opportunities for continuing contact may not be 
considered sufficiently as a viable option. This issue is considered in the following 
section.  
5.5 Non-Consensual Adoption with Direct Contact 
 
Non-consensual adoption with direct contact is another option which may potentially 
strike the balance between protecting children’s best interests on the one hand and 
children and parents’ ECHR Article 8 right to respect for private and family life on the 
other. Case law has long emphasised the importance of contact
887
 between children and 
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parents in the context of family breakdown but in the adoption context, the judiciary has 
been reluctant to order post-adoption contact.
888
 When an adoption order is made, it is 
common practice for contact between children and parents to be decreased or even 
stopped prior to an adoption
889
 and contact is thus either indirect (via letters sent from the 
birth parent to the adoptive parents) or non-existent post-adoption.
890
  
 
One reason why post-adoption contact is not regularly ordered is because judges fear that 
post-adoption contact will destabilise the adoptive placements and threaten the security of 
adopters in their role as new parents.
891
 However, there is no concrete evidence to support 
this contention.
892
 In fact, there are many reasons which suggest that post-adoption 
contact may be beneficial.
893
 Contact with the birth family assists the development of 
personal identity (especially for children from ethnic minorities
894
) and enables 
continuance of family relationships.
895
 Research suggests that adopted children may 
experience a sense of loss and rejection by their birth parents, even where the adoption is 
successful and the children have a good relationship with their adoptive parents.
896
 It has 
been found that adopted children place an importance on knowledge of their origins
897
 as 
well as social and genetic identity.
898
 According to Ryburn, post-adoption contact has the 
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benefit of replacing ‘speculation’ and ‘fantasy’ with facts899 and provides children with 
information and certainty about their identity. Moe suggests that there are benefits from 
open adoption with direct contact such as lack of secrecy, a knowledge of identity and 
family medical history and a reduced need for the child to construct a fantasy of what 
their birth parents were like.
900
 Furthermore, it has been suggested that contact with birth 
parents can sometimes enhance children’s relationships with their adoptive parents.901  
 
There is a perception that the courts have not fully come to terms with post-adoption 
contact. Hughes and Sloan have argued that the courts need to ‘get to grips with the human 
rights implications of [adoption] cases’ and ‘to consider the relationship between each of 
these competing rights, and the relationship between these rights and the welfare 
provisions of the Children Act 1989 and Children and Adoption Act 2002’.902 Hughes 
and Sloan have argued that the UNCRC conceptualises contact as a human right. This can 
be seen in UNCRC General Comment No. 14, for example, which in relation to UNCRC 
Article 9 states that: 
 
‘When separation becomes necessary, the decision-makers shall ensure that the child 
maintains the linkages and relations with his or her parents and family (siblings, 
relatives and persons with whom the child has had strong personal relationships) 
unless this is contrary to the child’s best interests. The quality of the relationships 
and the need to retain them must be taken into consideration in decisions on the 
frequency and length of visits and other contact when a child is placed outside the 
family’. 
 
Furthermore, the European jurisprudence has referred to the importance of contact 
between children and their parents (see Section 3.4.7). As public authorities have a 
positive obligation to act compatibly with Convention Rights under s6 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, then the courts ought to protect the right to contact under ECHR Article 
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8.
903
 Sloan has pointed to the decision of R and H v. UK
904
 (see Chapter 6) where, he has 
argued, that the Court of Human Rights has attached great significance to the issue of 
post-adoption contact in the context of Article 8.
905
  
 
In contrast to the position taken by the ECtHR which emphasises the importance of 
contact, the Children and Families Act 2014 has the objective of reducing the scope for 
post-adoption contact (see Section 4.2.3),
906
 which adds further uncertainty to the issue of 
contact and adoption in England and Wales. Regardless, it is clear that the courts in 
England and Wales have been cautious, in that they regard contact as one of the factors 
which may be considered under the welfare checklist rather than a specific right which 
the State has a positive obligation to protect.
907
 In the High Court decision of Seddon v. 
Oldham MBC (Adoption Human Rights)
908
 Jackson J made it clear that the making of an 
adoption order brought to an end pre-existing ECHR Article 8 rights to family life 
between children and their birth parents. He stated that:  
 
‘…[T]he making of an order for contact at the same time as an adoption order would 
create a new right to contact, though not necessarily an Art. 8 right. The right is not 
the preservation or extension of a previous right held by virtue of being a birth 
parent’.
909
 
 
The only right that parents have, according to the English Courts, in the context of post-
adoption contact is the right to correspondence under ECHR Article 8 (i.e. letters).
910
  
However, while the courts’ existing approach serves to protect the stability of the child’s 
adoptive placement, there may be disadvantages to such a rigid approach. According to 
Neil et al, the disadvantages which a child may face if he or she loses contact with his or 
her parents as a consequence of adoption, is an issue which has yet to be explored fully 
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by the courts in England and Wales.
911
 Diver has argued that removing the presumption 
that children are best raised by their natural parents (see Chapter 2) would remove delays 
within the child protection process and that the absence of such a presumption would 
necessitate greater protection of parental rights post-adoption. Thus, she has suggested 
that a consequence of removing this presumption might be that open adoption and 
indirect contact would become more ‘widely accepted’.912  
 
The approach taken by the judiciary and by the adoption legislation in England and Wales 
(see Section 4.6.4) has been contrary to the growing body of research which is in favour 
of open adoption.
913
 Despite the existence of this research, Harris-Short has observed that 
judges face ‘difficulty in reconciling a move toward openness with the traditional legal 
understanding of the nature of an adoption order’.914 It can be argued that regardless of 
whether or not the courts in England and Wales have conceptualised contact as a right, in 
cases concerning post-adoption contact, jurisprudence from the ECtHR (considered in 
Chapter 3) can be used to support the notion such a right may exist even though this right 
may be limited by the children’s best interests. Non-consensual adoption with direct 
contact would in some cases be a less restrictive alternative to non-consensual adoption. 
Thus, in cases which children have positive relationships with their birth parents, may not 
only protect parental rights under ECHR Article 8 but also serve to protect children’s best 
interests and rights under ECHR Article 8 and UNCRC Articles 7 and 8. Therefore, post-
adoption contact should take place, where possible
915
 and children and birth parents have 
a right to contact with one another (as long as it is in the child’s best interests).  
 
5.6 Government Targets, Financial Savings and Proportionality 
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As has been considered throughout this thesis, while there may be many cases where non-
consensual adoption is a necessary and proportionate measure, there have been cases 
(considered above and in Chapters 3 and 4) where less restrictive and potentially equally 
effective alternatives might have been used. The question then is, why, in the light of the 
benefits of State assistance, kinship care and non-consensual adoption with direct contact, 
successive governments have not placed more emphasis on less restrictive alternatives to 
non-consensual adoption. It has been argued that one of the reasons is due to the 
perception, on the part of successive governments, that non-consensual adoption is the 
most cost-effective measure for children in care and that this is part of the rationale for 
endeavouring to increase the number of adoptions and to reduce delay in the adoption 
process, even though non-consensual adoption has the potential to violate children and 
parents’ right to a family life under Article 8. While it is true that placing a child for 
adoption is less expensive than looking after children in care (e.g. in a residential home or 
foster care), which it has been estimated to cost £23,470 a year,
916
 it is not necessarily 
true that non-consensual adoption is the most cost-effective measure available or that the 
emphasis on adoption for children in care is justified.  
 
Barton has argued that there is no explanation behind the government’s aim to increase 
the number of adoptions by 50 per cent, how these figures were calculated or how the 
target is ‘reconcilable with the need for a case-by-case assessment’.917 After the 
enactment of the ACA 2002, local authorities were instructed to increase the percentage 
of adoptions of looked after children by at least 40 per cent. Public Service Agreements 
about adoption figures were sometimes created between the government and local 
authorities, which set specific targets for local authority performance, with the 
understanding that a reward grant would be paid to local authorities which met national 
targets for adoption.
918
  
 
Many local authorities who reached their targets received significant financial rewards. 
For example, Hammersmith and Fulham Council publicly acknowledged that it had 
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received £500,000 for placing over 100 children for adoption in 3 years, most of whom 
were adopted without parental consent.
919
 Although the government has denied giving 
bonuses to councils for meeting adoption targets, this remains a controversial issue, with 
political figures such as John Hemming maintaining that there is documentary evidence 
that councils have been offered financial incentives to increase the number of 
adoptions.
920
 This means then, that there may be cases where non-consensual adoption 
has been or is being used in cases where less restrictive alternatives (such as State 
assistance, kinship care and special guardianship orders) might have been available and 
which might have been equally effective.  
 
In the government’s Action Plan for Adoption: Tackling Delay, it was advocated that 
local authorities ought to use ‘score cards’ to record how quickly adoptions take place 
and that performance tables ought to exist to make local authorities accountable for delay. 
The scorecards, published on the Department for Education website, show how long it 
takes local authorities to place children in care for adoption. It can be argued that these 
scorecards may have a naming and shaming effect, which may encourage local 
authorities to speed up the adoption process, instead of focusing on the welfare of the 
individual child. In other words, councils may be encouraging non-consensual adoption 
in cases where equally effective but less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual 
adoption may be available.
921
  
 
Academics and social workers have both expressed concern about the target-driven 
nature of the adoption process.
922
 Allen, for example, has expressed concerns that 
government targets may have led to social workers prematurely deciding that children 
ought to be adopted when, after time they could have been reunited with their birth 
parents.
923
 It has also been suggested by Dale that there should be caution in treating 
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adoption as a ‘panacea’.924 In fact, the policy of more adoptions more quickly may result 
in a failure to consider alternatives to adoption and may marginalise the rights and 
interests of birth parents and ultimately minimise the importance of substantive and 
procedural safeguards in court.
925
  
 
Adoption policy is potentially a way of fulfilling a political agenda (especially in world of 
cuts in funding) which does not promote either the welfare and rights of children or the 
rights of their parents.
926
 This pro-adoption policy may not strike the correct balance in 
protecting the best interests and the rights of children and the rights of their birth 
parents.
927
 In fact, encouraging adoption means that adoption orders may be made when 
there may be other options available (such as special guardianship orders or kinship care), 
which are less intrusive to family life and thus less likely to violate the rights of children 
and parents under ECHR Article 8. It is possible that the government’s pro-adoption 
policy is a misguided way of furthering State interests
928
 rather than protecting children’s 
best interests or the rights of children under Article 8. It is argued that the Labour 
government, which enacted the ACA 2002, may have been influenced by the fact that 
adoption is regarded as a cheaper alternative to other types of placement.
929
  
 
The current Conservative government has continued to support the pro-adoption policy 
even though it can be criticised as being influenced by the fact that it is regarded as 
cheaper and easier to place children for adoption than it is to undertake complex 
assessments and managing programmes aimed at reuniting children and their parents.
930
 
Figures reported during the passage of the ACA 2002 suggested that adoption was in fact 
a less expensive alternative to long-term foster care. Allowances provided to adoptive 
parents are, in practice, significantly less than those provided to foster parents. The 
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figures quoted were that the adoption allowance available for a child between 4 and 7 was 
£54.89 a week, which is means-tested and adopters receive less child benefit. However, 
for a child of the equivalent age who is fostered, the care allowance offered to foster 
parents was £153.58, which is almost treble.
931
 These figures show that local authorities 
can make significant savings when children are placed for adoption, rather than being 
kept in long-term foster care.  
Between 2013 and 2014, the government allocated £150 million of funding to local 
authorities to enable them to boost adopter recruitment and support and to fund the 
creation of a National Gateway enabling adopters to find potential children quickly.
932
 In 
other words, a significant amount of money has been invested in adoption. However, 
more recent research has suggested that it may be more cost-effective to invest in 
reuniting children with their parents or wider birth family than to place them for adoption. 
Thomas, for example, considered the findings of several studies on the costs of 
supporting birth families versus supporting adoptive families and found that although the 
allowance provided to adoptive parents was less that provided to foster parents, the 
average cost of an adoptive placement by local authorities and voluntary adoption 
agencies was £36,000 in financial year 2007-2008.
933
 In practice, there are a range of 
different expenses associated with the adoption process. The Helping Birth Families 
study found that the mean cost of supporting birth families was £511 over the 12 month 
study. The cost ranged from nothing to £4,563.
934
  
The Family Findings study found that the costs of finding a suitable family to adopt a 
child could be expensive. In a swift case, this would cost £4,430 and it could cost as 
much as £5,835 for a wider search.
935
 The Family Finding study demonstrated that 
adoption support services for each child varied widely and the cost could range from 
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£980 to £6,270. The mean cost of this was £2,842.
936
 The mean cost of support services 
for contact for adoptive families was £999 but could cost anything between £0-£4,052 
over a 12 month period. For birth families the mean figure for support was £757, costing 
somewhere between £0-1,984 over a 12 month period.
937
 This study seems to suggest that 
supporting birth families may be less expensive than searching for suitable prospective 
adopters and supporting adopters before, during and after the making of the adoption 
order. More research therefore needs to be undertaken to determine just how cost-
effective adoption is in comparison to other measures such as reuniting children with 
their parents, their wider birth family and the use of long-term foster care.  
However, even if policies aimed at returning children to their birth parents would be more 
cost-effective than placing them for adoption, returning children to their parents is 
unlikely to be appropriate in the most serious cases of neglect and/or abuse. In fact, 
returning children in such circumstances would have the potential to violate the child’s 
rights under Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment). Thus, in some cases, non-consensual adoption may 
well be necessary and proportionate but in others there may be less restrictive alternatives 
available, such as kinship care, which may be just as effective in terms of the outcomes 
for children. It is argued here that regardless of whether a child is placed for adoption, 
placed with birth relatives, returned to birth parents or remains in foster care, that 
although financial considerations might be a relevant factor, a financial motive should not 
be the overriding factor influencing adoption policy. In such cases, if equally effective 
alternatives to non-consensual adoption were in fact available, then the adoption would 
amount to a disproportionate measure.  
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the alternatives to non-consensual adoption and has 
considered the extent to which each option complies with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The alternatives considered in this chapter may, in some cases, protect 
children’s best interests and rights and the rights of their birth parents under ECHR 
Article 8. Alternative measures such as State assistance, special guardianship and kinship 
care may also have the benefit of protecting children’s rights under UNCRC Articles 7, 8 
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and 9. An important consideration underpinning the discussion in this chapter is the need 
to balance the State’s positive obligation under ECHR Article 8 to reunite children with 
their birth parents (where possible) against the State’s positive obligation to children 
under Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment).
938
 
 
This chapter has considered that State assistance primarily consists of financial support 
and/or practical assistance such as provision of parenting classes, therapy. The provision 
of State assistance increases the likelihood that the State has satisfied its positive 
obligation under ECHR Article 8 to undertake reasonable efforts to reunite children with 
their parents, even if the State then subsequently determines that non-consensual adoption 
is in the child’s best interests. In particular, it has been suggested that one way for the 
State satisfy its obligation under ECHR Article 8 to reunite children and their birth 
parents and also to protect children’s best interests (and rights under Articles 2 and 3) 
may be via the use of concurrent planning. However, it has been emphasised that there 
must be thorough scrutiny of this measure to ensure that it amounts to an equally 
effective alternative to non-consensual adoption and not merely a tokenistic way of 
acknowledging children’s and parents’ rights.  
 
This chapter has emphasised the increased use of and potential value of kinship care as a 
less restrictive alternative to non-consensual adoption. It has been observed that the 
psychological, social and educational outcomes associated with kinship care are on a par 
with the outcomes for non-consensual adoption. Thus, it has been argued that efforts 
ought to be made to overcome potential barriers to kinship care (such as the lack of 
financial resources for carers and the need for assistance with parenting skills enabling 
birth relatives to care for children with challenging behaviours). Thus, it has been argued 
that kinship care is, in many cases, a measure of intervention which protects children 
from harm and also protects children’s rights to develop and maintain relationships with 
their birth family under ECHR Article 8 (which are further reinforced by UNCRC rights 
such as Article 8, for example).  
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Special guardianship has the benefit of ensuring that children retain their legal ties with 
their parents and wider birth family. Research suggests that the use of special 
guardianship orders is on the increase and, in some cases, SGOs may be made in respect 
of kinship carers. This chapter has shown that special guardianship orders have many 
uses and are potentially beneficial for older children or children from different cultures. 
In such circumstances, special guardianship may be a more proportionate interference 
with children’s and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8 (and children’s rights under 
UNCRC Article 20).  
 
This chapter has also considered the fact that, in some cases, non-consensual adoption 
may be a justified, necessary and proportionate measure. However, it has been argued in 
some cases that non-consensual adoption with direct post-adoption contact would be a 
less restrictive (and potentially equally effective) measure of intervention to protect 
children’s best interests and rights under ECHR Article 8 on the one hand and parents’ 
ECHR Article 8 rights on the other. It has been observed that the courts have, in many 
cases, been reluctant to order that direct post-adoption contact should take place. 
However, while direct contact may not be appropriate in cases of very severe neglect and 
abuse, there may be cases where it offers real benefits to children and their parents since 
it enables children and parents the opportunity to maintain and continue to develop 
relationships with one another, thereby protecting parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8 
and children’s rights under ECHR Article 8 and the UNCRC.  
 
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that there are cases where non-consensual 
adoption is a proportionate measure and offers much needed protection, security and 
permanence for children. Adoption is an appropriate measure for protecting children’s 
best interests in many cases. However, there may be cases where alternatives to non-
consensual adoption may be available which are less likely to amount to an interference 
with children and parents’ human rights. It is clear from the discussion in Chapters 4 and 
Chapter 5, that placing an emphasis on encouraging and investing financial resources in 
non-consensual adoption, may mean less restrictive alternatives are not being pursued 
which may enable children to retain relationships with their birth families or which may 
prevent them from going into care in the first place. This thesis will now go on to 
consider adoption cases from the UK which went to the European Court of Human Rights 
202 
 
in order to consider whether or not less restrictive but equally effective alternatives to 
non-consensual adoption should have been considered and made available in these cases. 
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Chapter 6: An Analysis of UK Adoption Cases in the 
European Court of Human Rights 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As was considered in Chapters 2 and 4, non-consensual adoptions in England and Wales 
are made on the basis of children’s welfare (see the Adoption and Children Act 2002, 
s52(1)(b)). It has been emphasised in the case of Re B-S (Children)
939
 that the balance 
sheet approach is now the method that the English Courts must use to decide whether or 
not it is in a child’s best interests for an adoption order to be made. The focus in adoption 
cases heard in the European Court of Human Rights (see Chapter 3) is different as the 
ECtHR considers alleged violations of parental rights, including ECHR Article 8(1) and 
whether or not interference with these rights can be justified on the basis of children’s 
best interests (under Article 8(2), for example). The Court’s role to play is then to decide 
whether or not State intervention, including non-consensual adoption, may be regarded as 
a necessary and proportionate measure.  
 
It has been argued that the courts in England and Wales and the ECtHR, ought to 
routinely consider parental rights as well as children’s rights in non-consensual adoption 
cases which may include factors such as the child’s attachment to his or her parents and, 
where appropriate, a consideration of the child’s wishes and feelings. It is argued that 
these are relevant factors and may, influence whether or not less restrictive alternatives to 
adoption should be chosen. The cases considered in Chapter 3 showed that the ECtHR 
held that there had been violations of parental rights under ECHR Article 8 and that less 
restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption should have been chosen (see Pontes 
v. Portugal,
940
 R.M.S. v. Spain,
941
 and Zhou v. Italy
942
).  
 
This chapter considers two key decisions on non-consensual adoption originally heard in 
the UK and subsequently taken to the ECtHR (R and H v. UK
943
 and Y.C. v. UK
944
). It is 
argued, in the light of these cases, that the domestic courts and the Court of Human 
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Rights ought to refer to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
order to assess what is in the best interests of children. It is also argued that a fresh 
assessment of the best interests principle and the availability of less restrictive (and 
potentially equally effective) alternatives to non-consensual adoption ought to form part 
of the reasoning of the domestic courts and of the ECtHR. 
 
6.2 Two UK Adoption Cases in the European Court of Human Rights 
6.2.1 R and H v. UK 
 
R and H v. UK
945
 concerned an adoption which had originated in Northern Ireland. The 
final appeal was heard in the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court in the UK) which 
is the final court of appeal in the land for Northern Ireland as well as England and Wales. 
Thus, even though the adoption law is different in Northern Ireland, this case is important 
to this thesis because it nonetheless forms part of the law on England and Wales and may 
be relevant in cases where the Court considers non-consensual adoptions under the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002. This case also provides an example of how subsequent 
analysis on an adoption case heard in the highest court in England and Wales has been 
approached by the ECtHR. 
 
In this case, the applicants were the biological parents of N, a baby girl, who was born in 
April 2002. The mother had a history of alcohol problems and was admitted to an 
addictions centre after the birth of N (who was removed after birth) and attended a 
parenting centre with N for assessment purposes. The reports were positive and the 
applicants were allowed to take N home. However, the mother subsequently returned to 
her drinking and asked for assistance from Social Services because she was unable to care 
for her children. N was again taken into care by social workers from Down Lisburn 
Health and Social Services Trust on a voluntary basis and placed with foster carers. The 
mother had three other children who were placed in trust accommodation but who were 
eventually returned to their mother. N’s care plan was that she would remain with foster 
parents in the short term, but in the long term, she would be freed for adoption. A kinship 
assessment was made of N’s maternal grandmother but it was decided that the placement 
with her would not be appropriate. On 31 May, 2005 it was determined that adoption was 
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in N’s best interests because it was unlikely that the mother would remain abstinent from 
alcohol and because of the mother’s failure to prioritise the needs of her children and 
herself over those of her partner. The judge accordingly made the freeing order requested 
by the authorities.  
 
The applicants took their case to the ECtHR and argued violations of Article 6 (the right 
to a fair hearing) and Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life). It was 
argued under Article 6(1) that conducting freeing order proceedings deprived the parents 
of the opportunity to participate in the later adoption order proceedings, which breached 
their right to a fair hearing. In terms of the substantive aspect of Article 8, it was argued 
that the freeing order was a disproportionate interference with their rights because the 
national authorities had not kept the family situation under review and had not given 
sufficient consideration to kinship assessments for N. The applicants also argued that the 
reasons for the freeing order provided by the trial judge were neither relevant nor 
sufficient because the order had been based on the prediction that the second applicant 
would be unable to abstain from drinking alcohol, a prediction that she disputed. The 
applicants drew attention to the fact that they had subsequently had another child, O, who 
had not been the subject of care proceedings since birth and with respect to whom no 
concerns had been expressed about his welfare. They also argued via the procedural 
aspect of Article 8, that it was procedurally improper to make a freeing order in advance 
of an adoption order and was disproportionate in the light of the mother’s lengthy period 
of sobriety. The Court considered the arguments presented by the applicants and held that 
there had been no violations of Articles 6 or 8. 
 
The Court did not consider the argument that the freeing order prevented the couple from 
participating in the adoption proceedings within the scope of Article 6(1); but instead 
dealt with it as part of the Court’s analysis of the procedural requirements of Article 8. 
The question for the Court was whether the removal and adoption struck a fair balance 
between the parents’ right to have a relationship and contact with N on the one hand and 
N’s best interests in being protected from harm on the other.946 The Court considered the 
relationship between the parents’ Article 8 right and the best interests of the child. In 
doing so, it examined the earlier child abduction case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. 
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Switzerland
947
 which stated that the child’s best interests should be treated as paramount 
even where they clash with the rights of the parent. In R and H, the Court held that the 
principles in Neulinger were of general application and could be applied to cases 
concerning custody and adoption proceedings. In Neulinger, it was proposed that there 
are two limbs to be applied when determining the child’s best interests: 1) ‘the child’s ties 
with its family must be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved 
particularly unfit, 2) ‘it is clearly also in the child’s interest to ensure its development in a 
sound environment, and a parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such measures 
taken as would harm the child’s health and development’.948  
 
The Court observed that the State had a wide margin of appreciation in matters pertaining 
to the best interests of the child. However, despite this wide margin, the Court noted that 
as adoption had the effect of depriving biological parents of their parental responsibilities, 
then adoption should be authorised only in exceptional circumstances and would be 
justified only if the adoption was in the child’s best interests.949 In this case, the Court 
deferred to the UK Court in determining what measure was in the child’s best interests. 
Leaving the State to determine both the best interests and the appropriate measure to be 
taken in pursuit of the child’s best interests without further scrutiny is in keeping with the 
wide margin of appreciation. However, it seems to differ from the approach envisaged in 
Neulinger, which allows the Court of Human Rights to perform its own best interests 
analysis, which has been acknowledged as being of general application in all cases 
concerning the child’s best interests.950  
 
In terms of the procedural aspect of Article 8, which requires fairness in decision-making 
relating to Article 8 rights, the Court emphasised that this principle applies ‘with greater 
force when those proceedings may culminate in a child being taken away from her 
biological parents and placed for adoption’.951 On the facts, however, no Article 8 
violation was found. The applicants had been legally represented, had been able to 
participate, and to make their views known and there were practical reasons for the two-
stage procedure involving first the freeing and then the adoption of their child. The Court 
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observed that freeing orders were not made lightly and that well-defined criteria tended to 
be applied. Although it was noted that it would be more advantageous to biological 
parents if they were able to participate in adoption proceedings, ultimately, weighing this 
against the right of the child, meant that ‘the interests of the biological parents must 
inevitably give way to that of the child’.952  
 
The Court was unable to conclude that the process was unfair or that Social Services and 
the UK Court had failed to provide sufficient protection to the parents’ interests. In 
balancing the interests of the child against those of the parents, the State had acted in a 
manner which was proportionate to the aim of protecting the welfare of the child. The 
mother’s problem with alcohol was cited as a reason for N to be freed for adoption, rather 
than being returned to her parents. The Court accepted this as a relevant and sufficient 
reason for rejecting the applicants’ submission against the freeing order and held that 
there was no violation of Article 8. 
 
The Court decided that ‘exceptional circumstances’ justified N’s removal into care and 
her subsequent adoption without parental consent. As considered in Chapter 3, however, 
it is not difficult to establish the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’, which will in 
the eyes of the Court justify a removal and placement of a child for adoption (see Section 
3.5.3). However, on the facts, when N had been removed into care she had suffered very 
serious neglect
953
 which arguably engaged her right to freedom from torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment under ECHR Article 3. It is not disputed that the initial State 
intervention was justified but it is at least questionable as to whether non-consensual 
adoption was necessary and proportionate. 
 
It has been suggested in Section 3.5 that a number of factors may be relevant in 
determining whether or not a non-consensual adoption may be regarded as a necessary 
and proportionate measure. In the first instance, the child entered into the care system 
with the mother’s consent. In the second instance, based on the facts, there was 
recognisable neglect which warranted State intervention. The State had provided 
assistance initially to the parents, but once N had been taken into care a second time, it 
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was determined that adoption was in her best interests. In part, this seems to have been 
based on the ‘complex problems’954 of two of N’s older siblings, who were considered to 
be ‘extremely disturbed and damaged young people’.955 However, one of the older 
siblings had not been as seriously affected by the mother’s issues and the mother and N’s 
father were raising O effectively, which suggests that the mother had worked hard to 
address her issues and was able to parent effectively.  
 
As considered above, the mother’s alcohol problem was the main reason used to argue 
against N’s return and suggest that she was at risk of harm. However, this was never 
argued in relation to a subsequent child, O, who had never been subject to care 
proceedings. If anything, the facts seem to suggest that the mother’s circumstances had in 
fact changed and that her continued sobriety had enabled her to raise all of her children 
without the need for support from the State. Further measures of State intervention could 
have been appropriate here and that practical assistance (such as ongoing alcohol 
rehabilitation, therapy or support from social workers) may have addressed concerns 
about future relapses of the mother. Furthermore, while the trial judge had been 
concerned about history repeating itself’ on the part of the mother, the Court of Appeal 
was less pessimistic in this regard.
956
  
 
The ECtHR appeared to place little weight on particular factors which suggested that the 
parents were able to raise N. These factors were the parents’ ability to raise O, who was 
born after N as well as N’s three half-siblings. Another relevant factor which ought to 
have been considered in more depth was the attachments which had been observed during 
contact sessions between N and her parents. The Court simply described the existence of 
this fact as ‘instructive’957 and stated that the national authority was entitled to focus on 
N’s individual needs and interests, although the ECtHR did not articulate what these 
needs and interests were and how they had been best served by adoption. It could be 
argued here, that the national authorities should have considered the impact that the 
adoption would have had on N’s right to know and be cared for her parents under 
UNCRC Article 7. The Court should also have considered how an adoption prevented N 
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from being raised with her three half-siblings and her full sibling O. These considerations 
could have been weighed against any potential detriment to N if her mother were to 
resume her alcohol addiction. Even if the ECtHR had still ultimately agreed with the 
State’s decision, by providing a detailed assessment of the N’s best interests it would 
have sent a clear message to Member States as to which factors should be emphasised in 
an assessment of best interests.  
  
In determining the best interests of N, once the national authorities had decided that she 
could not be returned into her parents’ care, they only examined one possible alternative 
to adoption which was placing the child with her grandparents. The ECtHR considered 
this and concluded that Social Services had been justified in rejecting the kinship 
placement with the grandmother, based on the allegations of indecent assault made 
against the grandfather many years before. However, the Court failed to consider the 
possibility of other less restrictive, but equally effective, alternatives which might have 
achieved a better balance between the protection of the best interests and the rights of N 
on the one hand (i.e. to be protected from harm under Article 3 and to have a relationship 
with her parent under Article 8) and her parents’ Article 8 rights on the other hand. Here, 
long-term foster care may have been beneficial as N would have maintained the legal 
relationship with her birth family and it would have protected N from the potential impact 
of her mother’s alcohol abuse, if she were to suffer another lapse. However, it would not 
necessarily have been as equally effective as non-consensual adoption. 
 
Although the decision in R and H v. UK was not necessarily the wrong one, it is arguable 
that the Court’s reasoning and analysis could have been better. The analysis would have 
been stronger if the ECtHR had provided a more in-depth examination of whether 
adoption is the most proportionate measure in the light of rights-based considerations 
(under the UNCRC for example) or whether other less restrictive measures could provide 
a the grandmother was considered but this option was rejected. Furthermore, despite the 
parents’ ability to raise O, a full sibling of N, it was decided by the Court of Appeal that it 
was in N’s best interests to be adopted. Although the ECtHR reiterated that the State is 
not required to undertake endless measures to reunite children and parents, it is suggested 
that there were viable alternatives to adoption here which would have served N’s interests 
equally well as adoption and would have afforded better protection to N’s Article 8 right 
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to have a relationship with her parents and siblings (and her UNCRC rights to know and 
be cared for by her parents under Article 7, for example).  
 
The Court accepted the domestic court’s assessment that adoption was in N’s best 
interests, without considering how N’s rights may have been affected or how these best 
interests and rights were linked with her parents’ rights. In fact, N not only lost the legal 
tie with her birth parents and siblings but also lost the opportunity to be raised within her 
birth family even though her parents were capable of caring for her (arguably an 
important right which is protected under UNCRC Article 7). Based on N’s continued 
relationship with her parents and siblings, it may have been possible for her to have been 
reintegrated into her family. Even though it may have been possible to have reunited N 
with her birth parents, the question is whether or not this would have been an equally 
effective alternative to non-consensual adoption?  
 
Interestingly, despite the fact that there was no Article 8 violation in respect of the 
aforementioned arguments, the Court considered the issue of post-adoption contact in 
some depth. In R and H, the parents were concerned that there would be no contact with 
N after the adoption and it was one reason why the parents refused to consent to N’s 
adoption. Expert witness, Professor Triseliotis had made submissions to the Court that 
direct contact between N and her parents would be beneficial and that direct contact 
should have been sought. The Court agreed that the parents were justified in refusing to 
agree to adoption without knowledge of whether contact would occur. However, one 
factor which may have influenced the Court was an unusual feature in this case which 
was that post-adoption contact was still ongoing at the time the case was heard, even 
though there was no specific legal order in place to enforce this contact.  
 
It could be argued that a contact order might have provided some protection for N and her 
parents’ Article 8 right to maintain their relationship, as a fear of loss of contact was the 
main reason why the parents disputed the adoption. It has been argued in this thesis (see 
for example Section 5.5) that in some cases non-consensual adoption with direct contact 
may be an effective way of striking the balance between protecting children’s rights and 
best interests on the one hand and parental rights on the other. However, in R and H v. 
UK while the parents were given assurances by the local authorities that contact would 
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continue, no formal court order was in place which protected N and her parents’ mutual 
right to contact. 
 
It is interesting that there were some dissenting judgments in this case: one in the ECtHR 
and the other in the House of Lords. The brief dissenting judgment of Judge Kalaydjieva 
in the ECtHR referred to Lady Hale’s dissenting judgment in the House of Lords. Lady 
Hale had questioned: ‘whether it is necessary and proportionate to sever the links with the 
family of birth if a new (adoptive) family has not yet been identified’.958 Judge 
Kalaydjieva held that freeing orders helped authorities to search for prospective adopters 
but they did not 1) provide a proper assessment of the child’s best interests or 2) provide 
an assessment of the parents’ rights and how they would be impacted by the freeing order 
and the likelihood of a subsequent adoption order.  
 
Simmonds has suggested that R and H v. UK demonstrates that the Court is placing a 
greater weight on children’s rights in the field of child protection and adoption than in 
other areas of child law. She has argued that in contrast to relocation cases (such as 
Neulinger), for example, the ECtHR does not conduct a substantive analysis of the 
content or the weight to be given to the child’s best interests.959 Simmonds argues that 
children’s rights are better protected due to the Court’s acknowledgement of paramountcy 
in cases such as R and H v. UK. She claims that the ECtHR protects parents’ rights in 
contact, residence and relocation cases but that it is ‘happy to side-line parental rights’ in 
child protection and adoption cases. Nonetheless, she has approved of the paramountcy 
approach taken by the Court and has suggested that ECtHR rulings now ‘comply more 
fully’ with the UNCRC as far as adoption is concerned,960 in contrast to the approach in 
the earlier case of Johansen v. Norway
961
 which involved balancing the interests of the 
child in remaining in care on the one hand and the parents’ interest in being reunited with 
their children on the other. 
 
While Simmonds has observed that the Court has side-lined parental rights in child 
protection and adoption cases, she has emphasised that these cases provide increased 
                                                          
958
 Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust and another (AP) (Respondents) v. H (AP) and another 
(AP) (Appellants) (Northern Ireland) [2006] UKHL 36. 
959
 Claire Simmonds ‘Paramountcy and the ECHR: A Conflict Resolved?’ [2012] 71 CLJ 448 at 500. 
960
 Ibid at 501.  
961
 (Application no. 17383/90) 7 August 1996. 
212 
 
protection for children’s rights. However, it can be argued that not only did the Court in R 
and H v. UK fail to consider N’s rights (e.g. under Articles 5, 7, 8 and 9) but it also failed 
to give sufficient consideration to her best interests because of the narrow approach it 
took in accepting that adoption was the best option at the time for N. The evidence 
suggested that N had formed a good relationship with her birth parents and family and 
that loss of contact had the potential to be distressing for her. Adoption would also have 
had the effect of severing the legal ties with a full sibling who remained with their 
parents, as well as half-siblings. Because of the existence of the facts mentioned above, 
weighing these up alongside the other considerations of the Court, it can be argued that 
adoption might not have been in N’s best interests. Furthermore, if N’s rights had been 
considered by the Court, perhaps it would have given greater consideration to the 
importance of protecting the legal tie between N and her birth parents and her 
relationships with her wider birth family. As was mentioned above, N’s parents were 
allowed to look after a younger full sibling O, who had never been subject to care 
proceedings.  
 
While it was necessary and proportionate to remove N from her parents’ care, it is 
arguable that freeing N for adoption (which had the effect of severing the legal tie 
between N and her birth parents) may not have been proportionate to the aim of 
protecting N’s best interests which appeared to include maintaining contact with her birth 
parents. Here, it would have been appropriate for the Court to have considered less 
restrictive measures which still would have had the effect of protecting N’s best interests, 
such as long-term foster care with a contact order in place enabling N to maintain a 
relationship with her birth parents. This case is an acute demonstration of the Court’s 
tendency to shy away from considering whether adoption itself is proportionate, 
seemingly regarding it as falling within the wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
domestic authorities in cases of this nature. It also demonstrates that despite stressing the 
importance of post-adoption contact (of which Social Services had managed to arrange in 
this case), the Court did not assert that the child has the right to post-adoption contact 
despite the benefits that can be derived from this arrangement. These benefits can include 
the contribution that post-adoption contact may have to the child’s identity development 
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and the atmosphere of trust and openness which may be created with the adoptive parents 
due to the open lines of communication with birth parents.
962
  
 
6.2.2 Y.C. v. UK 
 
This was the first case to be heard by the European Court of Human Rights involving a 
non-consensual adoption in England made under the Adoption and Children Act 2002. 
Y.C. was the mother of K, a boy, and P.C. was her partner. The three of them had lived 
together until reports of domestic violence and Social Services intervention led to the 
removal of K (then aged 7) by way of an emergency protection order under the Children 
Act 1989. In foster care, K seemed stable and content and the local authority (on the basis 
of recommendations by a psychologist) proposed that K’s best interests would be best 
served by adoption. Y.C. sought to address the local authority’s concerns; namely that her 
relationship with P.C. was abusive, that witnessing and intervening in domestic violence 
had been traumatic for K, and that Y.C’s own behaviour was affected adversely by 
drinking, thereby impacting on K. She gave up drinking alcohol, ended the relationship 
with P.C and found a new property to live in. She sought to be the sole carer of K, in the 
light of these new circumstances, but the UK courts refused to perform a fresh parenting 
assessment to see if K could be safely placed with her because it had been decided that it 
was in K’s best interests to be placed for adoption.  
 
By the time that the facts had reached the ECtHR, the applicant had accepted that the 
passage of time rendered adoption the best option for her son. She nonetheless, alleged 
that her Article 8 right to respect for private and family life had been violated for two 
main reasons. The first was that the UK courts had not assessed her as a sole carer for K. 
The second was that the UK courts had failed to take into account all of the relevant 
considerations when making the placement order, preceding the adoption, which meant 
that no reasoned argument had been provided for making the adoption order which 
permanently severed the links between Y.C and K.  
 
The ECtHR was satisfied that Y.C’s Article 8 right was engaged in respect of both her 
arguments. The Court agreed that refusal of the assessment did constitute an interference 
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with Article 8 but the decisive issue was one of the ‘necessity and proportionality of the 
measure’.963 The Court had to consider whether, in the light of the case, as a whole, the 
measures were ‘relevant and sufficient’964 (the substantive aspect of Article 8) and 
whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s 
rights (the procedural aspect of Article 8).
965
 The best interests of the child were regarded 
as paramount in cases concerning the permanent severance of ties between parent and 
child. Identifying the child’s best interests and performing the proportionality assessment 
depended on considering a number of non-exhaustive factors, including those contained 
in the CA 1989, s1(3) and the ACA 2002, s1(4).  
 
The first argument on the assessment of Y.C as a sole carer was interwoven with the 
second argument concerning lack of procedural safeguards. The first argument was 
dismissed because it was in K’s best interests to ensure the existence of a stable and 
secure environment for him to live in. The Court took the view that another assessment 
would not have been in K’s best interests because it would threaten the stability of his 
existing arrangements. The ECtHR accepted the national authorities’ conclusion that any 
assessment made would not have had an impact on the decision to make a care order, 
which would have been made in any event.  
 
The second argument involved a close examination of the procedure which led to the 
placement order being made. The domestic court (the Family Proceedings Court) had to 
consider an application for a care order and a placement order for K. The Court made an 
interim care order with a direction for a further assessment. In doing so, no specific 
reference was made to the Children Act 1989, s1(3), although reference was made to the 
CA 1989, s31(2) with an indication that the ‘threshold’ criteria were met. The local 
authority and K’s Guardian appealed against the Court’s direction ordering that the 
assessment take place and sought a final care order and a placement order. The County 
Court held that the Family Proceedings Court was mistaken in not making a final care 
order but the County Court made no reference to the ACA 2002, s1(4) welfare checklist. 
There was also no reference to Article 8 or to the rights of the parents and children. The 
judge stated that the conditions needed for making a care order existed, and therefore 
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approved the placement order. Despite the fact that the County Court judge had made no 
reference to the s1(4) welfare checklist, the appeal courts in the UK accepted that it was a 
finely balanced case and that the County Court judge had applied his mind to the 
checklist.
966
  
 
The ECtHR asserted that the lack of direct reference to or consideration of s1(4) could 
have been remedied by Y.C requesting clarification from the judge. She was invited to do 
so by the County Court judge,
967
 but it is unclear from the facts of the case why she did 
not seek further clarification from the judge as to his reasons for making the placement 
order. Furthermore, the ECtHR was satisfied that as the threshold for making a care order 
had been met, it was satisfactory to make a placement order without a care order in place 
on the basis that the UK had a margin of appreciation to do so. The approach of the 
ECtHR was to hold that it was irrelevant that the usual procedure had not been followed 
on the basis that the outcome would have been the same in any event. A care order would 
have been made. The ECtHR concluded that there had been no violation of Article 8. The 
Court also held that the welfare checklist under s1(4) of the ACA 2002 broadly reflected 
elements in assessing necessity under Article 8(2).  
 
Ifezu and Rajabali have argued that the decision in Y.C v. UK shows that the ECtHR 
approves of the approach in English Law which ‘reflects a substantial shift in its attitude 
toward children, at least in cases concerning adoption’.968 However, it can be argued that 
certain aspects of the judgment are unsatisfactory. Thus, for example, the Court did not 
consider the lack of procedural safeguards for the parents which were available in this 
case. Y.C v. UK has been subject to approval by the UK Supreme Court which regarded 
the case as providing some clearer guidance. In ANS and another v. ML (AP) 
(Scotland)
969
 (a non-consensual adoption case discussed in Chapter 4) where the Supreme 
Court opined that Y.C made it clear that the factors laid down in the welfare checklist in 
the ACA 2002 were factors considered when determining the proportionality of making 
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an order. In ANS, Lord Carnwath stressed the importance of both Y.C and the earlier 
Neulinger decision, and stated that there is:  
 
‘…currently a broad consensus – including in international law – in support of the 
idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be 
paramount…’
970
  
 
The two-limb test which was first articulated in Neulinger
971
 was referred to in Y.C v. 
UK
972
 but, as Lord Carnwath pointed out, there is some inconsistency within the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.
973
 In other words, Y.C seemed to demonstrate that these two limbs were to 
be considerations borne in mind rather than fixed tests to be applied in each case.
974
 The 
approaches in these cases therefore differ with the approach in Y.C v. UK indicating that 
there was flexibility as to whether or not the test should be applied whereas Neulinger 
seemed to suggest that these two limbs must be applied in cases concerning the rights and 
best interests of children. In Neulinger, the ECtHR has arguably and potentially given 
itself the power to look more closely at the substance of decisions made in adoption 
proceedings.  
 
The problem is that adoption may be regarded by the ECtHR as quite a different factual 
context from that of Neulinger which was a case involving international child abduction 
and which may be fact-specific. The above interpretation of Neulinger and the approach 
taken in adoption cases is supported by Simmonds who argues that, despite the approach 
taken in Neulinger, the Court had nonetheless been moving towards a ‘paramountcy’ 
approach in the context of adoption proceedings whereby children’s best interests take 
precedence over those of their parents.
975
 It is argued in this thesis that although the 
ECtHR must defer to national authorities and respect their greater knowledge and 
possession of the facts in any given case, performing its own best interests assessment in 
adoption cases would have the benefit of encouraging courts at all levels to provide a 
more detailed analysis of the child’s best interests in such cases.     
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With respect to the facts in Y.C. v. UK, the UK courts placed a great deal of emphasis on 
the stability that K was offered via adoption. However, this was not weighed against other 
considerations, such as K’s close relationship with his mother. When analysing the 
decision of the County Court, the ECtHR did not examine the extent to which the rights 
of K were considered by that court or the lack of weight that was placed on K’s apparent 
bond with his mother and suggestions that the child had expressed a desire to return home 
to his mother. The decision shows that the ECtHR adopts a rather deferential approach to 
the national courts without the detailed scrutiny that might be considered to be 
appropriate in cases where the consequences flowing from this alleged rights violation are 
so severe, namely the permanent severance of the legal tie between a boy and his birth 
parents.  
 
As Sloan has observed, the Court of Human Rights in Y.C ‘saw no incompatibility 
between assertions’976 that the child’s best interests are paramount and that ‘family ties 
may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and . . . everything must be done 
to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to “rebuild” the family’.977 In the 
light of these important principles, it is arguable that the ECtHR should have conducted a 
more thorough analysis of the facts and of K’s best interests and rights. Judge De 
Gaetano, in Y.C. v. UK, gave a dissenting judgment in which he emphasised that the 
consequences of adoption warranted a greater protection of rights and that safeguards 
were needed to prevent improper interference with rights: 
 
‘[T]here can be no more draconian measure in the context of the relationship 
between parent and child than an order which permanently severs family ties. The 
need for safeguards against arbitrary, or even merely unjustified or unnecessary 
interference, is compelling…’
978
  
 
He was of the view that Article 8 had been violated because the UK courts had failed to 
take into account relevant considerations (such as the child’s age and his attachment to 
his mother) and had not provided a reasoned judgment. He described the placement order 
as being made in a very ‘unorthodox’ way and he expressed his distaste for the ‘cavalier’ 
way in which the Court of Appeal had refused to give the mother permission to appeal. 
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He was highly dissatisfied with the analysis of the UK courts and the fact that no 
reference had been made either to the Article 8 rights of the child and parents or the 
principle of proportionality.
979
 He also disapproved of the ECtHR’s decision to concede 
to the UK’s margin of appreciation in this matter. He referred to Saviny v. Ukraine980 in 
order to emphasise the severity of severing family ties, despite States enjoying a margin 
of appreciation: 
 
‘…not withstanding a margin of appreciation enjoyed by domestic authorities in 
deciding on placing a child into public care, severing family ties means cutting a 
child off from its roots, which can only be justified in very exceptional 
circumstances…’
981
  
 
He also suggested that there had been insufficient consideration given to the age of K, 
who was not a newborn or a young child but an 8-year-old boy who had lived with his 
parents from birth. The age of the child in this case seems particularly relevant as most 
cases concerning adoption tend to involve younger children who will have little or no 
memory of their birth parents (as seen in R and H v. UK above and most of the cases 
referred to in Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Although the best interests of K were considered by 
the domestic courts and by the ECtHR, it seems that the analysis was narrowly confined 
to factors proposed by the UK (i.e. his stability and security) rather than to overt 
reference being made to the bonds that existed between K and his mother (who were 
described as having a good relationship), the possibility of the grief that K might suffer as 
a consequence of the adoption and considerations of identity and relationships with his 
wider birth family.  
 
Fenton-Glynn argues that the decision in Y.C. demonstrates that paramountcy is no longer 
so ‘alien’ to the ECtHR.982 She argues that the decision in Y.C. demonstrates that a 
greater weight has been given to children’s rights in the area of child protection and 
adoption as there is no longer a strict balancing process
983
 or a vigorous analysis of the 
proportionality of a measure (such as adoption) and that there is no substantive analysis 
of the content or weight of the best interests by the ECtHR.
984
 The author of this thesis 
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respectfully disagrees with Fenton-Glynn’s argument that greater weight has been given 
to children’s rights on the basis that the ECtHR failed to consider K’s relationship rights 
with Y.C under ECHR Article 8 or other potentially applicable rights under the UNCRC 
(such as Articles 7, 8 and 9) in the light of his attachment to his mother and expressed 
wishes to maintain contact with her. Furthermore, K’s adoption was arguably not a 
necessary measure to protect his rights under UNCRC Articles 6 and 19, and under 
UNCRC Article 21 it could be said that considering the gravity of the measure that a 
greater analysis was required than the bare welfare test applied by the domestic courts 
(see also Section 2.3.3 and 2.3.5).  
 
However, Fenton-Glynn has rightly argued that the same is not true in respect of the 
views of the child. She claims that, in this area, children have not been helped by the 
‘conservative jurisprudence’ of the ECtHR. She has further observed that in Europe there 
is no clear consensus on at what age children should (if at all) be able to consent to 
adoption, of the weight to be given to their views in the context of adoption proceedings, 
or if they should be given any weight at all.
985
 The importance of the voice of the child in 
court proceedings (see Chapter 2) is emphasised in UNCRC Article 12 (the child’s right 
to be heard) but at the domestic level in the UK and in the ECtHR, there was very little 
discussion of K’s wishes. The ECtHR simply affirmed the English Court’s best interests 
assessments, without considering the child’s wishes, even though a child’s wishes may 
form part of an assessment of best interests under the law in England and Wales.
986
  
 
In general, whereas society and the courts are increasingly placing more emphasis on 
ascertaining the wishes of the child,
987
 Y.C v. UK shows that there is insufficient 
consideration of the voice of the child at ECtHR level in the context of adoption 
proceedings.
988
 Considering the age of K, even though there was no legal requirement to 
listen to his opinion, it is suggested in this thesis that his thoughts and feelings should 
have been an important consideration in determining his future because of his age and his 
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likely ability to understand the consequences of his adoption. Although it has been 
acknowledged by Gilmore and Herring, that the greater the weight that is attached to 
children’s perceptions, the greater the likelihood that children may be manipulated into 
saying what adults want them to say, they have argued that the benefits of listening to 
children may outweigh potential fears that they may be manipulated.
989
 Y.C. v. UK is a 
case where it would have been appropriate to have listened to the views of K and to have 
attached some weight to them.  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the Court ought to have undertaken a more thorough 
analysis of less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption as it did in cases such 
as Pontes v. Portugal,
990
 R.M.S. v. Spain,
991
 Zhou v. Italy,
992
 and SH v. Italy.
993
 While 
none of these cases involved a child witnessing domestic violence, SH v. Italy did involve 
a mother who faced difficulty in parenting her children due to mental illness. In this case, 
the Court held that the State ought to have continued to offer State assistance, a less 
restrictive alternative to removal for adoption. With respect to Y.C. v. UK, it is argued that 
the potential detriment to K in being adopted might have outweighed the benefits that he 
would have obtained from the arrangement. It is also argued that the Court of Human 
Rights in Y.C v. UK should have taken more cognisance of the fact that K was aged eight 
and was likely to have a strong sense of identity vis-à-vis his birth family, an important 
right which is protected by UNCRC Article 8 and relevant in the context of this right 
since the adoption resulted in the legal severance of K between him and his mother and 
the loss of his de facto relationship with her. Furthermore, his strong attachment to his 
mother meant that it would be potentially more difficult for him to adjust to an adoption 
placement than a younger child or a child of the same age with a weaker attachment to a 
parent.  
 
Therefore, in the light of these considerations it could be argued, for example, that the 
State could have made more concerted efforts to see if K could have been safely placed 
with his mother, who had separated from her partner, and wanted to be considered as a 
sole carer. It is possible that with State assistance, for example, in the form of therapeutic 
                                                          
989
 Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring, ‘Listening to Children… whatever’ [2014] 130 LQR 531. 
990
 (Application no. 19554/09) 10 April 2012. 
991
 (Application no. 28775/12) 18 June 2013. 
992
 (Application no. 33773/11) 21 January 2014. 
993
 (Application no. 52557/14) 13 October 2015. 
221 
 
support and visits from social workers, that such a placement could have worked. 
Alternatively, a special guardianship order could have been considered, as it was 
envisaged by the government in England and Wales as a less restrictive alternative to 
adoption for older children for whom it would be desirable to maintain legal ties with the 
birth family.
994
 A special guardianship order (see Section 5.4) would have allowed Y.C to 
retain her status as the legal parent of K and respected the bond between Y.C and K, 
while ensuring certainty for K. Thus it is argued (as considered in Section 2.3.5) that less 
restrictive (and potentially equally effective) measures could have been undertaken to 
protect K’s rights under UNCRC Articles 6 and 19 and his right to freedom from torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment under ECHR Article 3.  
6.4 Conclusion 
 
It is beneficial and in line with the approach taken by most domestic courts and 
international law for the ECtHR to place emphasis on the best interests of the child. 
However, doing so in conjunction with allowing a wide margin of appreciation to 
Member States in determining these best interests acts as a disservice to both children and 
parents because, as considered in R and H v. UK and Y.C. v. UK, will automatically mean 
that State measures with regard to non-consensual adoption are likely to be justified. It is 
suggested that best interests is one aspect of children’s rights (see for example, UNCRC 
Article 3) but that the interests of children would actually be better protected by the 
ECtHR if it also considered children’s rights in adoption cases (both under ECHR Article 
8 and under the UNCRC). Although the Court is not compelled to consider the rights of 
children in adoption cases when they have not been argued before the Court, it is argued 
that examining the rights of children would improving the reasoning of both the ECtHR 
judgments and potentially domestic court judgments. A clear articulation of the rights of 
children in cases like those discussed above would enrich case law on children’s rights 
and might, in the words of Van Bueren, even act as a ‘catalyst’995 for vicarious protection 
of the rights of other family members, including parents.  
 
It can be concluded that the Court of Human Rights has shown more deference to the UK 
authorities in R and H v. UK and Y.C v. UK than it has to other national authorities in 
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cases concerning non-consensual adoption (considered in this Chapter and also in 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5). In other words, the Court has been openly critical of many adoption 
proceedings which originated in other Member States and has placed more emphasis on 
the use of State assistance and need for less restrictive alternatives. Despite the fact that 
the Court of Human Rights has the discretion to provide an in-depth assessment of 
children’s best interests, based on the authority of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland 
and also, R and H v. UK, the Court chose not to do so in the cases discussed in this 
chapter. If it had undertaken a best interests assessment in these cases, it would have 
improved the quality of the Court’s reasoning and it would also have afforded greater 
protection to children’s and parents’ rights in adoption cases. It has been argued that due 
to the severity and permanence of adoption, that it would be appropriate for the Court to 
provide a more in-depth consideration of children’s best interests in adoption cases.  
 
In particular, it is suggested that the Court ought to have given more consideration to the 
potential availability of less restrictive alternatives in these cases. In fact, less restrictive 
alternatives were available in both cases, although with regard to R and H v. UK it is 
difficult to assess whether or not the alternatives (returning N to her parents or placing 
her with her grandparents) would have been equally effective to protect N’s welfare and 
rights. In contrast, it is argued that Y.C. v. UK is a non-consensual adoption which was 
neither necessary nor proportionate as alternatives (namely special guardianship or the 
child being returned to his mother as a sole carer) would have been equally effective.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes this thesis on the proportionality of non-consensual adoption by 
providing an overview of the thesis, an analysis of its main research findings and 
suggestions for further research.  
7.1 An Overview 
 
This thesis has examined the proportionality of the law on non-consensual adoption in 
England and Wales under the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The purpose behind this 
thesis has been to determine the circumstances in which a non-consensual adoption may 
(or may not) be regarded as a proportionate measure. In doing so, this thesis has referred 
to relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and has considered the 
importance of the best interests (or welfare) principle. This thesis has considered how 
ECHR and UNCRC rights as well as European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
jurisprudence could assist in determining when non-consensual adoption would be the 
least restrictive measure available and the circumstances in which alternatives might be 
more proportionate.  
 
In performing this analysis, the thesis has explained and assessed the approach taken by 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, the UK Supreme Court 
and by the ECtHR in cases where children have been adopted without parental consent. 
Thus, this thesis has examined whether or not non-consensual adoption has been the least 
restrictive measure which could have been chosen. In doing so, it has discussed the 
alternatives to non-consensual adoption which may have been as equally effective as non-
consensual adoption and which may also have amounted to less of an interference with 
children’s and parents’ rights, not only under ECHR Article 8, but also under the UNCRC 
(e.g. Articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20 and 21).  
 
This thesis has argued that the approach towards less restrictive alternatives to non-
consensual adoption is underdeveloped and that greater clarity and a consistent use of the 
proportionality principle are needed to provide optimal protection for children’s and 
parents’ rights. This thesis has considered how the proportionality principle can be 
applied in cases where alternatives to adoption may be available and has distinguished 
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between cases where children can be returned to their parents safely and cases where 
children cannot be returned to them.  
 
7.2 Main Research Findings 
 
The main findings from this research are based on an analysis of the relevant legislation 
and case law relating to the issue of non-consensual adoption. In particular, the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights has been of crucial importance when assessing 
the circumstances in which non-consensual adoption might, or might not be, a 
proportionate measure. In non-consensual adoption cases, such as R.M.S. v. Spain,
996
 
Zhou v. Italy
997
 and Pontes v. Portugal,
998
 the ECtHR observed that less restrictive 
alternatives were available to the State, but that despite the existence of these alternatives, 
the national authorities in these cases nonetheless chose to place the children for adoption 
without parental consent (see Chapter 3). An important conclusion reached by the ECtHR 
in these cases was the importance of providing State assistance (such as financial or 
practical assistance including housing and support from social workers) to ensure that the 
States in question satisfied their positive obligations under ECHR Article 8 to reunite the 
children with their parents (see Section 3.4.5). These decisions make it clear that the State 
is compelled to use financial and practical resources to attempt to reunite children and 
parents, where this is possible. The difficulty is that, due to the loosely defined nature of 
Member States’ positive obligation under Article 8, it is unclear the extent to which 
national authorities must actively assist and support families in staying together before 
determining that it is in a child’s best interests to be removed into care and placed for 
adoption without parental consent. However, factors (such as the existence of any form of 
State intervention, the length of time for which State assistance was offered and the 
potential effectiveness of the type of State assistance offered) ought to be important 
factors which make it more or less likely that the State has satisfied its positive 
obligations under ECHR Article 8. 
 
In other words, in this thesis, it has been argued that if the State does not provide practical 
or financial assistance to families before removing children from their parents and placing 
them for adoption, this may in some cases amount to a failure of the State’s positive 
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obligation to provide assistance under ECHR Article 8. In contrast, where the State has 
intervened to protect children from harm and has provided birth parents with assistance 
which has proven to be ineffective, then in the absence of other less restrictive 
alternatives (such as kinship care) non-consensual adoption is likely to be the least 
restrictive measure available which will effectively protect a child’s welfare (see Section 
3.5 and Chapter 5).  
 
This thesis has argued that, in some cases, both kinship care and special guardianship 
may be as equally effective as adoption (see Chapter 5). Thus, kinship care may be 
appropriate to enable children to maintain relationships with their birth relatives. Kinship 
care also has the potential to protect children’s ECHR and UNCRC rights (e.g., the 
child’s right to know his or her identity under UNCRC Article 8). This thesis shows that 
social, psychological and educational outcomes for children in kinship care are 
comparable to the outcomes for children who have been adopted (see Section 5.3). This is 
a strong argument in favour of increasing the use of kinship care since, not only is it a 
potentially less restrictive alternative to non-consensual adoption, it may also protect 
children’s rights. This thesis has, however, drawn attention to the potential barriers which 
kinship carers may face in becoming carers and it has argued that these problems should 
be addressed at policy level by the government. It has been argued in this thesis therefore 
that kinship care may, in some cases, be an equally effective alternative to non-
consensual adoption as it provides greater recognition of and protection of children’s 
rights under ECHR Article 8 and UNCRC Article 8. For this reason, the UK government 
needs to invest in kinship care so as to ensure that information is available to potential 
kinship carers and so that they can readily access practical and financial support which 
they are entitled to receive (see Section 5.3.3). 
 
This thesis has acknowledged that special guardianship orders (SGOs) are also an 
important potential alternative to non-consensual adoption (see Section 5.4). SGOs are 
often made in favour of birth relatives who, as considered above, may provide care for 
children who cannot be raised by their birth parents. As considered above, the outcomes 
of kinship care are comparable to the outcomes for non-consensual adoption. Thus, it 
could be argued that SGOs made in favour of birth relatives may offer similar positive 
social, educational and psychological outcomes for children. SGOs are also ideal for 
particular groups of children such as older children or children from different cultures, 
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including cultures which may not recognise the validity of an adoption arrangement. 
Although the use of SGOs has been supported by Munby P, they are still less frequently 
used than non-consensual adoption.
999
 This is despite the potential effectiveness of SGOs 
in protecting children from harm on the one hand and protecting their rights under the 
ECHR and the UNCRC rights on the other. This thesis has also shown that there has been 
a growth in the use of concurrent planning. It has discussed the pros and cons of 
concurrent planning by reference to the Coram Concurrent Planning Project (see Section 
5.2.3). In doing so, this discussion has shown that concurrent planning has the potential to 
protect children’s and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8, provided the parenting skills 
classes and mechanisms for attempting to reunite children with their birth parents or to 
place them with other relatives, are effective.   
 
Another matter which this thesis has addressed is whether contact between parents and 
their children should be promoted more in non-consensual adoption cases (see Section 
5.5). It has been argued in this thesis that contact post-adoption might be appropriate in 
some cases, thereby rendering some non-consensual adoptions more proportionate. In 
other words, non-consensual adoption with direct contact might protect children’s best 
interests and protect their rights under UNCRC Article 8 (the right to know one’s 
identity) and prevent violations of parents’ and children’s rights under ECHR Article 8. 
This thesis has acknowledged, however, that in some cases of non-consensual adoption it 
might be contrary to children’s best interests for post-adoption contact to take place. In 
some circumstances, facilitating such contact could be traumatic, and not in children’s 
best interests and could violate their rights under the ECHR (e.g. Article 3) and under the 
UNCRC (e.g. Article 6 which protects the child’s inherent right to life and Article 19 
which concerns the child’s right to be protected from abuse). In cases where children 
openly express wishes to State officials that they do not wish to live with their parents or 
maintain contact with them, to pursue contact might also violate children’s rights (e.g. 
under UNCRC Article 12 which protects the child’s right to be heard). In cases where 
children are likely to be harmed by contact with their birth parents, less restrictive 
measures such as non-consensual adoption with direct contact or even special 
guardianship would clearly not be appropriate. 
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Despite the fact that there are circumstances where non-consensual adoption is a a 
necessary and proportionate interference with children’s and parents’ rights, there are 
circumstances where a non-consensual adoption might be regarded as a disproportionate 
measure. Such situations could include cases where parents’ circumstances have changed 
so dramatically that they have become able to parent their children, or may be able to do 
so with appropriate State assistance (see Section 5.2). In circumstances where children 
cannot be returned to their family home without harming children’s best interests (and 
potentially violating their rights under ECHR Article 3 and UNCRC Articles 6 and 19), 
this thesis has shown that it may still be possible for children to be placed in kinship care 
(see Section 5.3).  
 
Another argument put forward in this thesis is that there is insufficient discussion and 
analysis of children’s rights in the context of judicial decision-making in non-consensual 
adoption cases. Thus it has been shown that, although children’s best interests (and in 
some cases) children’s rights have been analysed by the courts in England and Wales and 
by the European Court of Human Rights, these courts are somewhat reluctant to refer 
expressly to children’s rights. Although the courts in England and Wales and on appeal 
before the UK Supreme Court refer to children’s rights in general terms, in some cases 
(e.g. In the Matter of B
1000
), they do not always explain or analyse what these rights may 
be or what State action might be required to afford protection to these rights (see Chapter 
4).  
 
It has therefore been argued in this thesis that interpreting children’s best interests in the 
light of children’s rights (including their UNCRC rights) would have a significant impact 
in non-consensual adoption proceedings. It would mean that children’s relationships with 
their parents, siblings and other relatives would be better protected in that the State 
(whether it be the courts and/or local authorities) might be more willing to consider the 
use of less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption (such as State assistance, 
kinship care or special guardianship). In other words, it has been argued that children’s 
rights under the ECHR (e.g. Articles 2, 3 and 8) and under the UNCRC ought to be 
important considerations when the courts and local authorities are determining whether or 
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not a non-consensual adoption is proportionate. Thus, instead of focusing, in the context 
of non-consensual adoption, on whether violations of parental rights can be justified on 
the basis of children’s best interests, the rights of children themselves should be taken 
into consideration when determining whether a non-consensual adoption is a 
proportionate measure. If the ECtHR was more willing to expressly consider children’s 
rights then the courts in the UK and elsewhere in Europe might be more willing to do so.  
 
Using the language of rights of children rather than children’s best interests would 
arguably ‘sharpen’ the courts’ consideration of the different parties’ interests.1001 
Referring to both the ECHR rights of parents and children and the UNCRC rights of 
children would afford greater recognition to the interests of birth parents and children. It 
would also allow for a more thorough consideration of children’s own rights to know and 
be raised by their birth parents (under UNCRC Articles 7 and 9). The UNCRC ought to 
be considered by the ECtHR and the domestic courts as it forms part of international law. 
An important aspect of the UNCRC which is crucial for the purposes of this thesis is that 
it can be implied from various UNCRC provisions that less restrictive alternatives to non-
consensual adoption ought to be chosen, where possible. This thesis has argued, in 
particular, that UNCRC Article 21 is an important right in adoption cases and requires a 
more detailed analysis beyond a bare welfare test, when domestic authorities are deciding 
whether or not a non-consensual adoption ought to take place.
1002
 In other words, a 
welfare analysis should include a consideration of important UNCRC rights such as 
Article 7 (the right to know and be cared for by one’s parents) and Article 9 (the right not 
to be separated from one’s parents). Furthermore, in the light of the indivisibility of the 
provisions of the UNCRC, it can be argued that the collective family rights which are 
protected by UNCRC Article 5 are relevant when determining whether or not an adoption 
ought to take place. In other words, key provisions in the UNCRC (including Articles 5, 
7, 8, 9, 18, 20 and 21) as well as the UN Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children 
all support the argument that both parents’ and children’s rights should be considered in 
non-consensual adoption cases, and less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual 
adoption ought to be explored and, where appropriate, implemented (see Chapter 2). 
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A particular issue in determining when less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual 
adoption may be more proportionate, is the extent to which State resources have 
influenced pro-adoption policy in England and Wales. Existing pro-adoption policy is, in 
part, based on the premise that non-consensual adoption is less expensive when compared 
with alternatives such as State assistance (see Section 5.6). This thesis has argued, 
however, that the cost of non-consensual adoption compared with other alternatives is not 
clear-cut and that further investigation needs to be undertaken to determine how cost-
effective non-consensual adoption is compared with its alternatives. Just because parents 
have failed to fulfil their duties in respect of their children, thereby making State 
intervention to protect children a necessity, does not mean that non-consensual adoption 
is always necessary or proportionate. In other words, there may be cases where parents 
are able to fulfil their duties with the help of the State (see the discussion in Chapter 5). 
When UNCRC provisions (e.g. Articles 7, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20 and 21) are read in conjunction 
with the best interests principle in UNCRC Article 3, they can be seen to emphasise that 
Member States ought to use the least restrictive measure possible to protect children from 
harm (see Chapter 2) which may include the provision of assistance from the State. 
 
It has been concluded that in cases of severe neglect and abuse where ECHR Articles 2 
and/or 3 would be engaged, that non-consensual adoption may be a proportionate 
measure (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, it has been shown that there are cases where non-
consensual adoption might not have been a proportionate measure. In some of these cases 
it can be argued that the children could have remained in the care of their parents with 
appropriate State assistance in place, or that kinship care or non-consensual adoption with 
direct contact may have been less restrictive alternatives which may have been as equally 
effective as non-consensual adoption. If such alternatives had been thoroughly explored 
but found to be unsuitable as not being in the best interests of the child, then a non-
consensual adoption would be shown to have been both necessary and proportionate. In 
other words, such an adoption would not be a violation of the human rights of children 
and their families. The following section of this chapter considers some suggestions for 
further research relating to the issue of non-consensual adoption.  
 
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
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This study has been limited by the nature of the methodology used which has been 
library-based rather than the product of empirical research conducted by the writer of this 
thesis. This study has also been adversely affected by the lack of availability of 
judgments from the lower courts in England and Wales. Access to these judgments would 
have made it possible to assess the extent to which the lower courts consider children’s 
rights and whether or not less restrictive alternatives to non-consensual adoption might 
have been available in these cases. The analysis, in this thesis, of cases from the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, the UK Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights has shown that there is a lack of consistency in 
examining alternatives to non-consensual adoption. Furthermore, by the time that some of 
these cases have reached the appeal courts, it is potentially in children’s best interests to 
remain with their adoptive parents. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Webster 
and another v. Norfolk County Council
1003
 (see Section 4.3). 
 
The limitations of this study (see above) have made it difficult to assess the true extent of 
the numbers of unnecessary non-consensual adoptions, and whether or not the claims, 
like that of John Hemming (that over 1,000 unjustified non-consensual adoptions take 
place every year) are true.
1004
 Although a small-scale case study has been undertaken by 
Luckock and Broadhurst examining the procedural approaches taken by the lower courts 
in non-consensual adoption cases,
1005
 more work needs to be undertaken to establish 
whether the concerns highlighted by high-profile figures such as John Hemming and the 
media
1006
 can be proved via a quantitative and qualitative analysis of court judgments. 
Such analysis could involve examination of the courts’ references to the ECHR, the 
UNCRC and an examination of the quality of the best interests analysis. Further research 
would be welcome, particularly in the light of concerns that the lower courts are not 
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following Court of Appeal and Supreme Court decisions which emphasise that non-
consensual adoption is to be regarded as a last resort.
1007
  
 
An important question raised in this thesis is whether or not non-consensual adoptions are 
more cost-effective than less restrictive alternatives such as kinship care or the provision 
of practical or financial State assistance. Although this thesis has not explored all of the 
possible alternatives to non-consensual adoption and compared the cost-effectiveness of 
these alternatives, it has shown that research findings thus far on the cost-effectiveness of 
non-consensual adoption appear to have been contradictory (see Section 5.6). Less 
restrictive alternatives, which are as equally effective as non-consensual adoption, may in 
some cases afford better protection to children’s and parents’ rights (including those 
under ECHR Article 8, for example). If these alternatives are less expensive, and in 
certain cases are less likely to violate children’s and parents’ rights, it is difficult to justify 
not using these alternatives. This thesis has argued that the fact that insufficient State 
resources are available to provide assistance to birth parents or kinship carers, is in part 
due to the government’s decision to redirect funding from State assistance towards the 
promotion and provision of a non-consensual adoption policy for children in care.
1008
 The 
continued existence of the government’s pro-adoption policy fails to recognise that non-
consensual adoption may not be in the best interests of all children in care and that such a 
measure may, in some cases, have the potential to violate children’s ECHR and UNCRC 
rights as well as parents’ ECHR rights (see Chapter 4).  
 
This thesis has referred to the growth in the use of concurrent planning and, in particular, 
it has emphasised the need for further scrutiny of concurrent planning to determine 
whether it is as equally effective as non-consensual adoption (see Section 5.2.3). In the 
light of the likely growth in the use of concurrent planning and the lack of independent 
research which has been undertaken to assess its effectiveness, further research needs to 
be conducted to ensure the effectiveness of concurrent planning schemes and to establish 
whether such schemes are human rights compliant under the ECHR and the UNCRC.  
7.4 A Final Word 
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This thesis has discussed Webster and others v. Norfolk County Council
1009
 in depth (see 
Chapters 1 and 4) and highlighted the injustice and potential lack of proportionality of the 
non-consensual adoption of the Websters’ three children. The analysis, in this thesis, of 
Webster and other non-consensual adoption cases heard in the courts in England and 
Wales and in the European Court of Human Rights has revealed the complexity in 
determining the circumstances in which non-consensual adoptions might or might not be 
a proportionate interference with children’s and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8 
(the right to respect for private and family life) (see Chapters 3 and 4).  
 
A conundrum which has been highlighted in this thesis is that if the State does not put 
sufficient effort into reuniting children with their parents, this might constitute a violation 
of the children’s and parents’ rights under ECHR Article 8, but if children are returned to 
an abusive family situation this might constitute a violation of children’s rights under 
ECHR Article 3 (the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment)
1010
 
or even ECHR Article 2 (the right to life) (see Chapters 3 and 5). Local authorities and 
the courts therefore have a difficult balancing act to undertake when considering how to 
protect children from significant harm, while at the same time ensuring that the rights of 
children and their parents are not violated. When a child has been severely neglected 
and/or abused by his or her parents, removal from the family home is likely to be a 
necessary measure to protect the child’s rights under ECHR Article 3 and also under 
ECHR Article 2. Thus, in such cases, where it can be shown that the parents are unwilling 
or are unable to change the behaviour(s) which have caused significant harm to a child, a 
more serious intrusion into family life such as a non-consensual adoption may be a 
necessary and proportionate measure. 
 
It has been argued in this thesis, however, that the existence of good reasons for removing 
children from the family home and for deciding that they should not be returned into the 
care of their parents, does not mean that a non-consensual adoption can necessarily be 
regarded as a proportionate measure (see Chapter 4). This thesis has argued throughout 
that, in certain cases, less restrictive measures of intervention may strike the appropriate 
balance between protecting children’s and parents’ rights on the one hand and children’s 
best interests on the other. The issues raised in this thesis necessitated untangling 
                                                          
1009
 [2009] EWCA Civ 59. 
1010
 In the Matter of J (Children) [2013] UKSC 9 at para 1 per Lady Hale.  
233 
 
complex matters and showed the impact of such a draconian measure on children, parents 
and other birth relatives. However, despite the serious injustices which have occurred in 
the context of non-consensual adoption, as highlighted by Mr and Mrs Webster’s case, 
and the need for consideration of less restrictive alternatives, adoption still has an 
important role to play so as to protect children in care from significant harm and to 
provide these children with lifelong security and stability.   
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